



# Understanding FATA: 2011

Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society  
in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Volume V

Naveed Ahmad Shinwari



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**Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP)**

**Understanding FATA:**

Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan's Federally  
Administered Tribal Areas  
Volume V

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Copies and more information available from:

**CAMP Head Office**

House 217, Street 39, F-11/3

Islamabad, Pakistan.

Tel: +92-51-222 5196-97 Fax: +92-51-222 5198

Email: [publications@camp.org.pk](mailto:publications@camp.org.pk) & [camp@camp.org.pk](mailto:camp@camp.org.pk)

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# **Understanding FATA: 2011**

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**Volume V**

Naveed Ahmad Shinwari





Dedicated to the people of FATA



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
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## List of Acronyms

1. TNSM-Tehrik e Nifaz e Shariat e Mohammadi
2. TTP-Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan
3. MMA-Muttahidda Majlis e Amal
4. FATA-Federally Administered Tribal Areas
5. IDPs-Internally Displaced Persons
6. FC-Frontier Corps
7. NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
8. FCR-Frontier Crimes Regulation
9. PA-Political Agent
10. NWFP-North West Frontier Province
11. PPP-Pakistan People's Party
12. JUI-Jamiat e Ulema a Islam
13. DDR-Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconstruction
14. FS-FATA Secretariat
15. FDA-FATA Development Authority
16. KP-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
17. NA-Not Asked




# Map of Pakistan and FATA



## LEGEND

- WANA, WAZIRISTAN, SOUTH
- THAL, HANGU, KOHAT
- FR TANK, FR LAKKI
- PARACHINAR, KURRAM
- KHYBER, LANDI KOTAL
- NORTH WAZIRISTAN, MIRANSHAH
- FR BANNU
- ORAKZAI
- MOHMAND, GHALANAI
- BAJAUR, KHAR
- FR D.I.KHAN

- Roads
- Rivers
- Stations



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## Preface

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has for many decades been marginalised, with only very limited evidence-based research being commissioned. As a result, policy makers have often been dependent on romantic, and ultimately inadequate prose produced by journalists, travellers, adventurers and historians. This has inevitably generated a massive gap in understanding, both with regard to the outside world looking into the region and the people of FATA looking out.

The 'Understanding FATA' series has endeavoured to bridge this gap in knowledge by beginning a conversation with local communities about their current concerns and aspirations for the future. Through this process of surveying attitudes, opinions can be formed without drawing on the prejudices of the many intermediaries working in FATA. The result of which, is that policymakers in Peshawar, Islamabad, Kabul, Washington and London are empowered to positively engage with the region over issues of religion, culture, politics and governance.

As CAMP has followed trends in FATA over the last five years, it is evident that social, political and economic perceptions in FATA are constantly evolving catalysed in large part by the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan. This edition continues to carefully document how internal and external forces interact with historical customs and traditions to shape contemporary attitudes towards security and development. It is unlikely that this report provides answers to all of the important questions but it does underline an important principle that is the people of FATA must be encouraged to speak for themselves.

The production of the 'Understanding FATA' series would not have been possible without the active involvement of the people of FATA. They have been extremely helpful in sharing their knowledge and insights, enabling clear analysis of the issues documented in this report. 'Understanding FATA'

has been widely quoted by academics, policy makers, writers, researchers and journalists when producing reports, books and articles, illustrating its value in encouraging debate and understanding. It can also be credited for contributing towards the pushing through by the Government of Pakistan (led by the Pakistan People's Party) of the FATA Reform regulations in August 2011.

This report would not have been possible without the dedication of the fifty enumerators who carried out the survey component. These men and women, hailing from FATA, professionally engaged with respondents to build trust and accurately document data, while often courageously visiting very remote and difficult areas. Their contribution is certainly worthy of praise and appreciation as they have enabled the 4,000 participants from FATA to be heard.

I also wish to show my appreciation for the dedication exhibited by my team at CAMP, without whom it would not have been possible to produce this report. In particular, I would like to thank my colleagues Tahir Ali (Programme Manager, Development) and Mariam Khan (Programme Manager, Advocacy) for their support; Riaz-UI-Haq (Programme Project Manager, Research) and Marjana (Project Manager, Understanding FATA) for co-ordinating field work, organising and moderating focus-group discussions and for supervising data collection; and, Rabia Jahangir Khan (Project Officer: head office) and Hamid Jan (Project Officer: regional office) for assisting me throughout the project.

My special appreciation also goes to Shahid Ali for designing this years report and to Nic Benton (Editor: London, UK) for providing the lead in copy-editing the material presented.

In addition, this body of work would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the British High Commission (Islamabad, Pakistan). Special mention is reserved for Phil Boyle (First

Secretary Political Section), Colin Hicks (Second Secretary Political Section), Haroon Khan (Project Manager Political Section) and Imran ul Hassan (Project Manager Political Section) for their constant co-operation.

All views expressed in this report are solely mine, as are any mistakes and errors.



Naveed Ahmad Shinwari  
Author and Chief Executive

Islamabad, February 2012

## Executive Summary

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is located along Pakistan's north-western Himalaya zone and south-western Suleiman Mountains. It runs as a narrow tract along the river Indus with the parallel lines almost north to south, and consists of seven semi-autonomous agencies or administrative units – Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Kurram, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan. Additionally FATA includes 'frontier regions' that adjoin the districts of Peshawar: Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. This united territory is separated from the Pakhtun tribes of Afghanistan by the Durand line: drawn in 1893 by the British colonial rulers of India.

The 3.2 million people living in FATA, according to the Pakistan census report (1998)<sup>1</sup>, are predominantly Pakhtuns, which are largely *Sunni* Muslims by faith; with *Shia* communities largely concentrated in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies. FATA is characterised by a strong tribal structure and cultural heritage, supported by rich ethnic diversity. The census report calculated the population growth rate at 2.2% and the population density estimated at 117 persons per sq. km (versus national and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPK] average of 166 and 238 respectively), varying greatly between individual agencies and frontier regions.

The administrative structure of FATA is unique. The region is primarily governed through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), 1901 and is managed by the Governor of the KPK province, based in Peshawar, who is a nominee and representative of the President of Pakistan. At the national level: FATA falls under the purview of the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) based in Islamabad.

Local administration in each agency is managed by a Political Agent (PA), who is a federal civil servant; and each sub-division (*Tehsil*) is headed by an

Assistant Political Agent. The Political Agents perform several functions at the same time – they act as an executive, judge and revenue collector. In facilitating their role they are assisted by the former-colonial *Malik* system (a local leader appointed by the government to represent their community). As *Maliks* are appointed by the PA their independence and loyalty can be questionable: with some acting in accordance with the wishes of the PA rather than the interests of the people they are supposed to be representing. Generally, the local people feel that they have been marginalised and inequitably treated. The participation of civil society is limited or non-existent.

Furthermore, prior to the signing of the FATA Reforms in August 2011 no political representation was allowed to function in the tribal areas. In the absence of a vibrant political process, there has been no platform to address grievances or to contribute to local and national affairs. The negative impact of this absence of inclusion is further compounded by a distinct lack of trust in the capacity of existing institutions to fulfil people's aspirations. This environment, aligned with poor economic development has created a broad political vacuum for militant groups to capitalise on.

The economy of FATA is shaped by a number of factors, most importantly: geography and topography; social and cultural traditions; political instability; insecurity; and, socio-economic dynamics. In general, there are few livelihood opportunities, with employment largely dependent on agricultural activities in the region's few fertile valleys. Land use data from 2003–04 shows that 7% of the total geographic area of FATA is cultivated, with another 1% recorded as fallow, while more than 82% of the land is not available for cultivation. This puts intense pressure on available farmland.

<sup>1</sup> It is acknowledged by the Survey Team that these 1998 figures are dated but they remain the latest official numbers available. The census is widely quoted and allows for some important comparisons to be possible with national statistics that would not be possible with later (unofficial) approximations. However, the findings of this survey and its predecessors are going some way to filling in the gaps in national knowledge on the region.



Only, 44% of this farmland is under irrigation, with the remaining cultivated area relying entirely on rainfall (<http://fata.gov.pk>).

With only very limited economic opportunities, most of the population is engaged in primary-level subsistence activities such as agriculture, livestock rearing or local small-scale businesses. Others are involved in trade within the tribal belt or local security; some have (e)migrated, in the hope of securing greater economic security. In particular, skilled labourers seek to migrate, with their families, to urban centres outside the tribal areas, including: Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar.

There are few reliable statistics on socio-economic indicators in FATA: those that do exist reveal significant disadvantages are held by inhabitants of the tribal areas – with government estimates recording that some 60% of the local population is living below the poverty line.<sup>2</sup> A measure exacerbated by below average levels of literacy (male literacy stands at 29.5%, while female literacy is a very troubling 3%) and primary school participation (41.3%).<sup>3</sup> Of those residents that do enjoy a positive education, significant numbers end-up deserting FATA looking for superior prospects; thus potential drivers for reform or entrepreneurship are continually removed.

Latest health indicators are unavailable but judging from the 1998 Census one doctor is available for 7,670 people in FATA, which indicates poor health conditions. Where hospitals and clinics are running, they are generally poorly staffed, under-equipped and unhygienic.

Although development plans exist and programmes have been implemented, most of them have been fragmentary and short-term solutions: often producing insensitive and corrupt consequences. According to a news report:

*'Interestingly, most corruption cases show that such projects [in FATA] are executed in such a manner*

*that the money ultimately ends up in the pockets of parliamentarians and a few 'favourite' local contractors.'*<sup>4</sup>

This ineffectual and inadequately monitored implementation of development has clearly benefited the elite, leaving little or no opportunities for the majority of the population. Women in particular have remained marginalised (largely due to the local tradition of '*purdah*'), while youth and minorities (both ethnic and religious) have little or no opportunity to express themselves or participate in the planning processes.

People's socio-economic status has also been affected by the presence of large numbers of Afghan refugees in FATA. The influx of refugees has further burdened the already overstretched resources of the region and caused disruption to cultural practices. This is likely to remain a daunting impediment to security and development in FATA, if initiatives such as the UNHCR funded 'Refugee affected and Hosting Areas Programme' (RAHA) fail to effectively implement policies that will improve livelihoods, rehabilitate local environments and enhance social cohesion within affected and host communities.

FATA has a unique strategic importance in terms of its impact on the security and stability of neighbouring Afghanistan and the associated 'War on Terror'. Pakistan and the international community are extremely concerned about how to deal with the situation inside of the FATA. The ongoing militancy in FATA seems to be contributing significantly to the sustaining of Taliban resistance against the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. Poverty, difficult terrain, an archaic system of administration, cross-border tribal and ethnic ties, *Pakhtun* traditions and the presence of *Jihadi* militants combine to create a set of overlapping challenges for the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as for the US and the international community. This volume of 'Understanding FATA' sheds some additional light

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.adb.org/documents/tars/pak/tar\\_pak33268.pdf](http://www.adb.org/documents/tars/pak/tar_pak33268.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> In comparison: national averages for literacy and primary school participation equal 45% and 77% respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Development Funds: Gilani doles out Rs. 30 million to FATA lawmakers', The Express Tribune, 21 January 2011.

on all of these issues.

To oppose the Pakistani Taliban and foreign fighters, including Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani military has conducted more than 15 offensive operations since 2002. At the beginning, most of these operations had limited success, resulting in compromises and, sometimes in spite of intense criticism, agreements. However, the recent military offensives in Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, and South Waziristan agencies seem to have achieved considerable gains for the Government of Pakistan.

In the recent past, much analysis has been conducted on the insurgency in the FATA, but most of this focus has been on the number and efficiency of these operations. The survey provides a different perspective based on sample statistics (instead of anecdotal evidence) of the landscape of militant groups, their perceived agenda and favourability in the eyes of the people of FATA.

Following improved military operations, it appears the Pakistan Army is growing in approval within FATA, resulting in increased acceptance and trust from communities. Also, successes in the Swat valley and South Waziristan have earned Pakistan reasonable credit and praises from the US and western countries. Consequently, the findings in this survey show that within FATA the people have become increasingly supportive of operations against militants, including from those that have been victims of displacement. Notwithstanding this level of satisfaction, several questions still need to be addressed in terms of the use of disproportionate levels of force by the military, access to compensation for crisis hit communities, responding to the associated humanitarian crises arising from the conflict and the issue of more than 3,000 suspect militants arrested by army.

The Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP) has been conducting surveys documenting the opinions of the people of FATA since 2007. That work comprises the 'Understanding FATA' series. The goal of this series is to map the thinking and attitudes within FATA so that policy makers and influential actors in: government, civil society, the international community, academia, media and the broader

Pakistani population will have useful, actionable information. This 2011 edition of 'Understanding FATA' is a comprehensive assessment of perceptions that complement and build on historical assessments on several key policy areas including governance, society, religion and politics. The goal of which, is to convey the aspirations and frustrations of the people of FATA so that these perceptions can directly feed into governmental initiatives.

Volumes I and IV were more descriptive, carrying greater reference material: this year's report is mainly a presentation of primary data. For further information on FATA see the previous volumes, accessible at [www.understandingfata.org](http://www.understandingfata.org) and [www.camp.org.pk](http://www.camp.org.pk)

'Understanding FATA V 2011' is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. Each chapter presents background material from multiple sources, together with supporting documentation from the experiences of CAMP; this is complemented by the findings of statistical data.

To strengthen the qualitative information incorporated in the survey: eighteen focus-group discussions were held to gather the qualitative opinions of men and women from FATA. Transcripts were recorded, analysed and utilised to write this report. Brief background and factual material used in the report came from the Understanding FATA Volume IV and desk research.

The quantitative data was collected through structured questionnaires with additional questions incorporated for this year. The objective was to sample an equal number of adult males and females to ascertain their opinion on the considered key issues of the people of FATA. Expanding on previous data recorded - the 2011 survey continues to track core appraisal areas while developing new information sources in response to changing dynamics and improving methodology.

A hierarchical sampling strategy was used to poll adult opinions across all six Frontier Regions and the seven Agencies. The first level of sampling was to select 400 villages from the accessible areas of FATA. The second level was to select a

representative sample of adult males and females from each village, as was necessary to create a robust sample with only a small margin of error (as described in the Appendix).

Since the latest census (1998) is out of date, a presumption had to be made on the current population size in FATA. It was calculated that the total population would be circa 4 million people. Therefore, in order to achieve the desired margin of error of less than 2% within a 95% confidence interval for “yes/no” type questions, 4,000 adults were interviewed. This is likely to provide an extremely robust sample because the total population will also include children; ergo the 4,000 people interviewed are more representative of adult perspectives than might otherwise have been suggested.

There are two areas of sampling bias however that must be noted. The first has to do with the inaccessibility to certain villages. This year again, 42% of the 960 villages were not secure enough for enumerators. The sample of 400 villages was drawn from the remaining 557 villages that were accessible. This introduces a bias of undetermined implications because there is no way to accurately represent the opinions of the people inhabiting these insecure areas. If one wished to be cautious in conclusions, one would have to add, “In secure areas at this time, the people of FATA believe...”

The second area of bias has to do with the starting point method used to generate quantitative samples in each village. The technique involves the selection of a starting point followed by a subsequent counting off of houses. The starting point bias comes from an important cultural fact, that the more influential families are closer to the *hujra* or mosque (or in the case of the Shia areas, the Imam Bargah) that were practical starting points for enumerators. Hence there is likely to be a bias towards more urban and affluent areas in each village. This bias also leads to the possible hypotheses that rural populations will be under-represented in the sample. In the analysis of occupations of the respondents, it can be noted that there is a greater proportion of professionals and merchants than would be expected for the

rural areas. These findings may also bias certain social and developmental priorities, such as education and empowerment. However, they should still be considered appropriate of long-term aspirations.

If a larger survey were to be conducted, samples would be obtained from across a village, taking in people of all ranks and stations. In this survey, however, the interviewers counted off in four directions (two for males and two for females) to sample a total of five males and five females in each village. This was achieved by interviewers conducting two interviews in one direction and then three in another.

FATA has been described as a mysterious borderland by historians, writers, travellers and journalists. Much of what has been written was based on misconceptions, creating further misconceptions from the students of the analytical and descriptive documentation produced. Part of the objective of this long-term study is to dispel the notion that the *Pakhtun* are a quaint and isolated people. And instead illustrate how the region is a valuable focal-point in historical and contemporary international and domestic developments.

Since the only viable means of sensitising governance and development is through the incorporation of local concerns into planning and implementation processes, the ‘Understanding FATA’ series is a sincere attempt to inform those debates that desire a greater understanding of the aspirations of FATA people, and possible opportunities for local ownership of programmes.

This survey is unlikely to provide all the answers to key issues, but it does underline an important principle: that the people of FATA if encouraged to speak for themselves, have a voice that wishes to be heard.

## KEY FINDINGS

- Direction of the country:** Compared to last year, statistics for the 2011 survey show a decline in optimism; with more than two-thirds of people in FATA feeling that Pakistan is going in the wrong direction. Moreover, levels of optimism have reduced from 38.4% in 2010 to just 12.95% in 2011. Supported by other data sets, the widespread pessimism seems to be the result of the poor governance exhibited by the ruling PPP government. Also: frustrations over the length of time being required by military counter-operations to oppose incessant Taliban resistance, price hikes, years of regional instability in Afghanistan, humanitarian crises, ineffectual response to IDP vulnerability have further reduced confidence in the government.
- Pakistan's biggest problem:** Concern about deteriorating 'law and order' in Pakistan continues: this year noted by two-thirds of FATA residents. This is followed by 'inflation' (14.4%) and 'bad governance' (14.3%). Related to law and order concerns: 'bomb blasts' continue to be a source of anxiety as identified by 8.4% of people.
- FATA's biggest problem:** Within FATA leading worries continue to include 'education and health services' plus 'employment'. In 2011 these concerns were joined by 'law and order' following a radical growth in insecurity identified by 43.1% of people. Dramatically, fears concerning 'Talibanisation' have reduced to zero from 15% in 2010. Taliban groups, or other militant groups, remain active however military successes or increased acceptance have made concern negligible.
- Essential services needed in FATA:** 'Electricity supply' (45%) tops the list of the most desired service required by FATA residents. This was followed by 'security' (44.6%), 'education/schools' (44.2%) and 'health services/hospitals' (39.9%). Despite bad governance being a recognised problem for Pakistan, improved 'governance' was a low priority (13.4%). This could mean that efforts to reform local administration is being mis-directed in the short-term, and that resources would be better spent empowering development and strengthening conflict-resolution; enabling reform of governance through integration of FATA into mainstream political structures. 'Tackling terrorism' at 28% is unexpectedly low.
- Feeling of security:** The 2011 survey shows a dramatic change in opinion – with just 43% of respondents declaring that they felt safe, an alarming decrease from 2010 levels. A change compounded by an accompanying increase in feelings of 'insecurity'.
- Suicide bombing:** The perception is that the mistrusted States of the US (43.4%), India (24.5%) and Israel (15.9%) were largely responsible for motivating suicide bombings. With, the internal Tehrek-e-Taliban only coming fourth with 13.8%. Despite the international focus of perceptions regarding motives – the local issues of 'unemployment' (22.1%), 'poverty' (17.4%) and 'intelligence failures' (16.7%) were considered the main motivator for suicide bombers in Pakistan.
- Internal displacement and governmental assistance:** Due to ongoing militancy and military operations, internal displacement is a considerable area of concern. The survey measured the percentage of population that had been victims of displacement, finding that some 18% of people had had to leave their homes. Of this percentage, almost half of these respondents showed great dissatisfaction in the Government of Pakistan's levels of assistance at the time.
- Islamic extremism:** Less than half of FATA residents (46.2%) felt that Islamic extremism was a 'threat' to Pakistan; a dramatic decrease from the two-thirds recorded in 2010. In spite of this, extremism remains an area of substantial concern that requires continued attention. The dramatic shift may be the result of increased acceptance of Taliban ideology or the result of 'war fatigue'.

- **Human rights in FATA:** The largest group of respondents in 2011 identified 'inability to provide basic amenities' as the greatest human rights concern in FATA.
- **Living in FATA:** Although there are differences according to Agency, in most parts of FATA, individuals preferred to remain in FATA. Nevertheless, one-third (34.9%) would rather leave if given the chance. Interestingly, the greatest interest in (e)migrating came from areas that were more stable.
- **Drone attacks:** US Drone attacks were considered by almost two-thirds of respondents to be 'never justified'. Only 4.3% were of the opinion that 'sometimes justified' and 1.7% that they were 'always justified'. Between January 2008 and mid-November 2011, 283 drone attacks have killed 2,550 people and left 207 injured.
- **Support for military operations in FATA:** Communities appear to continue supporting military offensives in FATA. In 2011, two-thirds of people in FATA (66.8%) supported these operations. Opposition was expressed by only 18.5%.
- **Trust in security providers:** The Pakistani military is documented as having the greatest support as acknowledged by 36.6% of the FATA population. They were followed by traditional 'tribal communities/Lakhkar' with 25.4%. In addition, some 60% desired the Pakistani military to pursue Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign fighters without the assistance of international forces – i.e. the US. However, some support was evident for international assistance in strengthening the Frontier Corps.
- **Future status of FATA:** Variations of opinion were prevalent with only 11% of respondents desiring 'no reform'. However, more than one-third of the FATA population were not able to offer an opinion. Overall, only 3.4% of people supported the establishment of a FATA Council.
- **Support for FATA Reform:** While reforms appear to be generally supported concerns remain as to the value of the changes formalised in August 2011.
- **Support for Political Parties Ordinance:** The 2010 survey mapped that the majority (59.7%) of respondents supported the extension of the Ordinance in to FATA; in comparison to just 9.6% who opposed this decision. The survey of 2011, however, documents a surprising reduction in support for the Political Parties Act to one-third; with opposition to the PPO rising to 16%.
- **Admiration for a living political leader/political party:** Interestingly, the popularity of Imran Khan - founder of Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTI) - has consistently risen from just 4.1% in 2008 to a high of 18.6% in 2011. Support for Imran Khan is likely to be due to his popularity with FATA youth and his effective use of media.
- **FATA Secretariat (FS) and FATA Development Authority (FDA):** As in previous surveys, 2011 shows that discontent continues to devalue trust in the FDA and FS. It was opined that greater involvement of local communities would improve effectiveness.
- **Taliban:** It is notable that some differing attitudes can be recorded between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban but overall two-thirds of respondents were unfavourable towards the Pakistani Taliban, compared to only one-quarter for the Afghan Taliban (the result of a 12% point drop in opinion). Nevertheless, endorsement of Afghan Taliban as Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation in Afghanistan have similarly lost legitimacy (23.55%) since 2009 (40.35%).
- **Al Qaeda:** Approximately only one-third of respondents were aware of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is often mentioned in the media and discussed at *hujra* gatherings, therefore, the discrepancy in knowledge may not be as stark as is recorded: instead fear of intelligence agencies, Taliban and Al Qaeda informers could have influenced respondents.



- **Foreign fighters:** The overwhelming majority of people in FATA desire the removal of international fighters, by force if necessary. This opinion is a continuation of attitudes expressed in 2010.
- **Afghan refugees:** In response to a question asking whether Afghan refugees should return to Afghanistan: an overwhelming 81.4% were of the opinion that they should.
- **Sources of information:** Access to information appears to be dominated by men, with women to a large extent relying on informal mechanisms. Radio appears to be the most valued form of accessing news, followed by television and newspapers. The radio stations: *Deewa* (Voice of America), BBC Pashtu and BBC Urdu remain popular radio stations. It is difficult to reconcile this attachment to these stations with the apparent negative attitudes attached to the countries that fund them (the US and the UK respectively); however, the cultural sensitivity of programmes broadcast may explain this.
- **Foreign affairs:** The findings are diverse but it is generally seen that the US and India produce considerable mistrust but there appears to be some softening of opinion to the 'West'. It also seems that general perceptions of the UK influence perceptions across all aspects of diplomacy that may affect Pakistan. Considerable support is recorded for China and Saudi Arabia. There is also support for Muslim countries (as exemplified by attitudes towards Malaysia) and a greater willingness to offer an opinion. Iran also appeared to have considerable support, but on closer examination, findings appeared to be distorted by extreme support in certain locations – a finding that showed that considerable opposition is being marginalised.

can be accessed in isolation but interweave with each other in many ways; therefore a complete study will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the perceptions and aspirations of people in FATA.

These findings provide only a glimpse of the results documented in the 2011 survey. It is important that the data introduced in this summary is contextualised by referring to the relevant sections as it is essential for a holistic and sensitive analysis. The chapters are segregated by theme so that they



# CHAPTER 1

## Socio-economic Life and Development Needs in FATA





## CHAPTER 1

## Socio-economic Life and Development Needs in FATA

Rough topography - consisting of limited arable land and arid areas - combined with scant public infrastructure - particularly poor education and health facilities - help to explain the enormous gaps between the conditions of the people of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the rest of Pakistan. In FATA 60 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line;<sup>5</sup> a consequence of the per capita income for the region being half that of the national average. This disparity is intensified by per capita development expenditure being approximately one third of that spent in other areas of Pakistan.<sup>6</sup>

This chapter discusses the economic, health, education, and physical infrastructure of FATA. With survey data defining: needs, willingness to remain in FATA and popular areas for migration in Pakistan.

### Most important services required in FATA

Questions concerning service provision and needs elicited a mixture of responses, from security and justice to health and educational services. In general, the people of FATA desire a secure environment with access to electricity, employment and local public health and educational services.

The survey results vary considerably over the period 2008-2011, as shown in figure 1.1.

In 2008, before the launch of major military operations in FATA, security was not the main

priority. Instead *justice* (73.3%), *education/schools* (64.6%) and *health/hospitals* (52.1%) were the foremost governmental services required in FATA identified by more than half of the respondents. The following year saw a change in attitudes, with 62.9% of respondents identifying security as a significant priority; a perception that persisted into 2010. It is therefore clear, that attitudes have altered over the last four years; the reason for which is the fragile and volatile security environment contained within FATA.


In 2009 *security and tackling terrorism* peaked as top priorities, as simultaneous military operations were launched in various parts of FATA and Swat, and 'Talibanisation' or militancy began spilling over from South and North Waziristan into other tribal agencies and frontier regions (FRs). While, tackling terrorism is related to security the survey team have differentiated the two, as security (as linked to conventional law and order) has long been an area of concern in FATA while terrorism is a post 9/11 phenomenon. Before 2001 tribes would defend themselves or use *Khasadars* (irregular levies) to tackle low intensity crimes. However, the *Khasadars* and well-armed local tribes were unable to oppose religion-based militancy in FATA. Consequently, in the first two years of the surveys (i.e. 2008 and 2009), *tackling terrorism* was identified as one of the main priorities by nearly half of the respondents.

However, for the subsequent surveys in 2010 and 2011, the importance of *tackling terrorism* has dropped to 26.9% and 28.0% respectively. Military

<sup>5</sup> ICG Asia Report No 125, entitled Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants – 11 December 2006 – page 9

<sup>6</sup> ICG Asia Report No 125, entitled Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants – 11 December 2006 – page 9

Figure 1.1: Which of the following are the most important services that the GoP should provide to your district?



operations appear to have gained some trust among respondents, allowing for attention to shift to other services. Similarly, events in 2011 appear to have reduced concerns regarding security for some people in FATA, however it remains a significant priority as it continues to be the most important issue identified by respondents (44.6%). For further information on security perceptions refer to Chapter 4.

*Education and health* remain main concerns for respondents; a result of their being considered essential requirements for the resolving of many of the problems faced by the people of FATA. These services have consistently remained top priorities since the first survey in 2008. In contrast, demand for justice has seen a considerable decline in its perceived importance – falling from its position as the overwhelming requirement of respondents (73.3%) in 2008 (a concern that was maintained albeit with some decline through 2009 [46.3%] and 2010 [46.5%]) to a low of 21.0% in 2011. It appears that during periods of heightened insecurity, justice drops as an immediate need.

*Employment* was included for the first time in the 2011 survey. Its inclusion has proven valuable as it is a top priority for a considerable number of


respondents (40.6%). Employment, it is considered, may help divert the attention of youths from criminal or other non-productive activities; thus, reducing the potential for militants to find recruits.

Power shortages also rank highly as a major cause for concern, with blackouts lasting up to 20 hours a day. This is partly because of a lack of power generating capability. However, failure or inability to pay electricity bills is a contributing factor. For many inhabitants of FATA, provision of electricity is considered to be fair recompense for guarding the frontier. Electricity remained a high priority in three out of the four years recorded. In 2010 the importance of electricity dropped to a low of 21.0% but has increased again to 45.0% for the 2011 survey.

### Essential services for children

Questions regarding essential services required by the people of FATA for their children were separated for male and female children in order to discover gender disparities. Overall, the responses reveal great differences in the services parents wish for their children - with demand for education and work opportunities generally favouring male children.

Figure 1.2: What do you want for your children? (Male children)



**Male children:** Throughout the lifetime of the survey process, the majority of respondents (an average of 62.8%) desire *more education* for their male children. With the second highest concern (with an average of 22.8% for four years) being *employment opportunities*. In contrast to the security concerns highlighted by adults: *more security* has consistently ranked as a low priority. *Marriage* also appears to be a low priority for parents with regard to their male children.


**Female children:** Education for female children has similarly been a consistent priority for parents, with

association of women as keepers of virtue and faith.

This discrepancy in the aspirations of parents towards their male and female children is shared with regard to employment opportunities. The role of girls in the work place is seen to be a very low priority for both fathers (2.1%) and mothers (3.2%).

Distinctions between male and female children continue with regard to perceptions of the need for *more security*. A greater number of respondents desired improved security provision for their daughters. In the honour-bound tribal psyche

Figure 1.3: What do you want for your children? (*Female children*)



on average a quarter of respondents (28.2%); however this figure is considerably lower (by approximately half) than the demand for opportunities for male children.<sup>7</sup> However, *religious education* appears to have become a significant demand for female children, with 23.3% of parents desiring this for their daughters according to the findings of the 2011 survey. This figure is more than four times that recorded for male children. This is likely to be because of the *Pakhtun* cultural (which is shared by most tribes)

security for males is not openly sought as it is considered very *un-Pakhtun* to not be able to rely on themselves. This is not the case for females, where security is interpreted differently; instead security is linked to the concept of *Purdah* or veil. Therefore, it is unsurprising that concern regarding security for female children is approximately twice that for male children.

**Parental differences:** As already indicated, there appears to be some discrepancy between the

<sup>7</sup> This difference can be attributed to the tribal nature of society, with a male becoming a source of income for their family, while females are expected to leave the family once they are married.



attitudes of mothers towards their children's development and that of fathers. In summary, mothers wish for *more education, employment opportunities and marriage*. Fathers, in contrast, appear to favour more conservative religious and cultural traditions for their daughters. These are significant differences that have implications for education provision in the community and for opportunities offered, as well as predicting the expectations of future generations.

### Findings of focus-group discussions (FGDs)

The survey attempted to document the qualitative perceptions of different male and female residents of FATA through the focus group discussions. In total, the survey organised 10 male and 8 female FGDs.<sup>8</sup> Among the participants were male elders and male youths, as well as female elders and female youths. The survey intended to explore and document the views of each segment of the society.

#### Male FGDs

In all FGDs, participants identified: security as the main service that the Government of Pakistan needed to provide to the people of FATA, along with *employment, justice, education and health*.

Youths from North Waziristan highlighted similar concerns, with the need for better security being of primary concern, followed by *justice, health and education*.

#### Female FGDs

Elder women from FATA, like their male counterparts, identified security as their top priority followed by *health and education*, and to a lesser extent the issues of *employment, justice and female empowerment*.

For young women, *education and health* were top priorities. The importance of education cannot be understated as female youths were of the opinion that the Government of Pakistan needs to make provisions on an emergency basis. Through discussion, improved *security and justice* were also considered priorities in FATA.

## Development priorities in FATA with international assistance

Various foreign countries, including the US and the UK, have expressed their interest in providing development assistance to FATA. A question about development priorities was asked first in 2010 and was repeated in the 2011 survey. Respondents were asked to state whether or not they thought international assistance was needed, and if so, to identify areas requiring development assistance from international partners.

Keeping in mind that the current humanitarian crisis in FATA is closely linked to the development and legacy of military operations, some interesting trends can be noted. For instance, education was identified by only 12.1% of respondents in the 2010 survey as an area requiring international assistance; this however jumped to 31.4% a year later. Likewise, help in improving access to *electricity* has risen from 12.2% in 2010 to more than double that figure (28.8%) in 2011. The greatest rise in perceived need for international development aid relates to health. In 2010 only 3.2% of respondents identified health provision as a main concern, but this rose to 25.2% for the 2011 survey.

One of the most striking changes in attitude towards perceptions of the value of international assistance is recorded in the desire for help in road construction. The people of FATA have traditionally remained very possessive of their culture and way of life and have historically opposed initiatives that would mean exposing themselves to outside influence. As a consequence, activities such as road construction have historically been actively opposed. Given this, it was unsurprising that only 5.4% respondents identified roads as a priority in the 2010 survey. In 2011 however, the data reveals that this attitude may have changed as almost a quarter of respondents (24.5%) desired help in improving road access in 2011. The reason behind this could be an improvement in people's trust

<sup>8</sup> For further details refer to Methodology section.

towards the government, especially Pakistan Army (see Chapter 4).


In addition, respondents identified humanitarian assistance as a development priority. Whilst this was seen as the main need in FATA during the 2010 survey, and has dropped only a couple of points in 2011 survey, other needs appear to have taken priority this year.

Perceptions regarding the need for greater security assistance have also increased between surveys. In 2010 only 8.6% of those surveyed desired international aid in providing security in FATA but this had more than doubled by the conclusion of

developing employment opportunities; a sharp rise from the approximate 10.0% documented in 2010. This increase is likely linked to the understanding that a lack of employment has contributed to militants exploiting disaffected youths. Notwithstanding this, expectations regarding international assistance for the development of livelihood options have not increased, remaining at approximately 13.0% for both 2010 and 2011.

However, there remain a significant number of people in FATA (nearly 10.0% in 2011, a rise from the 3.5% in 2010) who believe that no international assistance is required. It is notable that particular hostility is held towards the US and UK; this is likely

**Figure 1.4: Various foreign countries, including US & UK, have expressed an interest in providing development assistance for FATA. How do you think that assistance could be most valuable?**




the 2011 survey to 19.6%. This is likely to be because the Pakistani military has yet to achieve full control over the region, with many militants remaining at large, a reality which has created increased insecurity. This increase in the desire for help in improving the security situation in FATA is also likely to be a consequence of general feelings of disquiet towards security already documented.

Calls for greater international assistance is also documented with respect to *supporting employment*. The 2011 survey has found that almost 30.0% of respondents desire greater aid in

because of concerns that these countries have in fact worsened the attempts to improve law and order across Pakistan, including in FATA.

### Male FGDs

The FGD respondents were asked to share their priorities concerning international assistance. The majority of the participants agreed that international assistance is needed to assist the Government of Pakistan in providing basic amenities for the benefit of the local population of FATA. But they stressed that community

**Figure 1.5: Is there international assistance required?**

participation was essential in planning the kinds of international intervention offered so that assistance was appropriate to their needs. In particular, youths from North Waziristan desired that local peace committees should be more involved. FGD participants from Khyber and Mohmand Agencies also emphasised that capacity building support was a necessary requirement for local organisations to take a greater role in supporting initiatives.

For some participants it was opined that foreign aid should be channelled through the Pakistan Army. This is because respondents perceived government departments - including: political administrators, the FATA Secretariat (FS) and the FATA Development Authority (FDA) - to be corrupt and lack the capacity to implement large-scale programmes (see Chapter 3).

It was felt that the priorities of the international community should be focused on addressing problems regarding the fulfilment of essential services. Therefore, assistance was most desired in addressing security concerns, improving justice, education and health potential of FATA. It was also observed that assistance would be best utilised in supporting the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, hospitals and schools.

### Female FGDs


Females from Khyber and Mohmand Agency were of the view that no international assistance was needed for their local development. Instead they felt that the Government of Pakistan should be responsible for provision of all services. Female participants from Bajaur Agency were of the opposite opinion and welcomed assistance, highlighting employment opportunities for both men and women as key issues that could be prioritised.

Females from FR Peshawar and Kohat indicated that assistance was of limited value because benefits were largely confined to tribal elders, without trickling down to the population at large.

### Understanding of development priorities and project selection

The 2011 survey asked 4,000 respondents “whether they knew how development priorities were decided in FATA, and how projects were selected”. The greatest number of respondents (37.3%) was unsure, with a further 21.1% indicating that they were unable to say how these decisions were reached. Only a quarter (26.6%) of those surveyed answered yes to the question.

It should also be noted that many respondents echoed the findings of the Male FGDs, in that political administration, particularly that involving FDA and FS, was viewed negatively. It was desired

**Figure 1.6: Do you understand how development priorities are decided in FATA and projects selected?**

that FATA communities be afforded increased decision-making power because government institutions were considered to be working for their own benefit and not for the interests of FATA.

## Human Rights issues in FATA

In all of the “Understanding FATA” surveys undertaken, the issue of human rights has been a constant area of enquiry. The governance structure in FATA does not allow the Superior Judiciary of Pakistan to protect the rights of the people living in FATA under Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan, even though these rights are enshrined elsewhere in the constitution. However, it can be strongly argued that the violent situation in FATA, as a result of both internal and external influences, requires that the Central Government, which possesses the authority and responsibility for safeguarding the people of FATA, take action to protect vulnerable FATA residents. The figures outlined below show the evolution of this subject as a source of concern over the last four years.

Following the 2008 and 2009 surveys in which the greatest human rights concerns were not clearly disaggregated, the 2010 survey learnt that the main human rights issue facing the people of FATA was *the State’s inability to provide basic amenities required for life*; this concern should be understood as those basic human services required for living. This concern was identified by over a third (38.4%) of respondents. Provision of these services is the responsibility of the FATA Secretariat, as it is mandated to lead on developmental issues in general.

This anxiety was repeated in the 2011 survey, where it was again the most pressing issue raised, with more than quarter of total respondents (29.9%) highlighting it as an issue in FATA.

Concerns regarding freedom of expression have been consistently highlighted since 2008, with concern varying between 13.0% (as recorded in both 2008 and 2010) and 15.0% (2009). This figure has however, dropped for the 2011 survey, with only 7.2% of respondents identifying it as significant human rights problem. Irrespective of this fall, the continued reference to freedom of

expression indicates that people’s grievances against governance in FATA persist and there remains a desire for more participation in decision-making. Moreover, it is important to note that journalists are prohibited from enjoying free access to FATA; their movement is continuously controlled by Political Administrators and by the military. However, there is some hope for the future as 14 press clubs have recently been established by the Tribal Union of Journalists (TUJ) and encouraged by the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which may influence the potential for improved freedom of expression in the future.

It is a matter of great concern that fears regarding violence have risen among the FATA population. Violence against women was identified by 11.3% respondents in 2008 as a human rights issue. This figure rose to 18.0% in 2009 and remained high for the 2010 survey (17.4%). This figure has risen by almost 5.0% for the 2011 survey to 22.1%. Perceptions of the threat of violence to children and minorities, as well as excessive force adopted by the state, are significantly lower than those expressed with regard to violence against women, yet the 2011 survey finds that cumulatively 10% of people are worried about violence regarding these groups. Whilst increases in concerns about violence are troubling, some positives may be derived from the potential consequence that people of are becoming more aware of their personal and communal rights.


### Male FGDs

Male FGD participants shared concerns over the prevailing human rights situation in FATA. The majority of respondents identified the need for greater protection of their right ‘to life, liberty and security of person’, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It was commonly held that, at present, these basic human rights remain missing and there was a shared misgiving over the government’s ability to provide development and positive reforms.

### Female FGDs

Female respondents continued to emphasise security as their main concern, perhaps surprisingly not in regard to violence against women but instead expressing the concern that a male family member

Figure 1.7: In your opinion what is the most important human rights issue in Pakistan today?



could be endangered by militants or Pakistani military operations. Other areas of concern include: *freedom of speech and right to education*.


Anxieties were also shared over women's status in tribal society. A lack of empowerment was thought to prevent women from having a voice or decision-making potential, even at the familial level as a wife, mother, sister and/or daughter.

### Living outside of FATA

A lack of economic opportunities has compelled a major portion of the FATA population to migrate, either to other cities in Pakistan or to foreign countries (especially in the Middle East). This migration has contributed significantly to local economies, through the international remittances sent to family remaining in FATA.

Despite the implications of the security and development concerns identified by this survey, 57.5% of the respondents still want to continue living in FATA. As indicated in Figure 1.8: *lack of freedom of movement* is not a significant barrier as only 2.5% of respondents recognise this as a problem. Yet, a very significant minority (34.9%) of respondents would leave if given the opportunity.

**Figure 1.8: Would you live outside FATA, if given the option to?**



This data however, cannot be taken at face value as opinions differ widely according to agency (see Figure 1.9).

From the information presented, it is evident that the agencies/FRs, where the greatest numbers of people wish to migrate from (that is more than half of the local population wish to relocate), are areas of conflict. FR DI Khan, for example, possesses the highest number of people wishing to leave FATA with 76.3% declaring they would go if they could. The areas of FR DI Khan, Kurram, FR Peshawar and FR Kohat can all be described as locations suffering from conflict where the military has yet to establish its full control. In contrast areas considered under Pakistani military control, such as Bajaur and South Waziristan, the majority of respondents indicated a willingness to stay.

The conclusion is that FATA as an area is made up of disparate communities – each possessing varying motivations for remaining or migrating from their tribal areas. This is not unique to FATA as similar trends can be identified in other developing societies as part of rural-to-urban migration.

### If no: why would you prefer to live in FATA?

Those who did not want to leave FATA were asked subsequently why they preferred to remain. The largest group of respondents, 30.6% replied that *they like the way they live in their tribal culture and tradition*, while 28.9% preferred to *live within their own villages and communities*. A further 20.1% argued that they had been living in FATA for so long that it would be hard for them to leave the area. While there is some fluctuation in the total percentages over the last three years, the same reasons appear to be generally accepted, with respondents offering different perspectives each year rather than it being symbolic of shifting attitudes.

Figure 1.9: Would you live outside the FATA if given the opportunity? (break down by region)





Figure 1.10: If no, would you always prefer to live in FATA and why?




**Living outside of FATA by age group**

To further disaggregate the findings of the survey, responses were grouped by age. In 2011, it appears that the young and middle-aged groups seem to be more willing to leave FATA than they were in 2010 where the older generations appeared to be much more willing.

**If yes: why would you prefer to live outside of FATA?**

The 2011 survey has attempted to document the reasons motivating those who want to leave FATA if the chance arose. Almost a quarter (23.7%) of respondents believed that FATA is no longer a peaceful place to live, while some 20.0% identified the greater potential to find

Figure 1.11: Would you live outside the FATA, if given the option to? (break down by age group)






opportunities outside of FATA as their primary motivation. In addition, 5.4% pointed out that development conditions were insufficient to inspire them to live in FATA.

militancy and military operations. They said that if they had to leave FATA because of military operations they had only done so for a limited time and had returned to their homes once the situation had normalised.

**Figure 1.12: If Yes: why would you prefer to live outside?**



A similar number of survey participants stated that Taliban brutality or resulting military operations were their primary motivator. The linked use of drones appears to be significant, despite representing just 3.4%, because they are concentrated in a particular region of N. Waziristan. Therefore, this percentage is disproportionately large considering its overall influence across FATA. While the presence of the Taliban is of greater concern to residents of FATA, Al Qaeda fighters are also a concern for 1.7% respondents.

**Male FGDs**

The issue of leaving the FATA was discussed by FGD participants, with some showing a willingness to migrate to other cities of Pakistan, especially Peshawar. However, an equal number considered that no city in Pakistan was safe anymore, thus they would prefer to leave Pakistan.

**Female FGDs**


Surprisingly, no female respondents wanted to leave FATA, even after having faced the negative impacts of

**Preferred destination if leaving FATA**

Those who wanted to leave FATA were asked to identify their preferred destination. The majority of respondents preferred to remain in Pakistan, choosing to migrate to Peshawar (approximately one third (29.3%) of the respondents favoured this option in 2010), the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Peshawar is a central commercial and cultural point for the FATA people; they frequently visit Peshawar for many reasons, for example health treatment, employment, business, education, etc. Other unidentified cities in Pakistan received a similar number of endorsements (29.2%) in 2010. The close proximity of these figures may be the result of participants being allowed to make more than one choice; accordingly those who preferred Peshawar could also mention other cities.

Favoured overseas destinations are Saudi Arabia and Dubai, with the remainder of those desiring to leave FATA opting for destinations in the western world. This division of support between Pakistan and the rest of the

Figure 1.13: If yes, where would you prefer to live?



world appears to corroborate the findings from the male FGD outlined above, where equal numbers of respondents supported these options.

## Conclusion

Many development issues have been identified in this chapter, and despite the fact that they are not unique to Pakistan and FATA, the data is of importance in that it signals the areas that are in need of significant attention and will help policy makers prioritise interventions. To this end, it is clear that demands regarding security and peace remain high, while education, health, and other basic amenities are in need of development in order to meet the needs of FATA communities. For this to be achieved, to some extent, cultural attitudes towards men and women need to be addressed, with a greater emphasis on inclusion, both economically and politically being required.

Moreover, the willingness of FATA residents to seek employment opportunities outside of Pakistan is also significant in highlighting discontent, but also an opportunity to develop local economies through the influx of remittances from abroad.



# CHAPTER 2

## Constitutional Status of FATA





## CHAPTER 2

## Constitutional Status of FATA<sup>9</sup>

On 12 August 2011, President Asif Ali Zardari signed the long awaited FATA reform package, incorporating two orders that extended Pakistan's Political Parties Order of 2002 to the Tribal Areas and amended FATA's Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). These reforms are hoped to encourage greater integration of FATA into mainstream Pakistani life, as it will allow political parties to form and operate in the region for the first time. These regulations have however, met with some opposition with a significant number of local elites publicly questioning whether the reform package will bring about any significant reforms to the overall governance structure. This chapter discusses the constitutional status of FATA and tracks the last four years of survey data, in order to understand how respondents perceive the mainstreaming of FATA into Pakistan's political structures.

CAMP has been undertaking opinion polls in FATA since 2007 for its 'Understanding FATA' report and has covered the issues of: FATA's constitutional status, Political Parties Ordinance 2011, the future of FCR, political parties and their leaders and participation in the decision making process. This year the survey has added to the scope of its findings by posing new questions relating to the subject, which will help to develop an increased understanding of the topic.

### Governance in FATA

The Indian Independence Act of 3 June 1947

annulled the special treaties held between the Tribal Areas and the British Raj, allowing Pakistan to negotiate new relationships with the territory. In return for continued loyalty, the Government of Pakistan – represented by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and first Governor General of Pakistan – agreed to allow the FATA region's 200 *Maliks* to retain their rights and privileges. The recognition of FATA as a semi-autonomous region was subsequently formalised in the constitution of Pakistan; under Article 1 FATA is identified as being part of the territory that comprises Pakistan.<sup>10</sup>

In Article 246, the agencies and frontier regions that form FATA were formalised and include: Tribal Areas adjoining Peshawar district; Tribal Areas adjoining Kohat district; Tribal Areas adjoining Bannu district; Tribal Areas adjoining Lakki Marwat District; Tribal Areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district; Tribal Areas adjoining Tank District; Bajaur Agency; Orakzai Agency; Mohmand Agency; Khyber Agency; Kurram Agency; North Waziristan Agency and South Waziristan Agency.

Administration of these territories is prescribed in Article 247, which states that 'the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas'<sup>11</sup> and 'no Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs.'<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, Clause 7 of the article, bars the extension of superior courts, including Supreme Court and High Court, to FATA unless the Parliament

<sup>9</sup> The introduction of the constitutional status of and administrative structure is extracted from the volume IV of the same report. For more details please refer to Understanding FATA volume IV ([www.understandingfata.org](http://www.understandingfata.org))

<sup>10</sup> Government of Pakistan, Clause 1c: Article 1 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) <http://pakistanconstitution-law.org/article-1-the-republic-and-its-territories/>

<sup>11</sup> Government of Pakistan, Clause 1: Article 247 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) <http://pakistanconstitution-law.org/article-247-administration-of-tribal-areas/>

<sup>12</sup> Government of Pakistan, Clause 3: Article 247 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) <http://pakistanconstitution-law.org/article-247-administration-of-tribal-areas/>

so provides under law.<sup>13</sup> In spite of the liberties afforded FATA, most laws – civil, criminal, electoral and fiscal – have been incorporated into local governance structures.

FATA is represented in the Lower (National Assembly) and Upper (Senate) Houses of the Parliament by 12 and 8 independent members respectively. However, because the parliament has no jurisdiction over FATA it is not clear what influence these representatives possess, particularly since the Constitution of 1973 does not afford the people of FATA full participatory status in political processes. As a result, it can be argued that the people of FATA have effectively been marginalised from mainstream politics in Pakistan.

### The Structure of FATA Administration

To implement the constitutional provisions described above, the President and FATA Secretariat must be linked to local tribal structures. Historically, colonial structures co-opted the local leadership in order to annex tribal structures. A leading legal scholar summarises the nature of this system of governance:

*'The region has a peculiar system of administration. The people are governed through their local chieftains called Maliks, through financial compensation controlled by Federal Government and exercised by the FS official called a Political Agent.'*<sup>14</sup>

This style of government has formed the template for sustaining relations between FATA and the Government of Pakistan.

The local administration in each agency is managed by a Political Agent, who is a federal civil servant; and each sub-division (*Tehsil*) is headed by an Assistant Political Agent. The Political Agent performs several functions at the same time – they act as an executive, judge and revenue collector. They also head the Agency Council and oversee development projects.

The links between the FATA Secretariat and tribal structures is maintained through local leaders – holding the titles of *Maliki* or *Lungi*. These leaders are paid with allowances (*Mojib*) so that they remain loyal to the Political Agents that bestow this status (with the consent of the Governor-General) upon them. Should a *Maliki* or *Lungi* not be deemed to be fulfilling their purpose, Political Agents can also retain authority by withdrawing, suspending or cancelling this status.

The Political Agents, through the *Maliks*, maintain security through the use of *Khasadars*, police-like agents in tribal tradition; or *Lashkars*, a system by which tribal members are called together to form a militia to defend their community or to apprehend criminals.

### Mainstreaming FATA - Future status

In spite of the debate that has centred on the subject of FATA's status, more than one third of respondents (36.6%) questioned in the 2011 survey do not know or have an opinion on the political future of the tribal areas. This figure has risen dramatically over the lifetime of the survey process – from a low of 0.3% in 2008 – which indicates that there appears to be wide spread confusion on the issue. The reason for this is likely to be because of a lack of understanding regarding the constitutional status of FATA rather than an increase in apathy, as only 11.0% of respondents desire no reform.

Consistently, respondents have advocated for substantial change to the system of governance used in FATA. Demands have generally focused on full integration of FATA into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or its assimilation as separate province of Pakistan, enjoying equal constitutional rights and guarantees.


Support for *keeping FATA's current governing arrangements* has been gradually declining. In 2008 and 2009 approximately one in five respondents favoured this option but by 2010 this had reduced to less than one in ten. In 2011, despite a small

<sup>13</sup> Government of Pakistan, Clause 7: Article 247 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) <http://pakistanconstitution-law.org/article-247-administration-of-tribal-areas/>

<sup>14</sup> FATA: Challenges and Response by Dr. Faqir Hussain, Secretary Law & Justice Commission of Pakistan – un-published paper



Figure 2.1 – Should Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas...



increase in support, only 11.0% of respondents supported maintaining the current status quo in FATA. In 2010 an additional question was added to the survey, asking respondents if they would support a FATA Council with an elected assembly. While, this option appears to have some support from elites, just 2.9% of people in 2010 and only 3.4% supported this development.

### Reasons for supporting full integration into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)

As shown in Figure 2.1: 22.0% of respondents believed that FATA should *be fully integrated into KPK*; these 1,729 respondents were then asked why they believed this to be a positive outcome. The majority of respondents 30.7% (or 13.3% of the overall survey) believed that FATA and KPK are historically one and the same area, while 22.3% (or 9.6% of the overall survey) were of the opinion that KPK and FATA shared ethnic links to each other. Various tribes or clans live on both sides of the border between KPK and FATA - for example the Utman Khel tribe of Bajaur is also located in Lower Dir; a considerable number of the Wazir tribe are resident in Bannu; and, Mohmands have occupied most part of Shabqadar Tehsil in Charsadda.

Additionally, a quarter of the respondents who favoured uniting FATA and KPK into one province, did so because they believed that merging KPK and FATA would make either administrative sense (10.0%) or improve economic and social

opportunities (15.6%), while, 19.1% of respondents favoured closer ties with KPK because they perceive the two regions to be inexorably linked by geography.


It is important to mention that the merger of FATA with KPK is supported by the Awami National Party.

### Reasons that FATA should keep its current governing arrangements


Of the 11.0% who believed that the present political system in FATA should be maintained (see Figure 2.1), over half of the 560 respondents (or 7.2% of the total number of people surveyed) were of the opinion that this should be the case because they had *been living with this system for a long time* and that they were used to it. A quarter of respondents opined that *the system of FCR suits our culture and environment*. This opinion is surprising as FCR is a draconian system, introduced by Colonial Britain, and works to the detriment of local tribes.

Furthermore, some 15.7% believe that *the political system in the rest of Pakistan is not as good* and are therefore happy to maintain the current administration in FATA. This view appears to be particularly prominent among the older generation. This was because of concerns regarding police and judicial systems introduced in settled districts; it was feared that similar systems imposed in FATA would undermine their valued culture and traditions.

Figure 2.2 – Reasons for supporting full integration into KPK



**Figure 2.3: Reasons that FATA should keep its current governing arrangements**



### Reasons for FATA to be established as a separate province of Pakistan

This option was supported by the greatest number of respondents, (26.7%), participating in the 2011 survey. Calls for FATA to evolve into a separate

province have consistently increased over the last four years, after an initial decline from a high of 34.3% in 2007 to 19.8% in 2008.

Of the participants that wanted FATA to be established as a separate province, over half (887 respondents) were moved to this decision because they wanted greater control of their resources; an eventuality that could not be achieved through union with KPK and its more powerful elites (a concern of a further 185 respondents).

Accession of provincial status was also favoured by a significant 28.2% (or some 10.0% of the total number of people surveyed) because they believed it would allow *FATA to be mainstreamed into Pakistan while preserving local cultures and traditions*. Again, it is evident that inhabitants of FATA are very possessive of their culture, and wish to safeguard it from external influence.

### Reasons for establishment of a FATA Council

As illustrated by Figure 2.1: only a very small percentage of FATA respondents (3.4%) believed in the establishment of a FATA Council - with elected members, and with the President of Pakistan retaining constitutional powers under Article 247.

**Figure 2.4: Reasons for FATA to be established as a separate province of Pakistan**





Figure 2.5: Reasons for establishment of a FATA Council Pakistan



Of the 220 respondents that preferred this development, the majority of respondents (some 43.8% representing 2.4% of the overall survey) believed that the establishment of a FATA Council would help to prepare the leadership, as well as the local population, for future political changes; namely, the full mainstreaming of FATA into the rest of Pakistan. This notion of facilitating a gradual change was shared by a further 61 respondents (comprising 28.4%) who felt that a FATA Council would empower a steady transition from an old system to a new one.

A further minority opined that dealing with one decision maker, i.e. the President of Pakistan, was easier than dealing with the whole parliament – a potential cause of numerous delays and confusions.

### Male FGDs

All male respondents from the FGDs were invited to share their opinions relating to the constitutional status of FATA. The most commonly identified theory was that FATA should be established as a separate province, rather than merged with KPK. However, respondents from Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies unanimously agreed that joining KPK was preferential. This is likely to be because of close ethnicities with communities in KPK.

Male respondents from North Waziristan Agency suggested that a FATA Advisory Council be

established, prior to the formation of agency level Advisory Councils. They were particularly supportive of curtailing the powers of the Political Agent.

### Female FGDs

The majority of female respondents were unhappy with the present political system in place in FATA and therefore desired change. There was a commonly shared view that they were unsure how best to achieve this; however, some preferred the establishment of FATA as a separate province.


### Support for the Government of Pakistan on FCR reform

While reforms appear to be generally supported, concerns remain as to the value of the changes initially proposed by presidential decree in August 2009 and subsequently formalised in August 2011.

In 2010, some 43.0% of the respondents were supportive, at least in part; with 17.1% in *full support* and 26.7% *partly supporting* the notion. However, significant minorities of 15.6% (*fully*) and 6.9% (*partly*) opposed the idea. Approximately one third of respondents were undecided or unable to answer.

In 2011, similar numbers of people have remained supportive, but with a notable increase in those

Figure 2.6: What do you think of the Government of Pakistan’s current proposals for reform of the FCR?



that are fully supportive (an attitude shared by a quarter of respondents, an increase of over 7.0%), while opposition has significantly reduced; less than 4.0% of people expressed open opposition.

### The future of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)


As indicated by Figure 2.7: continued support for the FCR is held by only a very small minority of survey respondents. In 2010, only 3.4% of people would choose to *retain it in its present form*. In 2011, this figure, while enjoying some more support, remains at only 4.9%. In contrast, a sizeable majority desire significant change. It is notable however, that between the 2010 and 2011 surveys, there has been a dramatic reduction in

those calling for its abolition. In 2010, 45.4% wanted the FCR to be abolished; this figure has reduced to 30.0% (still a very significant number as it equals nearly a third of all respondents) in 2011. Calls for fundamental reform have remained steady with approximately 25.0% of people calling for this in both 2010 and 2011.

Partial reform of the FCR remains a largely unsupported option with just 8.4% of people offering this response. Again, a sizeable number of respondents, 16.3%, again did not know the answer or were undecided.

It appears that confusion has increased with regard to administration in FATA as over a quarter of respondents were unable to answer. However, the

Figure 2.7: What do you think of FCR?



data positively shows that there is an overwhelming desire for change even though the exact nature of the change is not as clear. It is therefore necessary that, there should be a vote on this issue and launch of public education programmes explaining the options needed to be introduced.


### What aspects of the FCR are in most need of change?

Following the findings of the 2010 survey an additional question was asked in 2011 to illicit those aspects of the FCR that respondents felt were in most need of change. The data shows that more

Additionally, 18.1% of survey participants desired the removal of the collective responsibility/arrest clause. Amendments to the FCR, introduced in 2011, have gone some way to facilitating this end, with women, children and elderly (age 65 and above) being granted exemption but considerable expectations remain on FATA males. 13.5% desired that the people of FATA be given the right to appeal against the decisions of the Political Agent. Subsequent to the conclusion of the research for this survey the FCR (Amended) 2011 has addressed this issue.

Among respondents (11.3%), there also appears to

**Figure 2.8: What aspects are most important to change in the FCR?**



than one third of respondents (35.4%) are undecided or did not know. Of those who did answer, the most supported view (held by 20.6% of respondents) was that the powers of the Political Agent should be considerably curtailed.

be a greater desire for the implementation of fundamental rights - an issue which has not been addressed by the FCR (Amended) 2011. The people of FATA are supposed to possess all fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan: however, there is no mechanism for safeguarding

residents of FATA from abuses. This is illustrated by the exclusion of the superior judiciary from ruling on issues in FATA.

Collective Arrest and Territorial Responsibility clauses of the FCR are very much intertwined. Law and order in a territory is the responsibility of the local tribe or clan but in extraordinary situations the territorial Political Administration can enforce these clauses. Approximately one in ten of respondents desired that these clauses be completely removed; however, it should be noted that if this were to be facilitated no other mechanism exists by which security can be provided to local communities against forms of internal or external aggression. These clauses remain part of FCR (Amended).

### What aspects are most important to retain in the FCR

Respondents were asked “what aspects are most important to retain in the FCR”? The most desired aspect of the FCR is the *Jirga* system, a mechanism supported by a quarter of respondents. The

*Pakhtun* tribes perceive *Jirga* to be the most efficient mechanism for justice dispensation in FATA. Furthermore, 13.5% respondents opined that the *Maliks*/tribes should remain responsible for managing law and order in their area.


Interestingly, 19.4% of the respondents thought that FATA people should be given the right to practice their customs and traditions without any external interference. This is surprising as only five per cent of respondents oppose reforms to FCR (see Figure 2.7).

Retaining any or all of these elements under FCR would require some changes to improve implementation; for instance, it is evident from the findings documented in Chapter 1 that *Maliks*/tribes have failed to address security concerns in FATA. The justice system represented by *Jirga* also raises several concerns, including the representation of women and minorities, the safeguarding of human rights, capacity to deal with complex cases of a civil and criminal nature.

### Male FGDs

In all male FGDs the majority of participants

Figure 2.9: What aspects are most important to amend in the FCR?



<sup>15</sup> FCR (Amended) 2011 had yet to be signed when CAMP facilitated the FGDs for the 2011 report

supported the reforms to the FCR announced on 14 August 2009,<sup>15</sup> although there was little knowledge of precisely what reforms were being proposed.

### Female FGDs


In all female FGDs, the overwhelming majority were unsure what aspects of the FCR needed reform. A lack of female empowerment may explain this uncertainty, with any information on the reforms largely derived from male members of their families, who, as shown by the previous data may have been similarly unaware.

## Extending the Political Parties Ordinance (PPO) to FATA

The 2011 survey attempted to gauge the level of agreement with the (then-current) proposal to extend the Political Parties Act 2002 to FATA. As previously noted, the survey was conducted prior to 12 August 2011.

As seen in Figure 2.10: the 2010 survey identified that the majority (59.7%) of respondents agreed that the Ordinance should be extended to FATA; while only 9.6% of respondents opposed this decision. The survey of 2011, however, has seen a surprising reduction in those supporting the Political Parties Act. Despite retaining significant backing (with one-third [34.9%] continuing to support the Act) the figure has dropped by almost 25.0%. This reduction is compounded by the growth in opposition to the PPO rising to 16.0%.

**Figure 2.10: Extending the Political Parties Ordinance (PPO) to FATA**



It can therefore be surmised that following the announcement in 2009, delays in implementation have had a detrimental impact on perceptions resulting in a loss of confidence in the government.

It is important to mention that, prior to the implementation of the Political Parties Act 2011, representatives from FATA in the parliamentary houses had been independent and without party affiliation. Following the acceptance of the PPO, party affiliation may help the electorate of FATA command greater influence in forming party agendas for change and development.

### Male FGDs

Male respondents from all FGDs, with the exception of those from Orakzai Agency, supported the extension of the PPO to FATA. It was felt that this reform would empower communities to become increasingly aware of their political rights and become more engaged in decision-making processes.

Respondents from Orakzai Agency remained cautious, as they feared that the PPO could result in increased conflict, by making reference to the politically motivated violence that has been experienced in other areas of Pakistan, especially during elections.

### Female FGDS

Almost all the female respondents were unsure of the benefits of PPO represented. But they were aware that activists from Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Muslim League were present in FATA.


## Admiration for a living national politician

Since PPO has been extended to FATA, all political parties appear to be interested in establishing a presence in FATA. In order to gauge the interest and awareness of political life in Pakistan, respondents have been asked to identify the politician whom they most admired.

For the survey years that this question has been asked, the most dramatic finding has been that the majority, (56.7% in 2008; 51.1% in 2009; 54.0% in 2010; 54.7% in 2011), either did not know a



**Figure 2.11: Admiration for a living national politician (Selected)**



national politician, considered none to be admirable or failed to respond to the question. As shown in Figure 2.11: there is clearly a great deal of work to be done before FATA can fully integrate into the political mainstream. The Figure carries a great number of politicians however the following analysis will focus on the most prominent leaders. From the surveys it appears that a dramatic shift has been recorded in respondents' perceptions.

Interestingly, the popularity of Imran Khan - founder of Tehrek-e-Insaf (PTI) - has consistently risen from just 4.1% in 2008 to a high of 18.6% in 2011. Support for Imran Khan is likely to be due to his popularity with FATA youth and his effective use of media.

Conversely, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) – PML (N), who was the most admired politician in 2008 (10.3% of respondents supporting his reputation) and 2009 (with 14.9%) saw his standing decline substantially in 2010 (to a low of 3.9%). In 2011, Nawaz Sharif's reputation has improved but remains low at 6.7%. Concerns appear to have been raised that he is not able to affect unpopular government decisions.

Asif Ali Zardari, President of Pakistan and Co-chair of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) has seen similar drops in his popularity following strong initial support in 2008 (9.9%) and 2009 (8.4%). In 2011, support for Asif Ali Zardari remained largely unchanged from his 2010 low (4.4%) at 4.5%, less than half that of his initial rating.

Respondents' admiration for Asfandiyar Wali Khan, head of the Awami National Party, who led the coalition government in KPK, has undergone consistent decline. He was the third most admired politician in 2008 (4.9%) but his following dropped to just 1.6% in 2009 and then 1.4% in 2010. Asfandiyar Wali Khan's reputation in 2011 has reached a new low of just 1.2%. This negative perception is in keeping with a general decline in trust towards ANP. Despite having a historical presence in FATA, ANP is overwhelmingly perceived to be corrupt in its management of KPK.

While support for political party leaders, with the exception of Imran Khan, is waning, religious

leaders have enjoyed gradual improvements in popularity, however, it could be argued that they remain peripheral figures in the eyes of respondents. Fazal ur Rehman, for example, received just 1.6% of respondents' support in 2008 but this increased 3.1% in 2009 and 2010 before rising slightly in 2011 to 3.6%. This growth in popularity is mirrored by Qazi Hussain Ahmad, former Amir of Jumaat-e-Islami (JI), whose rating has risen from 1.8% (2008) to 2.0% in 2011.

As initially stated, the answers (*none, do not know, and no response*) continually represent the majority. This suggests that Pakistani politicians have not endeared themselves to the FATA population and that political parties need to undertake extensive activities to engage with local communities.

### Male FGDs

Responses from the FGDs support the survey data presented in Figure 2.11. Participants overwhelmingly supported Imran Khan, with almost 80.0% of respondents identifying him as the contemporary political figure in Pakistan that they most admired. He is followed by Asif Ali Zardari then Nawaz Shahrif and lastly by Asfandiyar Wali Khan.

### Female FGDs

Though female respondents were not as confident in identifying a living politician whom they admired, most respected the late Benazir Bhutto. Of those contemporary politicians that were identified: Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Shahrif, Yousaf Raza Gillani and Asfandiyar Wali Khan featured most prominently. Imran Khan was not mentioned by any female respondent, except in South Waziristan where respondents provided unanimous support.

## Favourite political party for the next general elections


As noted, Imran Khan has the greatest support within FATA, the survey sought to understand whether this was mirrored with respect to political party preference.

Respondents were asked who they would vote for in the next general-elections. The data shows that

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan's party, remains the popular choice, receiving approval from 20.6% of respondents. The PPP came second with 8.2%. It is quite surprising to see how low support appears to be for PPP at this time, as they have generally supported some positive changes in FATA during their periods in office. FATA during their

periods in office. During President Farooq Laghari's caretaker government in 1996, the Adult Franchise Ordinance was extended to FATA, allowing for residents to vote in the 1997 elections. Furthermore, FCR (Amended) 2011 and the extension of the PPO have been established during their latest rule.

Figure 2.12: Favourite political party for the next general elections



PPP's limited endorsement is likely to be because of perceived limitations concerning issues such as governance, energy management, inflation, drone attacks. However, it should be noted that party approval is higher than that for its leader (see Figure 2.11). Equally, PTI's stance on improving governance and addressing corruption appear to have increased party approval.

PML (N) has a similar following as the PPP with 7.2% of respondents declaring their support for future elections. This figure is roughly equal to attitudes expressed towards PML (N) leader Nawaz Sharif. Attitudes towards ANP remain very low, enjoying just 2.5% of respondent votes; however, it should be noted that this figure is approximately double the level of support directed towards Asfandyar Wali Khan.

As was the case when clarifying perceptions towards political figures, more than one third of respondents did not select a party. This again reflects the need for improved political interaction in FATA and increased education at the grassroots level.

### Male FGDs

There was less clarity as to the level of support for political parties, but the FGDs highlighted that the problem of political indecision is unlikely to be because of apathy, as strong opinions were evident and has elicited strong debate.

### Female FGDs

Female participants were not aware of the PTI as a political party but stated support for the 'party' of Imran Khan if given a choice.

## Participation in the decision-making process

The people of FATA have largely been excluded from decision-making processes. The FCR administrative system established by British colonial rule in 1901 was reaffirmed by a fledgling Pakistan in 1947. The marginalisation of the FATA people continues to be a problem, in spite the fact that local people desire greater involvement.

Since 2008, CAMP has sought to document

respondents' opinions on various political and developmental decision-making processes. The results are shown in the figure of responses to the question: *what would you be willing to participate in?*

Effective development needs to be inclusive both to support the needs of the receiving community and to ensure that it is sensitive to the local context. It is encouraging therefore, that in 2010 one third (32.8%) of the respondents desired inclusion in this decision-making activity; while the 2011 figure is lower it remains significant – with a quarter of respondents (25.8%) calling for inclusion. This decline is likely to be due to other issues gaining greater significance rather than development decision-making losing importance, especially as *citizen forums to discuss local issues* have maintained their value.

For instance, the desire to influence the *activities of political parties* has risen dramatically from its 2010 low of 4.5% to 11.7% in 2011. This may be a direct result of debate surrounding the PPO.

Another interesting trend, that should be noted, is that the number of respondents desiring greater participation in the *monitoring of government service delivery* has fallen steadily since 2008. In 2008, over 20.0% of those questioned called for increased involvement in this area but by 2011 this figure had dropped to 3.2%. The implementation of a monitoring system for government projects would be challenging to achieve, keeping in mind the ongoing struggle with militancy in most parts of FATA, however this decline is likely linked to perceived disenchantment with government efforts to support such a process.


### Male FGDs

All participants complained that the Government excluded FATA communities from decision-making processes and demanded reforms that would empower involvement as a matter of urgency; however, the extension of the PPO was welcomed as a start.

### Female FGDs

Most of the female participants were unsure of their rights and believed that male family members

Figure 2.13: What would you be willing to participate in?



dictate decision-making. However, they, like their male counter-parts were of the opinion that the extension of the PPO to FATA was positive.

## Conclusion

The survey data for 2011 again documents the great desire for change possessed by large sections of FATA society, from the long-established Administrative model (Executive non-representative) and the regulatory system (FCR) to a new system - not as yet defined - that champions the level of governance enjoyed by other Pakistanis.

Furthermore, it is apparent that in combination with political reforms, a programme of political education is required in order to improve debate surrounding political leaders and the parties they represent. Accordingly, well-defined options must be presented to the people so that they can emerge from being an 'administered people' to one capable of fully interacting in the political process.

Respondents also showed their support for the PPO and exhibited a desire for increased decision-making powers to be bestowed on FATA. However, significant numbers also showed distinct frustration and disappointment with governmental failures to address concerns regarding empowerment.

# CHAPTER 3

## Assessment of Governance and Development Agencies







## CHAPTER 3

## Assessment of Governance and Development Agencies

There are several institutions that manage governance and development issues in FATA. The 2011 survey has sought to document perceptions in FATA of the performance of these organisations and the extent to which communities interact with leadership mechanisms.

Information has been collected on a range of departments, including: the Political Administration, FATA Secretariat and FATA Development Authority. This data provides a basis for understanding effectiveness and offers insights into how these bodies can improve their performance to better meet the needs of the people they are serving.


### Assessment of the performance of Political Administration

As mentioned in previous chapters, a Political Agent leads the Political Administration in each tribal agency; this senior civil servant operates as an agent of the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In addition to heading administration, they also manage their agency's judiciary, revenue collection and development agencies.<sup>16</sup> There is considerable opposition in FATA to this centralisation of authority, as it is strongly believed that bestowing so much power on one person has increased insecurity among the population. In order to investigate this assertion further respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of their local Political Administration.

The data derived from the 2011 survey appears to be encouraging for local administrations, as 37.8%

of respondents were of the opinion that performance was satisfactory; a further 9.7% described performance as good. This indicates that almost half (47.5%) of the respondents interviewed perceived their administration in a positive light. However, a significant minority opposed this view, as one third (34.3%) of respondents described their administration as poor (13.8%) or very poor (20.5%). Approximately one in five (18.2%) of respondents were undecided.

Figure 3.1: Assessment on the performance of Political Administration



Overall, the data shows that respondents were generally satisfied but urgent steps are still required to improve performance. The 'War on Terror' has seen a considerable amount of financial aid provided to Pakistan in order to improve its authority in FATA, and this appears to have been successful to some extent with regard to the performance of Political Administration but is less compelling in other data sets.

<sup>16</sup> Political Agents, between 2004 and 2007, were also responsible for leading the Agency Council.

Donors, especially the United States of America (US), Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and Switzerland have assisted political administration through the provision of development grants: aimed at restoring government influence in remote areas of FATA. The Office of Transition Initiatives, part of USAID, has implemented around 1,300 quick impact projects across FATA in collaboration with Political Administration. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a German development agency, has similarly implemented FATA Livelihood Programmes in Khyber and FR Peshawar. These combined with other internationally supported initiatives may explain some of the changes in perception towards the Political Administration.

### Male FGDs

The overwhelming majority of participants offered negative views on the performance of Political Administration. They believed that Political Administration is skewed in favour of elites, especially *Maliks*, and have never championed the interests of the people living in FATA. It was argued that Political Administration was unable to resolve the simplest of issues of local communities. Participants also negatively referred to the ongoing law and order situation in FATA, stating that Political Administrations were failing and that the Pakistani military should intervene.

### Female FGDs

The views offered by female participants were similar to those expressed in the male FGDs,

however, they were less confident in their analysis, as their knowledge of the Political Administration system appeared to be generally derived from others.


### How has the performance of the Political Administration changed over the past 12 months?

To better understand attitudes towards Political Administration, respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of their political administration over the past 12 months. Interestingly, the data appears to support the positive attitudes highlighted in Figure 3.1. If the data for those that answered *improved a lot* (8.0%) and *improved a little* (32.8%) are combined it appears that a considerable number of people (40.8%) have noticed a positive change. This clearly shows that Political Administration is gaining support. It is also encouraging that this figure is almost twice that for those that considered performance to have worsened to some degree (21.3%).

However, this indication of growing support for Political Administration in FATA does need to be tempered, as over half of the respondents have not noticed improvements if the number of respondents who believe no change has occurred (31.1%) with those that hold a negative perception.

It is not possible to compare attitudes towards Political Administration over previous years, as this is the first survey to conduct quantitative research on the subject. It is therefore difficult to evaluate

Figure 3.2: How has the performance of the Political Administration changed over the past 12 months?



the accuracy of these data.


### Male FGDs

Male participants were very explicit in their views: they opined that over the course of the last couple of years some development had taken place in certain areas but were unable to define what had been done. This has changed attitudes a little in favour of Political Administration; however, as shown above this change has been insufficient to improve overall perception, with participants demanding greater developments.

### What could the Political Administration do to improve their performance?

This question sought to highlight areas of concern held by respondents that local political administration could address in order to improve performance and consequently support. Unsurprisingly, given the findings outlined in Chapter 1 of this survey, the response that received the greatest support was concerned with security. 32.8% of respondents believed that Political Administration should concentrate on *improving the law and order situation* in their area.

**Figure 3.3: What could Political Administration do to improve their performance?**



### Female FGDs

Female participants were generally unaware of improvements in political administration, a consequence of gaps in knowledge rather than an opinion of things *staying the same*. Some however, especially those from Khyber Agency, declared that the performance of the Political Administration in their locality had improved because of developments in improving road infrastructure.

An equally large number of respondents (30.7%) wanted their political administration to concentrate on *improving living conditions*. It is not entirely evident what respondents would require from Political Administration but some examples may be discerned from the answers provided by participants of the FGDs documented below. 10.0% of respondents identified employment, and a comparable number called for *improvements to*

*justice dispensation systems.* A further 6.1% desired *improvements in education and health conditions.*

Only 2.2% of respondents required that their political administration *ensure community participation in decision-making processes.* This is surprising as inclusion and empowerment have been common desires throughout the survey (see Chapter 1 and Figure 2.13). It is clear that local participation is weak in influencing political and development administrations and is likely to remain so in the near future, but this is a necessary reform to improve governance and the sensitive implementation of development activities. *Improving human rights* received an equal number of responses, however changes to this situation may be expedited by greater inclusion and improvements in the other conditions identified.

### Male FGDs

Different views were expressed on this subject but general consensus focused on the issues of education and health; also tackling the issue of corruption was seen as essential in improving the image of Political Administration.

Representatives from Bajaur Agency added that confidence in political administration could be restored only after compensation had been provided to the victims of military offences. Furthermore, it was opined that the hereditary *Maliki* system be abolished and replaced with a system that allowed for equal opportunities to be provided to all.

Participants from Khyber Agency were of the view that the political administrations should allocate funds for developmental works only after the local community had been consulted.

In Mohmand Agency, it was believed that their Political Administration needed to improve in providing basic services, a role that had so far had to be filled by non-governmental organisations.

### Female FGDs

Areas of concern identified included building local

infrastructure (i.e. roads, schools and hospitals) which would help to improve living conditions, and should therefore be the priority of political administrations.

## The FATA Secretariat (FS)<sup>17</sup>

The FATA Secretariat (FS) is a government institution working on development programmes in the FATA region. The FS was established in 2002, first under the Planning and Development Department of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government, and then, in 2006, established as an independent secretariat.

The FS has administrative authority for health, education, livelihood, security, communication/roads, infrastructure and the general well-being of the people of FATA. However, it is yet to be properly recognised by Presidential Ordinance, as required by the Constitution of Pakistan.

FS, in a very short number of years, has had to contest with stigmatised perceptions of neglect formed from the successive marginalisation of FATA by governments in Pakistan. FATA is one of the most under-developed regions of Pakistan. However, as a consequence of the 'War on Terror' the Government of Pakistan has dramatically increased its involvement in FATA's development.

In the 2003-04 fiscal year, the Government of Pakistan, through the FATA Secretariat, allocated PKR 3,256 million to encourage development in FATA. This allocation of funds was more than doubled by the 2008-09 budget when it was increased to PKR 8,662 million - an annual increase of 266%. For the fiscal year 2010-11, this figure has again increased to PKR 15,000 million. The international community, especially the US and UK, Germany and the German Development Bank; along with the international organisations of the United Nations and World Bank, have invested heavily in FATA development, and provided some additional humanitarian assistance to refugee camps.

<sup>17</sup> This information is extracted from Understanding FATA – Volume IV. For more detail please visit ([www.understandingfata.org](http://www.understandingfata.org))

However, the capacity of FS to effectively coordinate implementation of large-scale development projects is yet to be seen, and impartial oversight may be difficult to institute because of the present security situation in FATA. This is essential, both in terms of ensuring quality and context sensitivity, but also in the policing of corruption – for example, the diversion of state and donor resources by government agents and *Maliks*.

The survey results presented below show the recorded perceptions of these administrative structures in FATA.

### Performance of the FS


The most remarkable finding is that two-thirds (66.6%) of respondents were unable to provide an opinion on the performance of the FS; a figure that is twice that documented in 2010. Given the resources at the disposal of the FS and its direct links to locals and their traditional leadership structures, it is essential that questions be asked as to why this is the case.

It is clear that the FS needs to improve its communication with communities in order to better promote its activities and to ensure projects' relevancy. This management of projects could be immediately improved with the adoption of policies that encourage widespread use of participatory planning – to encourage improved implementation and facilitate effective monitoring and evaluation of development efforts.

### Male FGDs

Majority of participants were aware of the existence of FS: however, they were unable to properly evaluate its performance. In response to questions regarding FS performance, most perceived it negatively. This in part, was because focus group members were of the opinion that FS was not treating them fairly; for example, a complaint was raised against FS because participants had been barred from entering its building. It was also noted that FATA citizens were not properly represented at the policy level.

Figure 3.4: Performance of the FATA Secretariat



It is also troubling that the number of people that viewed the FS in a positive light has reduced from 22.6% in 2010 (3.1% perceiving its performance to be *excellent* and 19.5% as *good*) to only 14.8% in 2011 (3.7% as *excellent* and 11.1% as *good*). This is a reduction of approximately one-third.

### Female FGDs

There was only limited knowledge of FS. But concern was raised that the body was likely to be biased towards elites. Female participants asserted that the FS needed to be more actively involved in providing clean water, education, health care, roads

and women-centred vocational training.

### In what way has FS performed well?

To elicit opinions on FS performance respondents were asked a multiple-choice question and Figure 3.5 documents the answers provided by participants. Predictably, the most common response, expressed by 42.4% was an inability to answer. This is likely to be a direct result of survey participants not being able to provide a universal opinion on FS.

Of those that were able to identify a particular FS value: 10.0% of respondents shared the opinion that FS staff were co-operative with FATA

well in including FATA people in the planning processes. This figure may be the result of localised involvement by participants in projects rather than an institutionalised practise. Nonetheless, this data should not distract from the compelling calls for greater inclusion documented before.


### In what way has FS performed badly?

In comparison, respondents were also asked what aspects of FS could be improved.

Again we see close to half the number of the respondents not being able to share their opinion.

Interestingly, there are no dramatic differences between positive and negative attitudes, but it is


Figure 3.5: In what way has FATA Secretariat performed well?



communities, while 6.8% declared that FS had been successful in implementing projects in FATA. A further 2.8% believed that projects implemented by FS have a long-term impact on the region. 3.4% of respondents were of the opinion that FS had used grants sensibly.

Arguably, an unexpected finding is that over 6.0% of participants believed that the FS had performed

worth noting that concern relating to inclusion is in excess of 10.0%, with 5.6% of people indicating that *FS does not involve FATA people in the planning process* and 5.9% declaring *FS does not involve FATA people in the management of projects*. A further indication that local empowerment regarding development programmes should be prioritised in the future.

**Figure 3.6: In what way has FATA Secretariat performed badly?**

### FATA Development Authority (FDA)

The FATA Development Authority (FDA) was established as a specialised development organisation in 2006 through a Presidential Ordinance. Its objective was to promote a more innovative, fast moving and participatory approach to development and replace the conventional straight-jacketed system that the FS is perceived to use.

Accordingly, the goals of the FDA – as enshrined in its Statutory Regulations – are to plan, execute and administer sustainable development projects in: minerals, industries, skills development, small dams, township development and tourism. The aim was to harness abundant human and natural resources in FATA to create increased economic and employment opportunities for tribal area communities.

However, as will be shown from the survey data, like the FS, not many people in FATA are aware of the existence of the FDA.

### Performance of the FDA

Data reveals that opinions directed towards the FDA are similar to those documented on the FS (see Figure 3.4). An overwhelming majority of respondents (70.5%) were unable to provide an opinion on performance; a doubling of 2010 figure of 35.8%.

Again it is clear that greater overtures need to be undertaken by the FDA to communicate with local communities to improve awareness and increase local ownership of activities. Confusion in distinguishing the responsibilities between FS and FDA may contribute to a loss in confidence in offering an opinion. Furthermore, apparent local emphasis on the role of the Political Administration may also have contributed to this emphasis (see

Figure 3.7: Performance of the FATA Development Authority (FDA)





Figure 3.3).

**In what way has FDA performed well?**

To elicit opinions on FDA performance respondents were asked a multiple-choice question and Figure 3.8 documents a sample of the answers provided. Predictably, the most common response, expressed by 40.7% was an inability to answer.

9.8% opined that the staff of FDA were co-operative - a similar number to that of FS staff. A greater number of respondents supported FDA's usage of development grants, in comparison to the FS - 8.7% versus 3.4%. A further 8.0% considered FDA projects to be implemented successfully in FATA. This is a slight increase on the same perception associated with the FS.

Figure 3.8: In what way has FATA Development Authority (FDA) performed well?





With regard to positive perceptions of FDA supporting local community participation and involvement, 5.6% of respondents believed this to be the case. This figure almost exactly fits those opinions expressed favourably towards the FS.

It is evident that, despite FDA being created as specialised department to implement innovative, participatory projects, it has failed to substantially improve on the development initiatives undertaken by the FS.

**In what way has FDA performed badly?**

In comparison, respondents were also asked what aspects of FDA could be improved

Again, close to half of the respondents (45.0%) were unable to offer an opinion. Interestingly, all of the choices, with the exception of attitudes towards the long-term impact of a project, were lower than those expressed towards the FS. In particular, less than eight per cent of respondents identified

barriers to inclusion; this result means that approximately 150 participants were not as negative towards the FDA as they were to the FS.

**Closest interaction with leadership**

Over the lifetime of the survey process, respondents have been invited to respond to a multiple-choice question on their interaction with different leadership figures. As shown in Figure 3.10: two important trends can be charted: 1) A decline in regular contact with the Political Agent, and 2) A reduction in contact with *Mullahs*. The first finding is probably linked to weaknesses in the Political Administration outlined above. The second finding reflects a decline in prestige held by local religious leaders as a source of advice and guidance.

The events of the last few years have undoubtedly influenced attitudes held by local people towards their leaders, with the reputation of *Mullahs* has suffered because of their weak response to terrorist

**Figure 3.9: In what way has FATA Development Authority (FDA) performed badly?**





Figure 3.10: Closest interaction with leadership



attacks perpetrated by the TTP and *Al Qaeda*. However, the slight recovery in 2011 interaction with *Mullahs* may indicate that people may again seek their support if other institutions are not able to meet the aspirations of the FATA people.

*Tribal elders* appear to be a strong source of leadership for a quarter of respondents (26.6%); a figure that almost doubles data recorded in 2010. This growth in support may indicate that respondents are increasingly turning towards traditional leadership mechanisms; that is, seeking guidance from existing administrative and tribal structures to resolve local issues and restore communal harmony. Interaction with *teachers* also appears to have grown in significance. Responses over the last three years have remained consistent, rising to 20.2% in 2011.

Following a steady decline in recent years, interaction with NGOs has improved in 2011 (i.e. from 1.6% in 2010 to 3.0% in 2011). The decline in previous years is likely to be because the security situation constricted their ability to operate; very few NGOs are able to work in the challenging FATA environment.

It is encouraging that less than 1.0% of respondents have sought interaction with the *Taliban* (0.8%) or *foreign fighters* (0.1%). While in contrast, trust seems to be growing towards Pakistani forces: with both the *military* and *Frontier Corp* enjoying increased support

It is concerning however, that a fifth of survey participants (21.5%) had not interacted with a leadership figure. Political and development organisations need to be aware of this discouraging finding as it may be symbolic of communities exhibiting a lack of trust or disenchantment with progress. Also it may indicate that large proportion of the FATA population is not being effectively represented, for example, because of local issues of gender inequality or of fear.

### Male FGDs

The overwhelming majority of participants identified tribal elders as the figures that they had had most interaction with, followed by Political Administration. Surprisingly, no mention was made

of *Mullahs*, teachers, parliamentarians, or NGOs.

### Female FGDs

The general consensus among the six female focus groups was that male family members, in accordance with tribal *Pakhtun* society, provided leadership. In addition, some mention was made of doctors and teachers: with whom guidance was sought for a particular health or educational issue.

### Most trusted institutions/leaders in FATA


The surveys conducted between 2008 and 2010 allowed for respondents to choose a single answer to the question of which institution or leader was most trusted – for the 2011 survey respondents were invited to select more than one option. The data contained in Figure 3.11 largely supports the findings defined by Figure 3.10. Those representatives that had had most interaction were largely considered the most trustworthy.

Attitudes towards Political Agents mirror that of the level of interaction documented above. However, it is interesting to note that levels of trust in this government representative have not fluctuated too greatly, while interaction has decreased over time. This indicates that certain mistrust has been felt towards the Political Agent, a finding that needs to be addressed if they are to become a source of guidance.

Substantial trust appears to be afforded to both the military and Frontier Corps, with almost three times the number of people declaring trust in the military, than the number of those that had had direct contact with them in 2011. This indicates that military intervention, in order to provide security, is not antagonising the FATA population, and as shown in Chapter 1 is supported.

Disturbingly, levels of distrust remain high, with the perception that none were trustworthy rising from 15.5% in 2010 to 18.7% in 2011. Also the number of those that were unable to answer has risen sharply from 6.2% (2010) to 15.1% (2011). This absence of trust needs to be addressed otherwise issues such as the insurgency in FATA may persist because

Figure 3.11: Most trusted institutions/leaders in FATA



leaders are unable to inspire support from communities to address political and development shortcomings.

### **Male FGDs**

Male participants greatly valued the role of the military in safeguarding security, and this trust was centred on their ability to oppose Taliban forces and reclaim land; excessive use of force was however questioned but trust was largely based on results and not human rights.

Furthermore, some respondents identified the *Jirga* system of tribal elders as a most trusted institution, dispensing timely resolutions on justice and communal issues.

### **Female FGDs**

The Pakistan Military and the Frontier Corps were similarly considered the most trusted institution; however this was not universal, with some participants not being fully aware of the parties under discussion.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has examined opinions regarding the administrative systems of governance in FATA. It shows, from the various perspectives, that discontent remains significant, with need for change being quite evidently illustrated.

This problem is compounded by the lack of a predominant leader that the people of FATA trust. With so many institutions providing leadership, a lack of coherence is inevitable, and generates confusion amongst the community about who should be expected to provide particular services. As expressed above, the FS and FDA must make greater efforts to engage with communities to communicate what they are doing and to empower increased local ownership of projects, a necessity for context-sensitive development. However, some trends regarding trust can be considered encouraging - trust in the military will be explored further in Chapter 4.



# CHAPTER 4

## FATA in the Context of International Conflict







## CHAPTER 4

## FATA in the Context of International Conflict

This chapter is organised into five themes: 1) The overall direction of Pakistan and FATA specific issues; 2) Security in general; 3) Perceived security threats to individuals; 4) Opinions on security providers; and 5) Support for the military and the tactics they employ.


The statistical findings are based on random, stratified samples taken in the FATA agencies using the methodology described in the Methodology Appendix. Where comparable data from 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 is available, it is used to show changes in opinion. Otherwise single-year data is used and described.

### 4.1 The overall direction of Pakistan and FATA specific issues

#### Pakistan - optimism versus pessimism

The survey sought to determine how the people of

**Figure 4.1: Do you believe that the country is going in the right or wrong direction?**



FATA assess the country's overall situation. The question was, 'Do you believe that the country is going in the right or wrong direction?'

Findings from 2009 appear to show quite a negative perception of Pakistan's overall direction by the people of FATA. At this time, FATA was fully overrun with militants and remained so, until Pakistani military operations were started in many tribal areas; a process that was met with some disquiet as FATA communities had been distrustful of military intervention.

It is important to mention here that in the beginning, probably after 2004, Taliban groups were seen to be very co-operative with local communities and had provided a justice service to the people: resolving very complex, decades-old conflicts. This interaction won the Taliban much support among locals. However, as Taliban brutality increased, which included the forceful recruitment of FATA locals for *Jihad* in Afghanistan, and local resources were confiscated, their prestige meaningfully declined; a process accelerated after imposed *Sharia* court rulings resulted in the beheading of several innocent people in FATA.

Hundreds of tribal elders were also brutally killed and humiliated in Waziristan, Bajaur, and Mohmand agencies, which created a huge gap in leadership. Several suicide bomb blasts targeting, among others, *Jirga* sessions, funerals and mosques intensified feelings of insecurity among local tribes.

Despite growing opposition, FATA communities were unable to resist the militants, as the Taliban were too strong and better equipped when compared with tribal *Lashkars*. Therefore, the people of FATA started looking towards the Pakistani military for support. In this environment it

was predictable that only a minority of people (16.7%) believed that the country was going in the right direction. However, as military operations grew in success and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) began to lose influence levels of trust started to increase significantly. Looking at the 2010 survey more than one-third of the respondents thought that the country was heading in the right direction. This support has dramatically dropped to just 13.0% in 2011, its lowest rating. People's perceptions tend to change in accordance with external influences and therefore, there could be several reasons behind this decline. These could include: failed military operations in FATA - allowing militants to continue to impose themselves on vulnerable and innocent people; killing and humiliation of tribal elders at the hands of militants; indifferent governmental treatment against internally displaced person (IDPs) from FATA as compared to those from Swat; the use of excessive force by the Pakistani military and air force resulting in local civilian insecurity; and the continued marginalisation of FATA (see Chapter 2 for more details) is totally ignored.

As support has dropped pessimism has inevitably increased. In 2009, 55.3% respondents believed that the country was heading in the wrong direction, a figure that lowered to 48.5% in 2010, but has radically increased 70.9% in 2011. These statistics show, that despite military successes, over two-thirds of people from FATA continue to perceive Pakistan as heading in the wrong direction. This attitude may directly contribute to the findings documented in Chapter 1, in which it was recorded that approximately one-third of respondents would, if it were viable, leave the FATA region (see Figure 1.9, 1.11 and 1.12).

### Male FGDs

Overwhelmingly participants from across the majority of FATA, except Mohmand agency, believed that the country was going in the wrong direction. Concerns were raised over security, inflation, corruption and a lack of political vision. Focus group participants from Mohmand Agency were quite optimistic about the direction of the country; however, they were unable to define why.

### Female FGDs

Similarly, all female focus groups, with the exception of Bajaur, agreed that the country was going in the wrong direction. Respondents from Bajaur agency remained quite optimistic about the political situation and direction of the country.

Optimism from Bajaur is surprising, as locals have suffered extensive hardship as a result of militant and military operations. Approximately half of the population have been internally displaced and their properties have been damaged in fighting. In spite of this, success in fighting the militants appears to be more influential.

### What are Pakistan's, biggest problems and FATA's in particular?

The survey attempted to highlight opinions regarding the biggest problems facing Pakistan as a whole, and FATA in particular. Problems listed are repeated for both Pakistan and FATA, with a few exceptions.


#### Pakistan's biggest problems:

In 2009, 45.1% of respondents offered a variety of unclassifiable problems at the national level. The reason for this was restricted number of options available for respondents to identify within the list. Since 2010 the list has been expanded allowing for a more comprehensive study to be undertaken.

The main problem identified by 35.1% of respondents was *law and order*, an unsurprising choice given the context. In the 2009 survey, by comparison, only 2.6% of the respondents identified this issue as the biggest problem facing Pakistan. This rise in identification of law and order as a problem corresponds with changes in perception towards militants. An additional reason could be that respondents are no longer as fearful of expressing their views openly.

Other significant priorities remain the historical issues of *inflation* (14.4%) and *bad governance* (14.3%) in Pakistan. Governance is a complex issue and often difficult to understand, yet it is apparent that increased awareness of the system has influenced public consciousness concerning its

Figure 4.2: What are Pakistan's and FATA's biggest problems?



problems. In 2009, only 2.5% of respondents recognised corruption as a problem but this has risen to 14.3% in 2011. This issue is also compelling as it indicates that local complaints regarding unjust government (as described in Chapter 2) are considered to be shared by other communities across Pakistan.

Other notable concerns are *bomb blasts*, which were identified by 8.4% of respondents; while the level of insecurity caused by this form of violence remains troubling it is notable that the level of concern has reduced by over 5.0% points from that recorded in 2010. These changes are directly linked to instances of terrorist activity. Due to increases in bomb blasts between 2009 and 2010 concern raised from an initial low of 2.1% to 14.6%. In 2011, following a substantial decrease in terrorist attacks, fear of bomb blasts has reduced.

### Male FGDs

The perceptions shared in FGDs are documented above. The majority of respondents confirmed security, terrorism, and destabilisation as the challenging issues for Pakistan.

Further concerns were raised at particular locations: some participants from Khyber said that that corruption was a significant problem; while participants from FR Kohat and FR Peshawar identified widespread unemployment in the country as the biggest challenge.

Among young participants, concern over a lack of sincere political leadership in Pakistan was a considerable problem.

### Female FGDs

Interestingly, female participants offered different concerns. The general consensus was that *poverty and unemployment* were major issues that need to be addressed across the country. As previously illustrated female empowerment is a problem in FATA and it is unclear what exposure women have had to national problems; therefore these concerns may reflect family concerns as much as they do an analysis of national concerns.

Nevertheless, female members from South Waziristan shared the concern of *law and order*.

This is likely due to their experiences in living with militancy and military counter-operations.

## FATA's biggest problems

With regard to local concerns in FATA: *education, health services and employment* were the leading concerns in 2009, however, subsequent years have witnessed a radical change in perceptions with contemporary concerns focussing on *law and order*. Law and order was recognised by just 1.6% of people in 2009 but has consistently risen to a new high of 43.1% in 2011.

Taliban remain a considerable source of insecurity in FATA but military engagement and local advocacy by media and NGOs appear to have reduced concern by engaging youths in productive activities. However, changing perceptions towards the Taliban (i.e. they are fighting for freedom, Islam and tribal cultures) by some participants may also explain this change (see Chapter 5).

The nature of the conflict in FATA has seen fears regarding *bomb blasts* steadily rise. In 2009 only 1.5% of respondents identified this threat as being important, but this increased to 5.0% in 2010 and to 8.8% in 2011.


*Education and health services* were a major concern for 21.6% of respondents in 2009 but this dropped dramatically in 2010 (to 2.5%) this does not mean that education and health are not causes for concern, as improvements remain an urgent demand for large portions of the FATA population (see Figure 1.1 and 1.4).

The overall data identifies that the people of FATA are more concerned with security, inflation, presence of foreign fighters and Taliban as their primary concern, rather than basic services. Furthermore, governmental increases in annual spending in FATA may have allowed people to start believing that problems concerning basic services are being gradually resolved by local political administrations and international aid agencies.

### Male FGDs

A number of issues were identified through the

Figure 4.3: What are FATA's biggest problems?



FGDs but primarily peace and security and terrorism were considered the main causes for concern in FATA. This was followed by unemployment, low literacy, poverty and the social injustice that is inherent in the existing administrative structures in FATA.

Participants from North Waziristan also pointed out the issues of the weak political awareness, health and undemocratic governance processes.

### Female FGDs

Female respondents from the agencies of Bajaur, Kurram, South Waziristan and Khyber identified militancy and the Talibanisation of tribal society as FATA's biggest problem (in contradiction of the findings outlined in Figure 4.3). This was followed by unemployment, poverty, inflation and weak education and health services as the biggest problems of FATA.

## Services that the government should provide

In order to focus more on the specific needs of the people of FATA the following question was asked: 'what are the most important services that the Government of Pakistan should provide to your district?' Multiple responses were allowed.

Respondents were largely of the opinion that Government was responsible for providing services that address the concerns highlighted in Figure 4.3; with the issues of security (44.6%), education (44.2%) and health (39.9%). However, it was documented that the greatest expectation from government is for electricity supply, which was desired by 45.0% of those interviewed.

Again, governance is a low expectation at 13.4%. This may be due to limited knowledge but it may also reflect a lack of concern. Meaning governmental efforts to reform political administration in FATA is being misdirected and should be redirected towards development and conflict resolution. This may, in the short-term, allow for the improved integration of FATA and lay the foundation for reforms in the long-term.

*Tackling terrorism* was identified by 28% of people. This figure could be considered low given concerns regarding security, the Taliban and bomb blasts but is in actuality reflective of common perceptions regarding *threat* and *danger*. This subject is analysed in greater detail in the next section. However, this should not diminish the fact that *tackling terrorism* remains an expectation of government for over a quarter of respondents.

### Male FGDs

*Security* remained the leading concern of participants. This desire was followed by the expectation that government should provide *peace and security* in their region; enabling businesses to operate unmolested and for other livelihood activities to be made available. This concern highlights that the spectre of terrorism remains of considerable concern for large parts of the FATA population. In addition, many other issues were highlighted, including the expectation that government should be responsible for: roads, hospitals, schools, establishment of industrial units, and provision of electricity.


It was shared, however, that expectations of government may be influenced by the shared feeling that FATA remains a neglected part of Pakistan; it was considered essential that the Government of Pakistan address this as a matter of supreme urgency.

### Female FGDs

Female participants regarded *employment* and *livelihood opportunities* to be the key responsibilities of government. They also shared the opinion of their male counterparts that providing *peace and security* needed to be a primary responsibility of government.

Females from Kurram Agency also raised the issue of sectarianism in FATA, especially in their locality, where fighting between Shia and Sunni sects has been an issue for the last four years.

Figure 4.4: Services that the government should provide



## 4.2 Security in General

As noted above in Figures 4.2 and 4.3: *law and order* has been the main concern in FATA for the last two years. We now seek to better understand this concern.

FATA is known as a ‘no-go area’ for non-FATA residents; however, it is home to more than 4 million people. The brutal excesses of TTP and other militant groups and military counter-operations have driven an important proportion of the local population out of FATA; thus giving the impression that FATA is an insecure area.


However, this external perception may need to be reevaluated following the finding that in 2010, 61.4% respondents felt secure (6.2% stating they were *very secure* and 55.2% that they were *somewhat secure*). When the 2010 survey introduced the question of ‘feelings of security’ some optimism was recorded, probably due to confidence being expressed due to the success of military operations Swat, Bajaur and Dara Adam Khel, as well as in parts of Mohmand, Orakzai and lower Kurram agencies. It was hoped that these operations would continue to succeed and result in the return of authority to civilian administrations.

In 2011, feelings of security remained high, with 15.1% stating that they were *very secure* and 27.9% that they were *somewhat secure* but it has to be noted that the total number of those feeling secure has dropped alarmingly by nearly 20% points; a change compounded by data equally showing that feelings of insecurity have risen. In 2011, around 50% of respondents informed the survey team that they felt insecure (32.0% were *very insecure* and 18.8% were *somewhat insecure*). This is a significant rise from the total of insecure (36%) in 2010.

In areas under Pakistani military control: respondents consistently noted feelings of security. Conversely, in areas of conflict respondents remained quite pessimistic – noting governmental inability to secure their locality from influence by militants. Figure 4.7 provides some insights into feelings of security, but it must be noted that it refers to perceptions regarding improvements in the security situation and not overall feelings of security in general.

This shift in opinion is understandable. Refugee camps, the only viable alternative to living in one’s vulnerable local community, expose people to many alternative risks and challenges.<sup>18</sup> CAMP


Figure 4.5: How secure do you feel in your daily life?



<sup>18</sup> 18.9% of respondents had indicated that they had had to flee from their home in the recent past.



Figure 4.6: Compared to last year, do you feel your security is getting better or worse?



personnel have seen this first-hand in the case of Bajaur Agency IDPs, who preferred to leave their IDP camps quite early - despite military operation continuing in their region – rather than remain. Respondents questioned the quality of the support being provided by the Government of Pakistan and the international aid community.

### Male FGDs

Male participants shared mixed feelings with the survey team. Half felt insecure while an equal number felt more secure. In areas where the Pakistani military has extended its control, participants appeared to have an improved perception of security, particularly those from Khyber and North Waziristan agencies and the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI Khan. Participants from Orakzai Agency however, remained quite pessimistic, noting that the government had been unable to secure their tribal area from militants.

### Female FGDs

Interestingly, the majority of female participants in FGDs were concerned about the security situation in FATA. This response, it could be argued, reflects a more realistic perspective of concerns in FATA as

*Pakhtun* men traditionally suppress fears because of *Pakhtunwali*. On the other hand, it may also reflect that women in FATA are more vulnerable to security than their male counterparts.


### Improvements in the security situation

The survey attempted to elicit perceptions on the changing security conditions in their respective tribal areas. The responses remain quite consistent in terms of respondents' understanding of improvements in security. It needs to be acknowledged that the survey was limited in its ability to interview respondents in certain tribal areas therefore they could be considered an abstraction of true levels; furthermore, the survey was only able to chart the perceptions of those currently living in FATA, and therefore does not take into account the perceptions of the large numbers of people who remain displaced – a proportion of society that would presumably not currently consider the local security environment to be conducive to return.

As shown in Figure 4.6: over the last two years significant numbers of people have declared that

**Figure 4.7: Compared to last year: do you feel your security is getting better or worse? (breakdown by region)**

■ Much better ■ Somewhat better ■ No difference ■ Somewhat worse ■ Much worse ■ No opinion ■ Don't know



the security situation has been improving. This, in conjunction with the data documented in Figure 4.5, implies that many FATA communities feel at least some sense of security, in spite of the violence that engulfs much of the region. Yet, it is not evident what the true meaning of this information is, as it is not clear whether respondents were answering in terms of year-on-year improvements, or over a longer period. That is, some 40% of respondents acknowledging continued developments on top of those recorded by half of interviewees in 2010 or do they refer to a changing of attitude of those that were less than favourable in the same period?

Consequently, the Government of Pakistan must not allow the improvements to trigger over-confidence, particularly as approximately one-fifth of respondents in 2011 considered the security situation to be at least *somewhat worse* (an increase of approximately seven percentage points on levels recorded the year before).

Future studies must therefore, seek to elicit the extent to which the opinions recorded are concerned with year-on-year changes in attitude or longer-term changes in security. Also additional evidence is needed to understand whether *no change* has positive, negative or neutral connotations for respondents.

To better understand differences in opinion on security by geographical location, Figure 4.7 has been produced. A word of caution is necessary as it is important to state that only villages and towns that were accessible are included in the sample (see Methodology Appendix): accordingly, responses may represent a more optimistic perception than might otherwise be expected as perceptions of security will differ for those living in peaceful areas compared to others living in more unstable areas.

During the last three years (2009 – 2011) South Waziristan, Orakzai, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber agencies have witnessed high levels of conflict - resulting in significant numbers of IDPs – yet these regions seem to be enjoying some levels of improvement in perceptions of security. In South Waziristan, for example, of the 280 respondents 67% of respondents thought that the security

situation in South Waziristan was better; implying increased confidence in the efforts of the Pakistani military to impose security in the tribal area. In Bajaur Agency 45% of respondents noted improvements in security; this in part may be the result of the repatriation of significant numbers (approximately two-thirds) of IDPs, forced out of their homes by fighting in the region.

These gains are not guarantees of shifting perceptions however, as illustrated by findings from Kurram Agency. In 2010, 80% of respondents from this Agency, scene of some of the greatest (sectarian) violence in FATA, noticed improvements in security. This figure has dropped dramatically to 24.9% in 2011.

Overall, the gains of 2010 appear to have been reversed for some 27% of the population. The opening of roads last year appeared to have raised hopes for the future, but substantial delays in reaching agreement and a lack of trust has increased levels of frustration. It is essential to note therefore, that improvements in perceptions of security do not necessarily equate to changes in general feelings of security. Security concerns in FATA remain a considerable cause for concern (see Chapter 1) and continued governmental activity needs to be applied, to ensure this momentum extends in to the long-term and to ensure that the worries of those that see *no difference* or believe the security situation to have got worse are addressed.

### Focus group discussions

Similarly to the last question, respondents shared mixed views. Again equal numbers of respondents showed either optimism or pessimism. Those participants who felt most unhappy with progress in their tribal area were from Orakzai and North Waziristan, both of which were continuing to suffer from Taliban interference. Female FGDs were less able or willing to provide opinions on this subject.


## 4.3 Perceived security threats to individuals

The last section concentrated on attitudes to security for FATA, and local tribal areas, as a whole –

this section seeks to document threats posed to individuals' security. The non-specific term of 'conflict' previously referred to in the survey is to some extent broken down into its various parts (the 'War on Terror', sectarian violence, terrorist attacks and army activity), while other human security concerns are also identified.

slowing in the military's ability to exert full control has undoubtedly influenced responses. Furthermore, the Pakistan Army as a source of insecurity has increased. In 2010, military progress, particularly in Swat and South Waziristan appeared to have encouraged/increased trust in the military as a source of security but in 2011 this confidence

Figure 4.8: What are the biggest threats to your security?



### Freedom from fear

The greatest concern raised by respondents in both the 2010 and 2011 surveys was that of terrorist attacks. It is notable however, that this source of insecurity has risen in the last year. In 2010, 41.2% of people considered terrorism to be the primary fear of individuals but this rose to almost 60% in 2011. This illustrates that despite slow improvements in perceptions of local security and military successes the spectre of suicide bombings, militant rockets, landmine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain substantial concerns.

Another striking shift in respondents' perceptions is in regard to the 'War on Terror'. Concern has more than doubled from 14.7% in 2010 to 29.6% in 2011. The people of FATA seems to be tired of this conflict; a source of much internal displacement, bloodshed and the ruining of local economies. Furthermore, a

seems to have faded. Accordingly, in 2010 only 5.8% of respondents believed that 'army activity' was the leading threat to individuals' however, this fear has risen dramatically to almost 20% in 2011. This is likely to be because of repeated examples of excessive force being used (resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of property, including livestock). Surprisingly, 34.1% respondents identified drone *attacks* as the prominent source of individuals' insecurity. This figure is almost four times higher than recorded in 2010 (9.1%).

In FATA, Shia Muslims constitute 12% of the total population, and in Orkazai and Kurram agencies sectarian violence appears to be a significant cause of individual insecurity. In 2011 survey, this fear was shared by 17.1% of respondents while this figure was 14.4% in 2010. It is not clear the extent to which these figures represent Sunni and Shia perspectives.

In addition, crime and banditry is recognised as a source of individuals' insecurity by over 10% of survey respondents. This may be linked to cultural traditions of tribal and family feuds, although previously mentioned factors of poverty, unemployment and a possibly weak judiciary may also have an influence. Notwithstanding the cause, this feature of insecurity is held by a significant minority and further investigation may be required.

### Freedom from want

Concerns relating to 'freedom from want' as a feature of human/individual security, while not being as prominent as those concerning 'freedom from fear' remain significant for approximately 20% of respondents.

*Inadequate healthcare* was a cause for individual concern for just 3.8% of people in 2010 survey however this figure has risen sharply in 2011 to 16.2%. As fighting has placed increased strains on healthcare facilities, infrastructure has proved insufficient resulting in unnecessary deaths and disabilities.

Issues regarding access to food have also increased, with approximately 5% of respondents noting that this was a considerable concern. It is important that these non-conflict issues are reduced in significance, especially as services relating to human development and health are considerable expectations (see Figure 1.1).

### Male FGDs

The overwhelming majority of participants stated that the Taliban and other militant groups posed the greatest threat to their individual security, but fears were also held in regard to the Pakistani military. They added that fighting had endangered both individuals' lives but also that of their livestock.

An additional cause for concern was the use of drone attacks by the US. While these attacks were considered by some to be very precisely targeted, the majority of participants were sceptical and did not approve of these drone strikes.

### Female FGDs

Participants appeared to be less confident in identifying threats but for those that were: the Taliban and other militant groups were considered to be the greatest threat to their individual security.

### Reasons for violence in FATA

As illustrated in Chapter 1 and Figure 4.8: conflict and violence are leading sources of individual and community insecurity. As a consequence, the survey has sought to create a more in-depth understanding of how these phenomena manifest themselves. As described there are numerous forms of conflict in FATA but Figure 4.9 aims to help illustrate what generally motivates them. Respondents were allowed to make more than one choice.

Based on personal experience, the most significant reason for violence was *conflict over land*, as recorded by 49.7% of respondents. This was followed by *tribal clashes* (35.9%) and family feuds (30.2%). These findings may indicate that local issues rather than the 'War on Terror' generate conflict in FATA, an explanation further supported by *extremism* only being recognised by 21.5% of people.


It has to be noted however, that there is no clear way of disaggregating whether conflict over land and tribal clashes relate to violence associated with outsiders (i.e. TTP and other Taliban organisations) taking over land and imposing their values on the indigenous tribe.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in understanding the root causes of the different conflicts recorded - the destructive nature of the 'War on Terror' has had the greatest impact on life in FATA; destroying the very core of tribal and *Pakhtun* culture and devaluing traditional social conflict-resolution mechanisms.

### Male FGDs

The majority of participants across most FGDs agreed that the main reasons for conflict in FATA were land disputes and honour killing. It was stated

Figure 4.9: What are the main reasons of conflicts in FATA?



that land disputes could result in the igniting of tribal and/or family clashes.

### Female FGDs

The majority of female participants clearly identified land disputes as the main cause of conflict in FATA. In addition, property and business disputes also generated violence in FATA.

### High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan – who is responsible?

The respondents were asked through a multiple choice question: ‘who do you think is responsible for the high rates of suicide bombing?’ Aside from non-state actors previously identified, the survey noted that substantial blame was placed on the three countries of the US, India and Israel.


The 2011 survey appears to show a strengthening in the perception of respondents that the US is largely responsible, because of its actions in Afghanistan; 43.4% of those interviewed believed this assertion to be true, compared to 25.8% in 2010. India, Pakistan’s historic rival, was also thought to be to blame by approximately a quarter of respondents – an increase on the 2010 figure of 13.5%. Israel was also strongly blamed, with 15.9% of people accusing them of motivating suicide bombing – this is likely due to their role in international relations and repression of Palestinians rather than as a

consequence of direct action in Pakistan. In spite of this, the authors are unsure as to the logic of ascribing responsibility to nations that are unlikely to be providing direct support to suicide bombers but it is a perception that cannot be ignored.

Furthermore, the West as a whole remains a significant target for blame. In the 2008 and 2009 surveys *Western influence* was identified by the majority of respondents (50.9% and 33.7% respectively) as being responsible for the high levels of suicide attacks in Pakistan. While this figure has declined in 2010 and 2011, if the choices of the US and Israel are added to this selection - the total is 69.9% for 2011. This clearly indicates that the majority people in FATA blame for the phenomenon on western countries. In contrast to Western perceptions of Saudi Arabia as a source of Talibanisation, FATA respondents considered it to have very little influence.

It is surprising that, despite TTP claiming responsibility for many of these terrorist attacks, only 13.7% of respondents believed that they were ultimately responsible. This must be ascribed to the fact that survey participants believe that their motivations are inspired by external forces. The perceived responsibility of *Al Qaeda* is also surprisingly low, albeit increased from 3.1% in 2010 to 7.0% in 2011. This is, in part, due to *Al Qaeda*

Figure 4.10: Who/what is to blame for the high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan?



being considered more of a threat to the West, especially US, rather than Pakistan.


Trust in the *Pakistan Army* (see Figure 3.11) has seen their blame for suicide bombings reduce considerably from 13.1% in 2008 to just 0.5% in 2010. While the 2011 survey has shown a marginal increase in those that attribute blame on the military, it remains very low (1.2%).

A large percentage of the respondents, 22.3% in the 2011 survey, were unable to provide an opinion.

## Factors enabling suicide bombing in Pakistan

In order to supplement findings relating to suicide bombing in Pakistan, respondents were asked to define what factors have enabled suicide bombing to continue in Pakistan. In both 2010 and 2011, survey findings reveal a mixed attitude towards internal and external influences, but with some changes on emphasis. This section will focus on internal contributions.

Figure 4.11: Factors enabling suicide bombing in Pakistan





The human security concerns of *unemployment and poverty* were considered considerable enabling factors, as prescribed by almost 40% of respondents (22.1% and 17.4% respectively), a figure almost double that calculated in 2010. The additional concern of *lack of education* – a further freedom from want, human security concern – also continued to rank highly; despite dropping from its position as the second most influential enabler (as recorded in 2010) it retained considerable impact for 13.7% of people. These concerns link back to the findings detailed in Chapter 1.

Given that over half of FATA respondents identified social problems for facilitating suicide bombing, it is somewhat unexpected that social development has lost significance: dropping from 8.2% in 2010 to approximately 1.0% in 2011. Irrespective of this, the findings outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 detail that this issue remains of importance to the creation of improved perceptions of security, and will increase potential for greater local inclusion in issues that will generate employment opportunities and develop programmes that can address poverty and weaknesses in education provision.

Another striking finding is that the FATA people are growing pessimistic of police capabilities, with 12.4% of respondents noting this in 2011 compared to 3.4% in the previous year. This clearly indicates that confidence in the police has deteriorated; however, this finding could be considered surprising as only 6.9% of respondents consider policing to be the most important service needed in FATA (see Figure 1.1). *Intelligence failings* were also identified in FATA as having allowed suicide bombing to continue; as instances of terrorism have increased failure to intercept has inevitably increased dissatisfaction.

These factors reflect a set of internal causes that recognise local responsibilities for the act of suicide bombing and responsibility for preventing these acts from being undertaken. This is useful for a programmatic approach to changing attitudes and addressing motivations for supporting militant actions.

### Male FGDs

Respondents were very vocal in their opinions as to

what the causes of suicide bombing in Pakistan were. In particular: lack of education, extreme poverty and insufficient employment and/or economic opportunities were the main causes; factors that had allowed militants to exploit youths and those disengaged from society.

Some respondents, especially in Bajaur Agency, believed that accurate religious education should be provided so that the extreme arguments provided by militants would not justify killing themselves or others.

Respondents from North Waziristan Agency and the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI Khan also declared that social infrastructure had to be improved, because at present, exclusion from governance mechanisms was sufficient reason to explain this violence. Moreover, it was suggested that the Government of Pakistan needs to negotiate with the Taliban in order to reduce conflict and by extension the need for suicide bombing.

It should be noted that some participants of the FGDs were unable to provide an answer.

### Female FGDs

Female participants were not generally conscious of what weaknesses enabled suicide bombing and therefore the majority were unable to provide an answer.

Of the few voices that were confident enough to define the causes - poverty, lack of education and insufficient social justice were again identified. In addition, retaliation/revenge for drone attacks was also offered as a reason.

### Source of suicide bombers

Respondents were also asked to identify the geographical source of suicide bombers in FATA. While, a significant minority (9.3%) of survey participants were unable to provide an answer this figure remains lower than was experienced in 2008 and 2009. This indecision may be a direct result of the internal displacement of FATA communities and growing frustrations with conflict: meaning that respondents were not confident in attributing a


homeland to suicide bombers.

Of the 60% of respondents that could answer, increased numbers (28.4%) are associating bombers with Afghanistan (i.e. a figure that equates almost half of those confident in identifying the

geographical source of bombers). This attribution builds on a growing trend of blame being associated with Afghanistan (16.0% in 2008, 14.5% in 2009 and 21.2% in 2010).

The West (14.6%), India (21.3%) and Israel (0.2%) –

Figure 4.12: Source of suicide bombers



the nations considered responsible for suicide bombing - are considered by the majority to be the source of the bombers. Interestingly, the focus on India has decreased from 28.7% in 2010 while accusations towards the West have increased from 4.9%. Moreover, it is compelling that despite suspicions being levelled towards these countries, desire for increased international assistance in addressing concerns in FATA was also found to have risen in this survey (see Figure 1.4 and 1.5).

Attitudes towards India appear to be based on their investing hugely in Afghanistan; this has compelled some Pakistani politicians to accuse their rival of using Afghanistan as a means of disrupting Pakistan. These claims have undoubtedly affected perceptions.

Arguably, the most surprising finding is that only a minority of respondents believe that suicide bombers originate in FATA (6.0%) or other parts of Pakistan (6.2%). This is striking as the evidence documented in Figure 4.10 above, on 'factors enabling suicide bombers', focuses in large part on local, internal, reasons and only a minority identify external influences. Attention must be placed on trying to understand this discrepancy in the findings.

#### Male FGDs

In accordance with the data in Figure 4.12 the overwhelming majority of participants were unsure where suicide bombers originated. However, some identified Afghanistan while others blamed the Taliban. Notably, the Government of Pakistan was also accused of being responsible for sourcing bombers.

#### Female FGDs

Again the majority were unable to answer this question. Female focus group members from Orakzai Agency were of the opinion that local Taliban groups were responsible for grooming suicide bombers in FATA (and elsewhere in Pakistan).

Also, as with the male FGDs, some elements blamed the Government of Pakistan for sourcing suicide bombers.

## 4.4 Opinion on security providers

In this section opinions towards security providers in FATA are explored. In Chapter 3 (Figure 3.11) a question regarding trust was asked of respondents. The findings showed that the Army (17.9%) and the Frontier Corps (8.1%) are the most trusted institutions in FATA. In contrast traditional leaders (i.e. teachers, Political Agents and Mullahs) are losing support, with the exception of tribal elders.

### Security providers in FATA

Survey participants were first asked: 'which of the following institutions do you believe should ultimately be responsible for security in FATA?' Respondents were allowed to choose more than one security provider.

From the data it is apparent that the *military* has the support of more than half (52.9%) of the respondents. Other security providers endorsed by survey participants are *tribal communities/Lashkars* (42.4%), *Khasadars and levies* (41.4%) and the *Frontier Corps* (33.8%). This shows that conventional security providers and traditional FATA mechanisms are perceived to share responsibility for providing security.

In 2010, when only one provider could be selected, a minority of respondents (15%) believed the *military* were ultimately responsible for security in FATA. Instead, respondents preferred to trust the *Frontier Corps* (31%) and the traditional mechanisms of *tribal communities/Lashkars* (24%) and *Khasadars and levies* (23%). Comparing this data with 2011 is not entirely useful as a different methodology was used in the survey but it remains illustrative of the growing legitimacy of the military in FATA.


### Male FGDs

The majority of male participants identified the Pakistan Army and *Lashkars* as the institutions ultimately responsible for providing security in FATA. However, the capability of *Lashkars* to provide security against the militant threat was questioned.

### Female FGDs

Knowledge of the different security providers was limited among female participants but focus group

**Figure 4.13: Which of the following institutions do you believe should ultimately be responsible for security in FATA?**



participants were able to identify the Pakistan Army and *Khasadars* as the institutions most expected to act as security providers.


### Which security provider do you trust?

Building on the question of trust asked in Chapter 3 and perceptions of responsibility for security (Figure 4.13) - survey participants were asked to choose which security provider they considered most trustworthy.

Given the improving attitude of people from FATA towards the *military* it is unsurprising that they received the greatest approval. 36.6% of respondents voted the *military* as the service provider they most trusted, replacing the traditional mechanisms that had been considered to have greater legitimacy in 2010. Of these historical methods *tribal communities/Lashkars* were most trusted, as chosen by 25.43% of respondents.

It is worrying that levels of trust in *Khasadars and levies* (13.8%) and *Frontier Corps* (7.0%) is so low in comparison to the security responsibility they are expected to undertake (see Figure 4.14). This diminishing of trust may, in part, be due to

**Figure 4.14: Which security provider do you trust?**



questions being raised over their capacity and motivation to perform what is expected of them. There have been instances, for example, of Frontier Corps and *Khasadar* personnel being abducted by

militants, and later being found dead.

### Male FGDs

Despite the acknowledgement of the impact of military operations and resulting displacement the majority of participants echoed the findings of the survey – with the Pakistani military being identified as the most trustworthy security provider. Tribal elders were also identified.

Others opined that if *Khasadars* were properly trained, trust in this traditional force's ability to maintain law and order would increase.

### Female FGDs

Female respondents in the majority of focus groups identified the Pakistani military and the Frontier Corps as their most trusted security institutions in FATA. However, some concerns were also expressed in the Frontier Regions of Peshawar and Kohat as it was stated that they were never around to come to the rescue when needed.

Female respondents from Kurram Agency shared that they had no local *Lakhkar* to turn to; therefore they were reliant on governmental institutions for their security. Participants from this tribal area were nevertheless scathing in their attitudes towards the Frontier Corps capabilities.

### How do you rate the performance of security providers in FATA?


Expanding on the above questions regarding security providers in FATA, the survey sought to record opinions on the effectiveness of these organisations in the eyes of tribal communities.

#### Tribal communities / *Lashkars*

Starting with traditional mechanisms, respondents were asked to consider the effectiveness of tribal communities/*Lashkars*. Over half of respondents looked positively on their performance, with 23.6% rating it as excellent and 38.8% as good. For a further 10.5% of respondents, tribal communities/*Lashkars* had performed satisfactorily. Only a 5.6% of respondents opined that their performance had been poor.

Respondents' perceptions on tribal communities/*Lashkars* are evidently quite positive; however, case

**Figure 4.15: How do you rate the performance of Tribal communities / *Lakhkars*?**




studies of their performance are mixed: *Lashkars* were raised in Waziristan, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur Agencies and the FR Peshawar (with the support of government) but they were unable to protect the hundreds of Maliks/tribal leaders targeted, humiliated and killed by militants. In comparison, *Lashkars* from *Salarzai* tribe (Bajaur Agency) and *Molvi Nazir* (South Waziristan Agency) have proved successful in opposing militants. These differences in levels of success may be the reason that one-fifth of respondents were unable to share their opinion.

#### *Khasadars* and levies

*Khasadars* and levies operate as a local police force under the authority of the Political Administration. They are recruited from local tribes on a quota basis, depending on the size and political influence of the tribe.

Despite diminishing trust in *Khasadars* and levies (see Figure 4.16) they are again seen to be effective in what they do: over half of respondents considered them to be *excellent* (18.0%) or *good* (36.9%). A further 17.9% perceived their performance to be *satisfactory*. Again only a minority of survey participants were dissatisfied (12.3%) but it is notable that this figure is more than double that expressed of tribal communities/*Lakhkars* (see Figure 4.15).

The data is again encouraging but is likely to be reflective of *Khasadars*' role of maintaining routine law and order rather than their role against


**Figure 4.16: Performance of Khasadars and levies**

militants. People in FATA remain nervous of the national police system (see Figure 4.21) and have vigorously opposed attempts to extend its influence in FATA. This viewpoint may have had some bearing on the findings documented in the survey.

In spite of the satisfaction offered by respondents, it is probable that *Khasadars* and levies are insufficiently trained and organised to provide effective leadership in the fight against militancy.

### The military

Moving on to governmental security providers – despite initial scepticism felt towards the military – successes in Swat and to some extent in Bajaur have helped change perceptions of their value within FATA. They appear to be trusted as the only


**Figure 4.17: Performance of Military**

institution able to oppose militant violence.

The data recorded shows that a significant majority of respondents believe the military to be performing positively. In excess of 70% of respondents view their effectiveness as being either excellent (42.1%) or good (29.6%) In comparison to just 6.3% that perceive it as being *poor*.

### The Frontier Corps

Frontier Corps comprises *Pakhtuns* from KPK and FATA. They are provided with training and equipment to oppose militants, in combination with the military. While trust in the Frontier Corps is low (see Figure 4.14) attitudes towards their performance are more encouraging with over 60% of respondents endorsing their effectiveness to some extent.

**Figure 4.18: Performance of the Frontier Corps**

In spite of this, some uncertainty remains as to their performance with over a quarter of respondent not being able to provide an opinion.


### Frontier Corps (FC) and security in FATA

As attitudes towards the Frontier Corps appeared to be contradictory, in terms of their ability and effectiveness, respondents were further asked the question: 'do you think the Frontier Corps plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?'

This question, when asked in 2010, noted that the 68.9% believed the Frontier Corps could play a vital role in providing security in FATA; in 2011 this conviction had dropped considerably, while still maintaining a majority, to 52.2%. A change in

attitude compounded by data showing that the number of people questioning their potential had risen to 17.9% (from 14.1% in 2010).

**Figure 4.19: Do you think the Frontier Corps plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?**



People in FATA appear, to some extent, to be growing disillusioned with attempts to end the insurgency by organisations other than the military. Yet, if capacity concerns can be addressed (see Figure 4.21) the value of the Frontier Corps in the eyes of the FATA population is likely to be maintained. This is exemplified by the attitudes expressed in male FGDs, where it was noted that since the recruits were *Pakhtun* they were best placed to provide security inside FATA.


### Training the Frontier Corps with international assistance

As has been noted, insurgent groups in FATA are often better equipped than the security providers (including the Frontier Corps) they are fighting. This combined with the ideological drive of insurgents has made them very difficult to oppose.

Following 9/11, the international community - led by the US, has offered technical and financial assistance to Pakistan to improve the capacity of the Frontier Corps. As a consequence, the 2011 survey has sought to document attitudes towards Frontier Corps' effectiveness would alter if international assistance supported training. It will also show the legitimacy attached to outside help by FATA people. Consequently, respondents were asked: 'if trained with the aid of international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in the ability of the Frontier Corps to do their job?'

A dramatic downturn can be seen between the 2010 and 2011 surveys. In 2010 more than half of the respondents (52.4%) interviewed were of the opinion that international assistance would greatly benefit the Frontier Corps, but in 2011 this opinion had dropped to approximately one-quarter (24.7%).<sup>19</sup> A deterioration in opinion compounded by the finding that 15% of respondents had no

**Figure 4.20: If trained with the aid of international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in the ability of the Frontier Corps to do their job?**



<sup>19</sup> It should be noted that in male FGDs the majority of respondents believed that international assistance was essential, but only if it was offered without conditions.



confidence that internationally assisted training offered benefit to the Frontier Corps. This is likely due to the perceived failure, to date, of the Frontier Corps, which has already received some international assistance to operate with the trust of tribal communities in FATA.

This change could also be seen as an endorsement of Pakistani-led training. The success of the Pakistan Army has possibly indicated that Pakistani professionals are just as capable, if not more so, of training their compatriots. It must be noted however, that almost one-third (29.7%) of respondents were undecided, so international assistance may still be supported if implemented well and with apparent successes.

In summary, the people of FATA appear to appreciate the value of local forces being active in providing security in FATA but there is a recognised need for the Frontier Corps to be strengthened. While international support may be of some actual benefit, perceptions appear to show a reversal in trust regarding its effectiveness.

### How could your sense of security be improved?

Following on the question on the present effectiveness of security providers, respondents were asked how these institutions could improve their performance in FATA. Survey participants

were invited to make more than one recommendation from the options offered to them.


The option that received the most support (44.6%) was: *more troops should be deployed in FATA*. This is unsurprising given the positive attitude held towards the military (see Figure 4.14 and 4.17). In addition, one-third of respondents (35.2%) believed that *local communities/Lashkars should be strengthened*; an outcome that would allow for a traditional conflict resolution mechanism to adequately face the challenges of the Taliban and other militant groups in FATA. A similar number of respondents desired improvements in the training and equipment to the *Khasadars* and Frontier Corps services.

The possibility of extending a more conventional police system to FATA proved less than popular, as it was an option only endorsed by 8.4% of respondents. This signifies that traditional law and order mechanisms remain the most legitimate form of policing in FATA.

## 4.5 Support for the military and the tactics they employ

In the previous section it has been narrated that, generally the people of FATA are supportive of the various security providers that they have interacted with. The survey subsequently looks at the military

Figure 4.21: How could your sense of security be improved?





in greater detail, to elicit the specific aspects of their operations that are perceived to have legitimacy in FATA, and those aspects that are less approved of.

To aid this analysis, data is presented per Agency/FR to illustrate how different tribal areas have reacted to the military and the tactics they have employed.

### Forced migration from FATA

One of the impacts of the conflicts has been forced migration. Those people who suffered forced migration would be one sub-set to compare with others who had not been forced to leave. This is an important intervening variable in public opinion.

Due to the on-going insurgency in parts of FATA, significant numbers of tribal communities have been forced to flee their homes and settle in either: IDP camps; host communities in adjacent districts or major Pakistan cities outside of FATA. The survey initially sought to measure the extent to which displacement had affected respondents. In 2011, 747 (18.7%) people out of total sample of 4,000 had been affected. This was a reduction from the 22.3% recorded in 2010 but remains a troubling statistic, on average one in five survey participants have been forced to leave their homes at some point in the last two years. It must also be stressed that for a large numbers of respondents, this displacement is likely to be have been undertaken with other family members; therefore it could be argued that the data should be understood as referring to 747 families and their dependents rather than individuals in 2011 - depending on the composition

of the sample. Furthermore, the figure does not account for those who remain displaced or have resettled outside of FATA.

The degree of dislocation varies markedly by Agency/FR - Figure 4.23 shows these statistics for 2011, thus, illustrating which areas have been most affected by conflict.

From this disaggregation it is clear that some tribal areas are more secure than others. Information given by respondents from FR DI Khan (70.0%), Orakzai Agency (59.3%) and FR Tank (53.8%) signify that these areas have been particularly vulnerable to internal displacement. Furthermore the areas of Kurram Agency (24.6%), Bajaur Agency (21.8%), FR Kohat (20.0%) and FR Bannu (16.3%) all registered percentages close to the overall average. The remaining areas appear more secure, particularly in FR Lakki (0.0%), FR Peshawar (1.3%), Khyber Agency (3.8%) and Mohmand Agency (3.9%).

### Male FGDs


Most of the participants from the Bajaur Agency FGD informed the survey team that they had had to leave their homes during the conducting of military operations in their respective areas. Respondents from North Waziristan also shared that they had had to leave because of the threat posed by militants and drone attacks.

Participants from the Frontier Regions of Peshawar, Khyber Agency and Kohat advised that they had not been forced to leave their homes. The findings from Peshawar and Khyber were unsurprising given the findings in Figure 4.23 but are notable for Kohat, given that 20% of those surveyed had been displaced in the past year: this implies that vulnerability is also unequal within tribal areas. Similarly some respondents from Mohmand Agency confirmed that they had been forced to leave their villages because of military operations, showing that again certain areas within a tribal region may be more insecure than implied in the table above.


### Female FGDs

In contrast to the findings from the male FGDs, female participants from the Frontier Region of Peshawar and Kohat Agency had been displaced

**Figure 4.22: Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years?**



**Figure 4.23: Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years? (Break down my agency)**



because of military operations. These experiences were shared by participants from the Agencies of Mohmand, Bajaur and South Waziristan.

Focus group participants from Khyber and Orakzai had not had to move because of fighting, as their homes had not been vulnerable to fighting.

#### **If you were displaced: where did you move to?**

The survey sought to build on the information gathered on displacement by asking the 18.7% that had been forced to leave their homes: 'where did you move to?' The respondents identified close to 40 towns/villages/districts and provinces, as well as five main towns/cities.

In 2011, Kohat city/district received a quarter

(24.6%) of the total number of FATA's internally displaced, in comparison to just 5.3% the previous year - an increase largely resulting from conflict in neighbouring Orakzai Agency. Overall, it is believed that Kohat has largely accepted IDPs from the Agencies of Orakzai and Kurram. In response the government has set up a local IDP camp where IDPs from Orakzai and Kurram agencies are residing. In addition, an unknown number of IDPs have been able to find housing, or where possible, live with family in Kohat.

The second major city identified by respondents (17.9%) was Peshawar, the administrative centre for FATA and provincial capital. In response, large IDP camps have been established in the Kacha Garhi

area, close to Hayatabad town. While still remaining an important destination, the number of IDPs seeking sanctuary in Peshawar has reduced from 40.4% in 2010. According to the UNHCR<sup>20</sup>, some 18,789 registered families or 97,052 individuals reside in Jalozaï camp, with 71% from Bajaur agency, 20% from Khyber agency, and 9% from Mohmand Agency. In addition, an unknown number of IDPs from across FATA and KPK are being hosted in Peshawar.

7.5% of respondents identified *Sadda* of Kurram Agency as the destination they moved to during their displacement, which was largely as a result of sectarian violence. Over the past four years, between 1,500 and 2,000 Sunni families from the Shia dominated Parachinar in Kurram have been displaced to *Sadda*, a major town with a Sunni majority. Conversely, some 2.5% of the local Shia population have had to migrate in the opposite direction Lower Kurram.

DI Khan was also a popular destination, as identified by 5.5% of respondents in both 2010 and 2011. This internal displacement is likely because of conflict in neighbouring South Waziristan, especially from the areas in and around Mehsud. Also, a similar number of survey participants identified the District of Bannu, close to North Waziristan, which was identified by 5.2% of those questioned (an increase from the 4.3% in 2010).

Outside FATA a minority of respondents identified Karachi in the far south of Pakistan, Balochistan to the south of FATA, and cities of Punjab in the East.

To estimate the overall scale of population displacements in 2010 and 2011 and the impact on host communities the survey team has sought to compare the sample percentage of 18.7% displacement with both the latest official population estimates for FATA (4 million; 1998 Census) and the estimate provided by local leadership (6 million). Accordingly, at least 716,000 - 1,074,000 people (plus families and dependents, where applicable) may have been forced to leave their homes in 2011. For 2010, the figures are

higher at between 847,400 - 1,338,000. These figures suggest that the people of FATA have been exposed to massive challenges, and that the insurgency is having a detrimental impact on human and communal development.

### Male FGDs

Participants from Mohmand stated that when they had been internally displaced they had moved to Peshawar or Shabqadar Tehsil in the Charssada District of the KPK where they had spent several months in IDP camps. Focus group participants from Bajaur, explained that they had travelled to Lower Dir, Charssada or Mardan districts in the KPK.

Additionally, those from the frontier regions of Peshawar and Kohat shared that they had migrated to each other's territory. And respondents from South Waziristan stated that they had sought safety in either DI Khan or Tank districts.

### Female FGDs

Female participants shared similar information to that provided during the male FGDs.

### How do you rate the level of support you received from Government of Pakistan during your displacement?


Building on this understanding, the 747 respondents who had had been internally displaced were asked how they rated the support they had received from the Government of Pakistan during their period of displacement.

Of the respondents, 255 rated the support they were provided as being at least good, of which only a very small minority of 18 people (or 2.4% of this select study) rated government intervention as excellent.

Troublingly, half of the sample (49.1%) held a negative opinion of governmental initiatives to support them during their displacement. Within this figure, the majority – constituting 31.5% of the total sample – considered the assistance offered to have been very poor. This finding was further supported by both male and female focus groups –


<sup>20</sup> UNHCR IDP Operation in Pakistan- Report 2009

Figure 4.24: If you were displaced: where did you move to? (selected)



where concerns about access to basic human necessities, including food, shelter and security, were commonly identified. Also there were concerns that victims were not being sufficiently compensated for damage or loss of property.

**Figure 4.25: How do you rate the level of support you received from Government of Pakistan during your displacement?**



Criticism levelled at the government has not been restricted to IDPs. The media have also noted that conditions of support are generally unsatisfactory.

From the data recorded it appears that levels of support have been dependent on location. IDPs from Swat and Malakand appear to have received better treatment as they repatriated within six months; while those from Bajaur and Mohmand continue to be subjected to hardships and living in deplorable conditions.

It is interesting to note that support for military operations is strongest among those that have not been victim to displacement, while pessimism is most strongly held by those that have been forced to leave their homes and communities.

**Military operations in FATA**

**What do you think of the Pakistan army's military offensive in FATA**

There have been more than 15 military offensives within FATA against the TTP and other militant groups. As has been recorded, military operations were viewed with scepticism in the beginning – a


reality that encouraged some political parties, such as: Pakistan Muslim League (N), Jamaat-e-Islamai (JI), Jamiat e Ulema e Islam (JUI) and Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaaf (PTI), to pressurise the government to start dialogue with the militants. But as shown by Figure 4.26, the military and its operations can be seen to have grown in legitimacy.

With regard to 2011, two-thirds of respondents (66.8%) supported military operations in FATA, of which 36.7% were in full support. This is in comparison to 18.5% who oppose them to some degree; perhaps motivated by the excessive force sometimes used in fighting militants. Reports from battlefields show that on occasion, innocent people have been caught in the cross-fire, leaving many killed or injured; also, much of local infrastructure has been destroyed; and local economies undermined.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that the military enjoys the support of the majority of people in FATA. This gives them a mandate to continue operating in FATA, and to oppose the Taliban style of governance that threatens Pakhtun culture and society. Based on the same question the survey has sought to disaggregate the information based on tribal areas.


Based on this, it can be seen that the military retains support in both areas that have been severely affected by fighting and others that have been less affected. Bajaur Agency, for example, has been the

**Figure 4.26: What do you think of the Pakistan army's military offensive in FATA**



**Figure 4.27: What do you think of the Pakistan army’s military offensive in FATA? (breakdown by region)**

■ Strongly support 
 ■ Somewhat support 
 ■ Somewhat oppose 
 ■ Strongly oppose 
 ■ Don't know 
 ■ No Response



location of considerable conflict since August 2008 – resulting in much destruction to property and communities; however support for the military remains high with approximately 70% of respondents offering their backing. This sentiment is shared in Kurram Agency, where some 65% of the local population support the military operation, and in Orakzai Agency by approximately 80% of the 280 people questioned. These agencies are also both locations of fighting between militants and government forces.

In Khyber Agency, where there has been only limited conflict, comprising a low intensity operation against Mangal Bagh of Lashkar-e-Islam in Bara tehsil, the local population remain sympathetic. Of the 760 sample size, 365 respondents declared at least *partial support* for military operations in FATA. However, it must be noted that this support is not universal, as a significant minority (18%) oppose the military, and generally have a strong opinion on the matter.

Greatest opposition to military operations appears to be in South Waziristan Agency, where the greatest number of respondents *fully opposes* army offences in FATA. Overall, 50% of respondents from this Agency expressed a negative opinion in response to this question. Notable discontent was also held in North Waziristan, where 30% (double the regional average) shared the concern of their neighbour.

### Male FGDs

The FGDs generally support the findings outlined above, as participants identified that the military had been positive in countering the activities of militants in their respective tribal areas. However, some voices of discontent were raised in the frontier regions of Peshawar and Kohat, as well as in North Waziristan, where participants opined that the military had had a harmful impact on the poor without addressing the issue of militancy in a meaningful way.

### Female FGDs

Female participants were generally in favour of the military offensive in FATA. Representatives from Bajaur Agency did, however, acknowledge that many civilians had been killed during fighting:

necessitating the military take greater care in respecting the human rights of the communities they are supposed to be protecting.

### Support for or opposition to military tactics

With regard to the military tactics being used in FATA, the survey asked respondents which form they would consider most legitimate in fighting. The findings are documented in Figure 4.28. The first option provided to 4,000 male and female respondents from FATA, was whether or not they would support the Pakistani military pursuing Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign fighters inside FATA. More than half of the respondents, 60.0%, supported the notion while a quarter of the respondents (26.0%) opposed it. 10.1% did not know the answer and 4.0% did not share their opinion.

From the information collected it is clear that the FATA population does not wish to have involvement of international military in their territory. This is unsurprising as only limited confidence is recorded over international assistance being offered for indirect activities, such as training security providers operating in FATA. International assistance to the Pakistani military was *strongly opposed* by 68% of respondents (and supported by less than 5%). This figure rises to some 75% at the suggestion of an independent US military intervention in FATA (an option supported by less than 1%).


The only option that was seen to have legitimacy was that the Pakistani military continue to pursue insurgents within FATA, as they have been doing, free from external interference. This was supported by 60% of respondents (the majority of whom did so strongly) and universally in male and female focus groups. In comparison only about a quarter of survey participants opposed this option.

### Do you support or oppose the presence of the following groups in FATA?

To further understand FATA attitudes to external actors, survey respondents were asked the extent to which they supported non-traditional influences in FATA.

It is evident from the survey questionnaire and

Figure 4.28: Support for or opposition to military tactics



FGDs that FATA communities do not desire the presence of non-traditional actors. This is unsurprising given documented historical opposition to the Pakistani military (before it gained legitimacy in recent years) and continued mistrust in the Pakistan Police infrastructure.

The data documented in Figure 4.29 shows that some 85% of respondents opposed the presence of US military in FATA, in comparison to just 3.7% who were supportive. Almost 10% were unsure whether US intervention would be beneficial.

Similar attitudes were described with regard to Arab and foreign Al Qaeda fighters, as approximately 80% of respondents recorded at least some opposition; male focus groups opined that this was in part due to its role in undermining Islam. A total of 149 survey participants (equal to

that supporting US involvement) supported their presence in FATA. Taliban fighters, either from Afghanistan and Pakistan were also resisted by approximately 75% and 70% respectively. Interestingly, a small but notable minority of respondents supported their presence, particularly Pakistani Taliban who were approved by 10% of those interviewed. Female focus groups concurred with the negative perceptions of these external groups and added that they had been a direct cause of hardship in FATA.

### US Drone attacks in FATA

Opposition to US involvement in FATA may be directly linked to the impact and perceived legitimacy of drone attacks in tribal areas, especially in North and South Waziristan.

Drone attacks are very controversial as they violate




international humanitarian laws because they perpetrate what could be defined as extrajudicial killings; they also violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and can be indiscriminate: killing innocent people, including women and children. Over the last two years, following the election of US president Barak Obama, there has been a significant increase in the number of drone attacks in Pakistan killing some 2,500 people and injuring a further 207.<sup>21</sup> Most of these attacks have taken place in the Agencies of North Waziristan and South Waziristan, areas suffering from considerable interference from Afghan Taliban. It is difficult to judge the overall value of these attacks on militants in FATA.

These attacks have been greeted with much public condemnation, however, it is alleged that a secret deal has been signed between the US and Pakistan

allowing for these strikes to continue unabated in FATA. It would be inaccurate however, to state that residents in FATA are universally opposed to drone attacks. Data outlined in Figure 4.29 and 4.30 show that some support is offered for these attacks, but it is a very marginal perception. In 2011 only 6% of respondents considered this military option to be justified, largely in exceptional circumstance. This support is considered to be held largely in areas close to Talibanised regions where the Pakistan Army has been unable to effectively oppose militants.


Survey data shows that 63.0% of respondents were of the opinion that drone attacks were *never justified*, an opinion likely influenced by the holding of several peaceful protests and rallies against drone attacks over the last year; these have often

**Figure 4.29: Do you support or oppose the presence of the following groups in FATA?**



<sup>21</sup> Between 29 January 2008 and 16 November 2011 CAMP has recorded 283 drone attacks in FATA, CAMP Database of drone attacks

Figure 4.30: What do you think of US drone strikes in FATA?



been led by political parties (especially the PTI) and civil society organisations. Considerable opposition to drone attacks is also, in part, a direct result of the fear held by over one-third (34.1%) of respondents that this military intervention (see Figure 4.8) was a threat to individuals' security.

Greatest support for drone attacks was recorded in the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki and Tank, also Kurram Agency and North Waziristan – otherwise only very limited belief in their justification is recorded in FATA. Almost one-third of respondents were not able to provide an opinion.

### Male FGDs

Not surprisingly all participants opposed the drone strikes and it was opined that what support there was came from Peshawar or Islamabad; areas that were considered to not have a very clear idea of the impact of drone strikes on innocent people and communities.

### Female FGDs

Limited knowledge of the problem was exhibited in female FGDs but for those that were aware, it was commonly believed that the US was irresponsibly killing innocent people, including women and children.

However, participants from Lower Kurram supported these attacks, because they felt they were addressing the issue of Talibanisation in FATA; a phenomenon that had taken the entire population hostage. Therefore, there is a sentiment that if the Pakistan Army was unable to address the problem then someone else had to take action. This response goes some way to understanding the data for Kurram Agency found in Figure 4.31.

### Nuclear possession and national security

Pakistan, as a nation, is quite defensive of its nuclear weapons capability. The survey sought to explore how secure the respondents felt about possessing these weapons considering their reputation in international relations and with regard to international security.

Considering the history of conflict and rivalry with India, the responses recorded are not surprising. Nearly three-quarters of respondents (73.2%) believed that possessing a nuclear weapon was vital for national security; this figure is however, a continuation of levels of uncertainty, rather than growing opposition, recorded since 2008. There is no indication whether this trend will continue into the future. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people from FATA believe that retaining a nuclear

**Figure 4.31: What do you think of US drone strikes in FATA? (Agency wise break down)(Percentage)**

■ Always justified   
 ■ Sometimes justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided   
 ■ Never justified  
■ No response   
 ■ No opinion   
 ■ Don't know





Figure 4.32: Do you think possessing nuclear weapons enhances Pakistan's security?



capability is essential – a belief almost universally shared by FGD participants, except males from South Waziristan, who considered the weapons to be a vital deterrent particularly to threats from India.

## Conclusion

The overall objective of this chapter was to make explicit the impact of conflict in FATA.

In spite of external perceptions of the *Pakhtun* tradition being isolated (i.e. out of touch with security and political concerns outside of the region), respondents have displayed a strong understanding of FATA's position in the international arena.

Also, this chapter allows for external stakeholders in FATA and other interested parties to gain a strong understanding of the region and specifically community perceptions. Data that should inform policy and allow for the development of strategies that are sensitive to local attitudes and aspirations.

Primarily, it is essential to recognise that two-thirds of people interviewed were of the opinion that Pakistan was heading in the wrong direction, with the issues of 'law and order', 'corruption' and

'inflation' being of particular concern. In addition, 'terrorist attacks' were identified as the major threat to individuals' security. It was also recorded that differences of opinion on the impact of military operations could be disaggregated based on experiences of internal displacement. These preliminary findings should be the basis for a more, in-depth inquiry and also the subject of policy and post-conflict strategies.

A level of pragmatism was also evident in terms of support for government military operations; but contention remains as to their interaction with external forces (i.e. in the form of US intervention and use of drone attacks), which were commonly opposed. A finding compounded by data that records that the West – with a few exceptions (for example when training the Frontier Corps) - has a poor reputation in FATA. This reality is likely to inhibit counter-insurgency. Therefore, it is important for the Government of Pakistan to address the internal issues that are motivating, or at the very least, enabling acts of terrorism – for example underdevelopment – which can in part be achieved without necessarily requiring overt international support. The reputation of the West is investigated in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

# CHAPTER 5

## Attitude Towards Religion and Militancy







## CHAPTER 5

## Attitude Towards Religion and Militancy

Religiously motivated militancy has a long and significant international history, including in South Asia. In Pakistan, Islamic militancy has aided in rallying people together in order to help forge an independent nation state. It must therefore be acknowledged that militancy, despite its contemporary impingement on liberal politics and rights to self-determination, has contributed to the forging of local and national identities. This legitimacy has changed as attitudes have evolved: for example, the 1979 insurgency in Afghanistan - against invading Soviet Union forces - was at the time considered a legitimate act of defiance; receiving support (albeit as a direct consequence of the 'Cold War') by the West, and in particular the US. This support enabled religious militants to achieve great military success and also usurp the political power of the contemporary liberal sovereign government of Afghanistan.

Subsequently, these militants have continued to threaten liberal values and international peace and security by directly training and safeguarding 'terrorists' that have exacerbated civil-conflicts (e.g. in Somalia) and fought in the 'War on Terror'. Nevertheless, describing attitudes towards religious militants in Pakistan is often confusing, as propaganda from all sides has created an environment within which opinions have become difficult to form. This is because, communities are both being called to fight for the sake of Muslim Kashmir and the Jihad in Afghanistan, while also being called to support governmental security forces as part of the defence of liberal values and the 'War on Terror'.

From Chapters 1 and 4, it is evident that insecurity is the primary concern in FATA and that Pakistan's military is for the most part trusted as a provider of law and order. This chapter seeks to examine in greater detail the extent to which people either

oppose religious militancy or simply desire stability.

### Islamic extremism and its threat to Pakistan

Respondents were asked at the beginning of this study on militancy, to define: 'How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism currently pose to Pakistan?'

It was revealed that in 2011 some 46.0% of survey participants believed Islamic extremism to be at least a fairly great threat to Pakistan, while 21.0% were of the opinion that it was *not a threat at all*. This appears to show that, while general opinion appears to be the same, attitudes are changing. It is notable that this latter figure, which appears to be accepting of Islamic extremism, is comparable to information listed in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 of total positive attitudes towards the Taliban, in its different guises.


In 2010, approximately 45.0% of respondents perceived the threat to be *very great* and a further 25.0% to be *fairly great*. This is a reduction of some quarter of all respondents. Conversely, rejection of Islamic militancy as a threat was held by only 11.0% of people in 2010. Nevertheless, the levels of concern regarding Islamic extremism are notable as only 21.5% of respondents had previously declared 'extremism' to be the primary reason for violence in FATA (see Figure 4.9).

This dramatic shift is, in part, a manifestation of the debate that continues over who is responsible for insecurity in Pakistan. As documented in Figure 4.10: opinion on responsibility for high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan is largely split between the West (particularly the US), which was censured in excess of 50.0% of respondents, and the religious militant groups of the Taliban and *Al Qaeda*, censured by approximately 40.0% of people. But

also, as documented by female FGDs, this could be the result of changing perceptions towards whether extremists can be classified as Muslims.

any opinion on the subject, however, those that did generally were of the opinion that extremists could not be classified as being Muslims, as the acts perpetrated by the Taliban, *Al Qaeda* and suicide

Figure 5.1: How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?



It is essential that further research be undertaken to try and understand why Islamic extremism is growing in acceptance, while perceptions of it being a threat are reducing - is it, for example, because of increased acceptance of more radical forms of Islam in FATA; a reaction to individuals' concerns regarding drone attacks (see Figure 4.8); conflict fatigue; or, the result of local perceptions changing towards the motivations of militants (i.e. self-interest instead of Islam). This additional research may also elicit the perceptions of almost one-third of respondents who were unable or unwilling to provide an answer.

### Male FGDs

Male respondents agreed with the view that Islamic extremism was a direct threat to Pakistan, as it devalued the very identity of the country.

However, as noted above, recriminations against Western policies were also evident in motivating, and potentially legitimising, extremism as a consequence of their facilitating the 'occupation' of Islam in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as in Kashmir).

### Female FGDs

The majority of female respondents did not offer

bombers were not true to Islam; it was opined that the targeted killing of *Shia* or *Sunni* were not true manifestations of any religion. However, if they were to be, then Islamic extremism was agreed to be a source of ruin from religious and societal norms in Pakistan.

### Describing the Pakistani Taliban

Following on from this, the survey team asked respondents to give their views on two known groups of insurgents: the Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban. To begin with, interviewees were asked to choose the characterisation that they thought best described the Pakistani Taliban.

From the information recorded: there does not appear to be a significant change between surveys, with a few notable exceptions. Accordingly, the majority of respondents continue to possess a negative attitude towards the Pakistani Taliban. In 2011, 30.3% of people considered the Taliban to be terrorists (compared to 27.4% in 2010) and 22.7% that they were uneducated youths (compared to 24.2% in 2010). From this evidence, it is clear that for the last two years approximately one-half of respondents viewed the Pakistan Taliban in less than favourable terms. In addition, 12-18%



considered the membership of this organisation to comprise foreign fighters, who, it is assumed are not fighting for the interests of the FATA communities.

The most striking difference between 2010 and 2011 is the growth in acceptance of the Pakistani Taliban as *defenders of Islam*. In 2011, 12.1% considered them to be defenders of Islam; this figure is almost three times greater than that recorded a year before. This belief was supported by the perceptions held by approximately 9.0% of respondents who considered their actions to be in defence of *tribal communities and freedom*. As noted above, the culmination of these figures is similar to those holding the belief that Islamic extremism is not a threat in Pakistan. Overall, this finding is surprising as findings outlined in Chapter 4, regarding the performance of security providers, did not appear to show much hostility to military operations on grounds of support for the Taliban.

Another notable change is that the number of people unable to provide an opinion has risen sharply to almost one-quarter of respondents from 14.3% in 2010. This may be a further indication of


confusion over the root causes of conflict in FATA.

Overall, the survey suggests that, although the majority of respondents have a negative perception of the Pakistani Taliban, a growing minority are beginning to provide them with support, or at least recognise the validity of their aims. It is therefore essential that perceptions of security and representation (see Chapter 1) be expanded, to allow for future data to be collected on the extent to which concern in FATA relates to attempts to expel extremism, particularly if it is considered by some to be part of local culture in tribal areas.

### Male FGDs

Male focus group participants further exemplified the different views expressed, and gave some indication of inter-Agency differences. Overall, the majority viewed the Taliban as a 'terrorist' organisation; however in FR Peshawar and the Agencies of North and South Waziristan the view was expressed that the Pakistani Taliban had never attacked civilians and were not a threat and that negative attitudes were the result of Western influence on the media.

Figure 5.2: How would you describe Pakistani Taliban?



**Female FGDs**

The majority of female participants were personally unsure of the character of the Pakistani Taliban, but they noted (as above) that it was not Islamic to use violence against other Muslims, or human-beings in general.

**Describing the Afghan Taliban**

A similar question was asked of the Afghan Taliban.


Arguably, the most startling finding is that in excess of one-third of respondents were unable to answer

FATA and individuals’ fears of drone attacks and suicide bombing.

**Male FGDs**

Most participants, in contrast to the perceptions expressed regarding the Pakistani Taliban, viewed the Afghan Taliban positively, with only a minority opposing this view. In summary, it was commonly asserted the Afghan Taliban were freedom fighters, fighting against the Western occupation of their homeland.

**Figure 5.3: What phrase best describe Afghan Taliban?**



the question, again showing a greater uncertainty. This common theme has affected both the number of those that perceive the Afghan Taliban to be Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation (23.6% - staying roughly similar, if slightly up from 2010) and those that consider them to be terrorists (24.8% - down approximately 12% points); interestingly, the perception of the Afghan Taliban being Islamic heroes is half that recorded in 2008, while the perception of them being terrorists has doubled in the same amount of time. These responses are likely to be directly linked to perceptions regarding increased trust in objectives of the Pakistani military to oppose ‘terrorists’ in

**Female FGDs**

Female participants appeared to disagree with the findings of the male FGDs, particularly in the Agencies of Kurram, Mohmand and Orakzai, where opinion was negative of the Afghan Taliban; in South Waziristan Agency, participants failed to express an opinion. The general consensus was that the Afghan Taliban had taken against the local population and created numerous hardships within FATA.

**Conclusions on the Taliban**

Overall, the data presented in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 indicates that, for both the Pakistani and Afghan

Taliban, there is a lot of indecision, with on average approximately one-third of respondents not able to characterise their attitude towards these organisations. It is also apparent that the Afghan Taliban has greater support as representatives of Islam than their Pakistani counterparts, but this does not correspond to their being welcomed in FATA especially as only 12.1% of respondents believe the Pakistani Taliban to be ‘defenders of Islam’, a further question would be required to elucidate this. However, it must be noted that support for the Pakistani Taliban does appear to be growing.

Interestingly, 10.0% of respondents consider the Afghan Taliban to be explicitly ignorant of Islam (this figure should however, not be considered accurate as many who view them as terrorists may do so for this same reason): an argument that devalues their reputation as Islamic heroes. A further 22.0% of respondents considered the Pakistani Taliban to be uneducated youths, and therefore, it is assumed, not as indicated before: recognisable ‘defenders of Islam’.

In contrast to this view of defenders of ‘Islam’/‘freedom fighters’, a very significant minority viewed the Afghan Taliban (25.0%) and the Pakistani Taliban (30.0%) to be nothing more than terrorists. This shows that perceptions are changing and that, for many, these organisations are losing their legitimacy and trust.

Regardless, it appears the Government of Pakistan must work with tribal communities to explain the political, social and economic reasons that they are vigorously pursuing conflict with the Taliban, and why it is working with international partners who appear to be perceived by many as the enemy. Otherwise conflict may continue indefinitely in the region.

**Perceptions on the likelihood of the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan**

On questions regarding the characterisation of the Afghan Taliban, the survey team asked respondents to state whether they believe the Afghan Taliban would return to power in their homeland. This question, is important in that it will help to determine whether the support being provided to


the Afghan Taliban is forlorn and whether the violence that is associated with the organisation is perceived to be of value. Consequently, these perceptions could have a bearing on public support regarding the pursuit of militants by the Pakistani Army.

This question has been asked since 2008 and the results for those that believe the Afghan Taliban will return to power have remained quite constant, fluctuating between 25-30%. The greatest fluctuations have been with regard to those do not believe they will return and those that do not know.

In 2011, only 15.8% of respondents do not believe they will return to power; a figure more than half that of 2010 (37.2%) and the lowest value recorded to date. Those that were not able to answer comprised almost 60.0% of respondents, a significant rise in the number represented in the previous year (34.6%). It is not evident why this change of opinion has occurred, but it must be stated that in spite of the reduction in number of those that do not think they will return to power there has been no increase in the number that think they will.

It is understandable that survey participants are unsure as conflict appears to continue unabated in FATA, with military operations being thus far unable to secure complete control of territory in either FATA or Afghanistan itself.

**Figure 5.4: Perceptions on the likelihood of the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan**



Accordingly, the data appears to be more closely linked to the contemporary situation in Afghanistan rather than one of excessive bias. Regardless, this question is not an endorsement of the violent operations used by the Taliban in either FATA or Afghanistan. Additional questions would need to be asked, in order to understand whether a successful return to power can only possibly be achieved by violence alone, and whether violence is considered a legitimate means of seeking a return to power in Afghanistan?

### Male FGDs

There were contrasting views expressed in the male FGDs. Some participants believed that the Afghan Taliban would return to power, following the defeat of US forces

In comparison, other participants opined that the Taliban would not be able to return to power because they would not be accepted by the people of Afghanistan.

### Female FGDs

The common perception of participants was that they did not know whether the Afghan Taliban would return to power.


### How would you feel about this if they did?

In response to a question concerning anticipated feelings should the Afghan Taliban return to power: again the majority of respondents (41.7%) were not able to answer. It is not evident whether this relates to a certain level of apathy towards issues outside of FATA or an unwillingness/inability to offer an opinion.

Perhaps surprisingly, given attitudes to Islamic extremism in Pakistan (see Figure 5.1), a strong minority of respondents believe that Afghanistan would be better off if the Taliban returned to power; this is supported by 19.2% of respondents who would feel *very good* about this and 20.4% who would feel *somewhat good*. In comparison, less than 19.0% would feel to some degree: *bad*.

The findings of this data are not entirely apparent but show that many people support the return of the Afghan Taliban to power in Afghanistan, it could be argued that this is an endorsement of the

**Figure 5.5: How would you feel about Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan?**




perception that the Taliban is fighting for Islam (see Figure 5.3); however, as shown in Chapter 6, this could equally be an example of the FATA people's desire for Afghan refugees to be repatriated.

Also, understanding of the figures relating to those who would feel badly if the Afghan Taliban, returned to power could either reflect a revulsion to Islamic fundamentalism (see Figure 5.1) or as opined by some members from the male FGDs could result in a further decline in law and order in FATA. Consequently, the answer to this question (and that reported in Figure 5.4), while remaining valuable, requires further analysis.

### Al Qaeda

It has been alleged that local tribes in FATA have given shelter to Al Qaeda. This survey has sought to

**Figure 5.6: Do you know what Al-Qaeda is?**



discover if respondents were aware of Al Qaeda. In both 2011 and 2010, approximately one-third of respondents were aware; the remaining two-thirds, perhaps, were not. Al Qaeda is often mentioned in the media and discussed at *hujra* gatherings, therefore, the discrepancy in knowledge may not be as stark as it is recorded: instead fear of intelligence agencies, Taliban and Al Qaeda informers could have influenced respondents.

Those who answered ‘yes’ they did know about Al Qaeda were subsequently asked to express their views on the network. As illustrated by Figure 5.7, 20% of respondents held a favourable view of Al Qaeda but the 57.3% viewed them in some unfavourable light.

Again there has been a significant change with regard to those that could not provide an answer. This is reminiscent of the findings on the Taliban, again indicating that a growing confusion has arisen. It is not clear why this is the case, it could perhaps be a result of stalling military progress against Al Qaeda; a loss of support for the ‘War on Terror’; or, a fear of saying something incriminating.

**Male FGDs**


Based on the present situation in FATA and the continuing impact of the ‘War on Terror’, the general feeling was that Al Qaeda is a negative network. However, some participants from North Waziristan declared support for Al Qaeda in their fight for Islam against the West.

**Female FGDs**

Female participants noted that they were aware of Osama Bin Laden but were not as knowledgeable on Al Qaeda. They considered Osama bin Laden to have been a good man, spending much money to provide services for local people.

From this, it seems the Government of Pakistan is going to need to engage with communities to educate them on how Al Qaeda and other religious militants are devaluing rather than empowering communities; thus, why the government is engaged in a ‘War on Terror’ against organisations led by individuals such as Osama bin Laden.

**Figure 5.7: What do you think of Al Qaeda?**




**Foreign Jihadi fighters living in FATA**

Foreign Jihadi fighters began entering FATA in the early-1980s, during the Soviet-Afghan War. At its conclusion, many local tribes offered asylum and protection to these fighters under the code of *Pakhtunwali*. It is not clear what role these forces played during Taliban supremacy in Afghanistan, but it is believed that since the US-led intervention they have, along with new international fighters, responded to the call of *Jihad*.

Given the influence of international fighters in FATA, respondents were asked to express their views on how communities should respond, as a consequence of their impact on peace and security in the tribal areas. Interviewees were invited to give more than one opinion.

From the information presented in Figure 5.8 it appears that the majority desire that these international fighters leave. In 2011, 72.8% opined that these internationals should be asked to leave; while, 28.5% considered that they should be removed by force. This opinion is a continuation of attitudes expressed in 2010 – respondents were only able to make one selection so the data is not entirely comparable, but approximately 43% of respondents desired the forced eviction of international fighters and a further 25% opined that they should be asked to leave.

**Figure 5.8: What should happen to any foreign fighter/Jihadi currently living in FATA?**



In contrast only 3.5% responded that these internationals should be allowed to stay; but this increased to 10.8% if they agreed to abide by a ceasefire. This opinion coincides with general attitudes towards Afghan refugees (see Chapter 6) and mistrust of governmental institutions when imposed on FATA (see Chapters 1 and 4); as well as reinforcing the perception that tribal communities resent external influences on their culture and traditions.

Overall, 12% of respondents did not believe that there were international fighters in FATA.

Almost half of those questioned did not provide a view on the subject. Therefore, while the information documented is compelling, it may not be fully descriptive of communal attitudes.

**Male FGDs**

Male focus groups were in general agreement that foreign fighters should be forced to leave because they were a violent source of insecurity. However, it was considered that the Pakistani military would have to intervene to ensure this outcome because these fighters were unlikely to leave if asked peacefully.

Other respondents did note that there might be some complication as a result of some international

fighters settling in their host community by marrying local women and possessing property.


**Female FGDs**

Female participants were unaware of foreign fighters in FATA.

**Role of religion in FATA**

Religion plays an important role in political and social life in Pakistan, as well as inspiring, and legitimising, the various stages of *Jihad*. Consequently, interviewees were asked to indicate what role, if any, religion should play in their lives. Unlike in previous years, respondents were invited to make more than one choice from those offered (only key data is listed in Figure 5.9).

**Figure 5.9: Role of religion in FATA**



In 2011, two-thirds of respondents (67.5%) stated that they believed that religion should *provide a moral code that every one should follow* (for information on the religious practices of respondents see the Annex on the demography of the survey). Religion’s utility as a ‘moral code’ is a common expectation, with respondents increasingly allocating this responsibility (as its primary role) between 2008 and 2010.

Additionally, it was maintained by one-third of participants (34.5%) that religion should *dictate women’s rights*. This attitude is likely to be significant if the security concerns of women (identified in Chapter 1) and concerns about community inclusion in governance and development (see Chapter 3) are to be facilitated. Consequently, initiatives will need to be sensitive to the context and not antagonise or marginalise different societal groups. It should be noted that, in 2010 only 4.6% of interviewees considered this control the primary responsibility of religion.


were of the opinion that religion should *play no role in politics*.

Building on these findings, questions were asked of how respondents view the two issues of: 1) ‘Honour killings’, related to one of the fundamental pillars of *Pakhtun* culture and 2) ‘Suicide bombings’, a controversial aspect that is related to extremist Islam, as aspects of society in FATA that may be influenced by religious codes of conduct.

**‘Honour killing’**

Since 2008, it appears that perceptions have changed. CAMP’s first survey of FATA documented that 61% of respondents felt that ‘honour killing’ was not justifiable compared to the some 33% that it may be condoned in certain situations. In 2011, this perception had been reversed with approximately 45% agreeing that act was condonable compared to just 38% that continued to believe that it is not.

Figure 5.10: Do you think that a person has the right to kill a relative to protect the honour of their family?



A further 21.0% of people considered that religion should define criminal and civil laws. This again would have implications for initiatives to integrate communities and therefore must be considered, as above. Data recorded also found that 10.8% of respondents should *define how governments are selected*; a point of view rejected by 1.3%, who

It is not evident why this change has occurred, but this increase may be the result of instances of Talibanisation or Islamic extremism influencing social conventions. Nonetheless, it appears that if religion is to provide a ‘moral code’ then contemporary demands may be more conservative than they were in previous years.



### Male FGDs

The majority of respondents were opposed to the practise of ‘honour killing’ as they termed it a breach of an individual’s human rights. A few respondents were of the opinion that this act was deep-rooted in tradition and should be considered a cultural undertaking: however, it was considered only being legitimate after a properly conducted investigation into the case.

### Female FGDs:

Female participants opposed ‘honour killing’, as they asserted it was against human rights standards and the principles of Islam.

### Justification of suicide bombing in Islam

In contrast to ‘honour killing’ respondents have generally retained a consistently negative attitude towards the practice of suicide bombing. In 2011 the majority of those interviewed (approximately 60%) declared that this act of terror was *never justified*. This is a marginal increase on data from 2010 and an increase of some 17% points from 2009 (while this figure is lower it remained the most significant answer for the year).

Attitudes in support of suicide bombing remained low as only 2.6% of interviewees thought that suicide bombing was *justified*, and 11.4% *rarely justified*. This is the lowest level of acceptance

recorded for this question in the three years that it has been asked.

Aside from these findings, it appears that a considerable number of survey participants are unsure of their attitudes. This could be linked to uncertainty regarding the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

As a consequence, it appears that the moral code of participants is strongly against the use of suicide bombing; however, for a significant minority it appears that it can be justified if defending Islam (see female FGDs).

### Male FGDs

Participants opined that suicide bombing (and the intended targeting of innocent civilians in general) was against Islam and liberal human standards.

### Female FGDs

Surprisingly, given female focus group participants’ attitudes towards Afghan Taliban some conflicting views were apparent. While some agreed with their male counter-parts others stated that because of anti-Islamic Western influence in the region ‘their Muslim brothers and sisters in Afghanistan’ needed support, including the use of suicide bombings if they are targeted at ‘enemies’.

It is not evident what form of enemy target could be attacked by suicide bombers; however, since

Figure 5.11: Justification of suicide bombing in Islam







Figure 5.12: Trusted religious authorities

■ 2008 (%) ■ 2009 (%) ■ 2010 (%) ■ 2011 (%)



female focus group participants have stated that it is anti-Muslim to target (see above) Muslims and civilians, it must be presumed that only military and infrastructure can be attacked.

**Trusted religious authorities**

As religion plays such a significant role in social and political life in FATA, the survey team sought to identify which religious authority was the most trusted by individuals. This builds on information acquired in previous years, but for 2011 extra options were offered to interviewees.

Significantly, approximately one-third of options did not believe that any authority was trustworthy, while a comparable number were not able to provide an opinion. With regard to the views of those that did offer an opinion: no particular individual or organisation secured dominant support.

Amir Liaqat Hussain, a presenter on a religious talk show, leads the list with 7.4% of respondents identifying him as being trustworthy; an increase from the 2.4% that he recorded in 2010. Last years leading authorities: the late Dr. Israr Ahmed and Tahir-ul-Qadri received endorsements from 6.1% and 5.7% of survey participants respectively, in 2011.


With regard to religious organisations, the TTP received the greatest trust (4.5%), followed by Sipah-e-Shaba (4.0%) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (3.0%). Cumulatively, religious organisations included in the survey received some 16% of respondent support. This is considered troubling, as these organisations are extremists and currently engaged in militancy against the Pakistan Army.

The lack of definitive support for a particular religious focal-point devalues the shared desire for Islam to provide a ‘moral code’ for the people of FATA as there is evidently a lack of consensus as to what values should be prioritised, with both liberal and conservative agendas competing with already established sectarian divides. This reality could result in increased violence as militants seek to impose their generally extreme conservative values on others.

**Most trusted religious authority outside of Pakistan**

When asked the same question of external religious authorities, interestingly only 1.1% of respondents declared none – this appears to indicate a strong influence of international Islamic leaders. Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman continues to receive the greatest support as identified by 45% of people;

**Figure 5.13: Most trusted religious authority outside of Pakistan**



while this remains very significant the total continues to show a decline in his influence, as recorded in all subsequent years to his 2008 high of 75%. It is not clear why this phenomenon is repeating as the people of Pakistan, including FATA, hold Saudi Arabia and the Imam Sudees in high regard.

Dr. Zakir Naik of India, has maintained his approximate endorsement of approximately 15% for the third consecutive year, while Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i of Iran received endorsements from 13.3% of interviewees: an increase from that recorded in recent years.

While it appears there is a greater focal-point for religious guidance from abroad, one-third of respondents remain unsure. This option which was included for the first time in the 2011 survey appears to show that there is greater uncertainty between these leaders than previously identified rather than a show of dissatisfaction, as only 0.3% of respondents selected: *other*.

## Conclusion

From the data it is clear that the people of FATA are devout in their beliefs, with the majority of respondents opining that Islam should provide a compass for people's moral code of living. However, it is equally apparent that there are significant differences as to the form of Islam that should be predominant; with particular divisions evident between conservative and liberal principles.

That being said, it appears that there is consensus regarding attitudes towards international *Jihadi* fighters, with a very strong majority stating that they should leave FATA, and by force if necessary.

Notwithstanding this example of unity, the different Islamic values (and/or cultural interpretations) of respondents were starkly illustrated with regard to perceptions on militancy, particularly in terms of legitimacy ascribed to the Taliban in its different guises and attitudes towards the threat that Islamic extremism poses to Pakistan. This difference in values within FATA needs to be recognised and studied in greater detail if governance and community-inclusion initiatives are to be effective.

It will also aid governmental initiatives to combat militants if they can understand and then justify theological and political opposition to these destructive organisations.



# CHAPTER 6

## Impact of Afghan Refugees





## CHAPTER 6


## Impact of Afghan Refugees

In this section, an examination is undertaken of FATA perceptions of the 30 year-long presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, particularly in the tribal areas, on the themes of: economy, instability, repatriation and Talibanisation.

### Repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan

Over the last four years respondents have been asked about their opinion on whether Afghan refugees should be repatriated. The overwhelming response, across all surveys, has been 'yes they should be repatriated'. In 2011, this majority comprised 81.4%, a small reduction on the data recorded in 2010. This opinion appears, in large part, to be the result of resentment felt towards Afghan refugees, as they are believed to be reducing the employment opportunities of indigenous communities; a viewpoint openly argued in both male and female FGDs.

**Figure 6.1: Should all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan return to Afghanistan**



Only a minimal percentage of people supported the notion of Afghan refugees remaining resident in Pakistan. It is notable that this support (8.0%) almost equates to the percentage of respondents

(7.9%) who supported the presence of 'Afghan Taliban fighters led by Mullah Omar in FATA (see Figure 4.29). This may indicate that those that do not support the return of Afghan nationals are also sympathetic to the Taliban; however, this cannot be confirmed. It could also reflect elements of integration in different communities. Future research would have to be undertaken to discern the meaning of this perspective.


### The Impact of Afghan Refugees on Pakistan's Economy

Following on from the question of Afghan repatriation, respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which Afghan refugees have damaged the economy of Pakistan. Perhaps surprisingly, negative attitudes towards Afghan refugees' impact on the economy are not as strongly felt as the desire for them to return to their homeland. In 2011, approximately half of respondents (48.2%) either strongly agreed (29.3%) or agreed (18.9%) that Pakistan's economy had been negatively impacted; a reduction in the levels of concern recorded historically.

Moreover, there appears to be an increase in the number of respondents that disagree with this sentiment. In 2010, some 6.0% of those surveyed did not believe that Afghan refugees had had an impact on the economy – this has risen to almost 15.0% in 2011. A further 33.2% of respondents either answered: *neither agree nor disagree* (18.3%) or *don't know* (14.9%).

These findings could illustrate that the strongly held desire for Afghan repatriation remains heavily linked to local concerns (e.g. employment competition, threats to security [see Figure 6.4] and traditional opposition to outside threats to cultural independence in FATA) rather than concerns for Pakistan as a whole. However, further research

**Figure 6.2: To what extent do you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan damage Pakistan's economy**




would be required to investigate this conjecture.

**Contributing to Pakistan's economy**

Building on this question of impact on Pakistan's economy, respondents were asked their opinion on whether they believed Afghan refugees were contributing to the economy. The majority of respondents were of the opinion that they were

not, with 19.2% *strongly disagreeing* and 37.4% disagreeing. This could not be considered surprising given the data recorded in Figure 6.1 and 6.2, and focus group comments on livelihood competition – but it appears to be a reversal of recent survey findings. That is, in 2010 only some 20.0% of respondents disagreed with the notion that Afghan refugees are not contributing to the economy.

**Figure 6.3: To what extent do you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan contribute to the Pakistan's economy**





Instead, the 2010 survey indicated that the majority of respondents were of the opposite opinion: with 40.3% saying they agreed with the statement that Afghan refugees were contributing to Pakistan’s economy, and a further 20.3% *strongly agreed*. Only 12.0% supported this attitude in 2011. While this lower level of recorded support for the perception that Afghan refugees are contributing to the economy is endorsed by other historical surveys, the data recorded in 2011 is particularly low. Further research is required to discover whether this change between 2010 and 2011 will be sustained.

**The impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan’s security**

In addition to the questions focused on the economy, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with the statement: ‘Afghan refugees living in Pakistan are undermining Pakistan’s security.’

As seen in Figure 6.2, more than half of those interviewed (52.7%) agreed with this assertion (of which: 31.5% *strongly agreed*). While this feeling is similar to the concern expressed towards the economic impact, it is a reduction in the concern expressed in answer to the same question in 2010. In 2010, in excess of 70.0% of respondents believed

that Afghan refugees had had a negative impact on security in FATA. From these answers it is not evident however, what aspects of hosting Afghan refugees they find a source of insecurity.

As previously noted (see Chapter 4) the threats of Talibanisation and drone strikes are sources of considerable insecurity in FATA, therefore either, in addition to others (e.g. crime, food security, economic security) could be seen as a cause for refugees to be considered an ‘undermining’ influence. Further research is required to understand this question.


The reason behind the decrease in positive responses against this statement (between 2010 and 2011) is also not very clear because there is no significant increase in the total number of those that disagree (12.5%). According, to this, respondents are not generally feeling more secure.

**Afghan refugees as a source of tension**

To some extent, uncertainties regarding perceptions of insecurity may be answered by the following question: ‘Afghan refugees living in Pakistan are a source of tension for the local Pakistani population.’ This question was first incorporated into the 2010 survey.

It is evident that, for both years, the majority of

**Figure 6.4: To what extent you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan undermine Pakistan’s security.**



respondents agreed with this statement; however, a significant decline can be seen between years. In 2010, some 80.0% agreed (half of which *strongly agreed*) with this notion; in comparison, this figure has dropped to 48.2% in 2011. These figures are roughly comparable with those relating to security. It can therefore be assumed that insecurity and tension are linked, but it is not clear what is meant by tension. Further research needs to be carried out to enable FATA communities to define what these tensions are.

Interestingly, a marginal number of respondents disagree that refugees are a source of tension compared to those who believe that they are a source of insecurity. This change may reflect local differences, with community integration marginally reducing tension yet not the overall levels of perceived insecurity, but it must be noted that this is conjecture.

## Conclusion


From the information recorded, it is evident that the people of FATA want to see Afghan refugees repatriated. What is not so clear is the reason why. FGD participants note livelihood competition, and the survey records that: approximately half of respondents believe that they have had a detrimental impact on Pakistan's economy and a similar percentage that they have increased

insecurity, but it is not evident the extent to which these concerns motivate the desire for repatriation.

Further research is necessary to map individuals' reasons for desiring repatriation – be it, for example: livelihood or development resources competition; economic concerns; security concerns; fears for local traditions; concerns regarding Talibanisation; or a belief that the security situation has improved in Afghanistan so it is time for them to go home. Conversely, it may be useful to ask: why respondents believe Afghan refugees want to stay? (e.g. is it because they feel insecure; they are part of the insurgency; they feel there is greater economic opportunities; or, because they feel accepted by their hosts). This may help to illustrate some of the barriers to repatriation and sources of conflict in the future.


Furthermore, it would be useful for research to be commissioned that will contextualise the situation of Afghan refugees in FATA – that is, define whether Afghan refugees have access to support from national and international agencies, and whether or not host tribal areas are being afforded access to the same level of support. This will aid in analysing whether external actors are contributing to these recorded perceptions.

**Figure 6.5: To what extent you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan create tension with the local Pakistani population.**



# CHAPTER 7

## Access to Information





## CHAPTER 7

## Access to Information

Since 2008; surveys have sought to track trends in FATA relating to access to information. Consequently, questions have been asked to elicit data on how knowledge is gained from external sources in the region: that is, the readership for newspapers, audience totals for radio programmes and the viewership of television. Additional questions sought to identify perceptions of how much value individuals ascribe to the media and the ways media influences social life.

### Information sources

Over the last four years, surveys have mapped respondents' preferred sources of accessible information. Figure 7.1 records the patterns of responses from 2008 onwards. Respondents are invited to specify more than one media source.

From the data recorded it seems that access to all forms of media is not universal, if it is considered that generally respondents will have offered more than one answer. Also, as seen in many of the female focus group discussions, a significant gender disparity may also be recorded in terms of access to formal news reporting services. That is, in response to several questions already documented in this survey, female participants' knowledge was dependent on the awareness of male family members. This may account for the high numbers of respondents that state either - *friends and family* (42.5%) or *neighbours* (37.7%).<sup>22</sup>

Aside from this observation, 'word of mouth' remains a significant conduit for information sharing as the percentage of people recording that they access information through *work colleagues* has also increased in recent years to a high of 20.8%.


With regard to formal media sources, *Pakistani radio* remains popular, despite data declining between 2011 (49.4%) and 2010 (55.0%) and Pakistani TV was identified by 33.4% of respondents. It must be acknowledged that fluctuations in these recordings may in part be influenced by the increased inclusion of women in the survey but also could be influenced by the destruction of property caused during conflict between militants and the military.

*Pakistani printed media* has seen some decrease in its popularity in recent years but it remains one of the leading avenues for news and information. Inconsistent levels of literacy may account for why this source of information sharing is fluctuating in accessibility (for some indication of literacy see the education level of respondents in the Annex: Demographics of survey and Figure 7.3). However, in contrast to other visual media, it can still be easily accessed at times of internal displacement and therefore its importance is likely to remain significant.

In terms of international influence: Voice of America's 'Deewa' *Pakhtu* radio service, a US government funded organisation, has gained in significance in FATA. In 2010, just 4.2% of respondents recorded it as being an accessible medium but this had risen to almost 20.0% in 2011. British radio has fallen significantly behind US alternatives but remains steady with an audience of approximately 10.0%. However, it should be noted that this figure does not correspond with data regarding BBC radio services identified in Figure 7.5: perhaps implying a greater sense of ownership of these British supported services. In terms of

<sup>22</sup> It is notable that the increased levels of respondents identifying 'friends and family' and 'neighbours' in 2010 and 2011 compared to 2008 and 2009 corresponds with increased involvement of women in the survey.

Figure 7.1: What are your sources of information that helps you to form your opinion?





access to *American TV* and *British TV* and the *internet*, it remains low as access to necessary equipment and infrastructure is largely limited to elites. Furthermore, access to English-language print media is understandably low (less than 1.0%) as limitations in those able to read the text are likely to be considerable.

### Most valued information sources

In order to better evaluate the quality of news that respondents believed they were receiving, interviewees were subsequently asked to identify the information providers that they most valued.

From the data it appears that formal, national media outlets are generally trusted by those who access them, with Pakistani radio, TV and print media receiving endorsements roughly similar, if lower, to the total numbers of people that accessed them. This indicates that the majority of people who access information through these providers trust what they are being told. This is significant, if the government wishes to continue to build confidence and oppose extremism; however, they must similarly be cautious of people gaining information from inflammatory sources within Pakistan. It must be noted however, that levels of literacy may influence the findings regarding trust in radio and TV as other formal sources of information could be inaccessible to those that cannot read, and therefore they are reliant on these sources.

Levels of trust in informal mechanisms, while remaining quite significant, is less favourable than other services. Data recorded that confidence in *family and friends*, *neighbours* and *work colleagues* has risen quite considerably since 2010; however it must be noted that these sources consistently score less than 75.0% of the total figure for those who access them. This is concerning as these information sources are likely to be the primary outlets for a significant number of people, particularly women. Therefore, for those who are dependent on these communication sources many are prevented from the right to form an opinion based on information that they trust; a reality that may help explain why significant numbers of responses have recorded with high percentages for

the answer *don't know*.

However, it is reassuring that only 1.4% of people state *none*, therefore information is being shared but it is not evident if respondents are gaining a holistic perspective of current social, economic and political issues, or whether access to local news is sufficient for their needs. Further research would be necessary to evaluate this question.

With regard to international media radio remains fairly well trusted, however with a greater correlation between the figures for US radio than for British radio. Surprisingly, a greater number of people (5.3%) trust *the internet*, *books and film* than access them – perhaps signalling a desire for greater access to these media than is currently available.

### Newspaper readership

To gain a stronger understanding of what information respondents were accessing, the 2011 survey asked interviewees to identify the newspapers they preferred to read.

The most significant change between the 2011 and 2010 surveys is the dramatic decrease in the number of respondents that were unable to answer. This is not a reflection of changing attitudes towards print media but is instead the result of positive change to the survey questionnaire: that is the 2011 survey included an additional choices that enabled respondents to note that they were either *unable to* (32.5%) or *chose not to* (27.7%) read newspapers.

With regard to the 40.0% of respondents that did access print media, *Mashriq* - an Urdu language daily newspaper - was most popular, read by over half of these (22.8%). A figure negligibly lower than that recorded in 2010. This is followed by *Aaj* - an alternative Urdu language daily newspaper – accessed by 16.6% of people

### TV audience

Again, a significant proportion, almost equal to the number of people that did not access newspapers, did not have a television (38.8%) or are prevented from watching / chose not to watch information programmes (18.5%).

Figure 7.2: Which sources of information do you value the most?






Figure 7.3: Which newspapers do you read regularly?





Figure 7.4: What TV Stations do you watch regularly?



For all respondents with access to a television, all Pakistani TV channels are available. The majority of television sets are installed in *hujras*, largely preventing women and children from accessing them: a further example of gender inequality in access to information.

Despite yearly fluctuations, *Pakistan Television (PTV)* is the most widely watched TV channel: ranging from 25.9% - 55.3% in the previous surveys, recording some 27.6% for 2011. Reasons for these yearly changes could, in part, be the result of militancy disrupting opportunities for TV channels (with the Taliban declaring the watching of television to be sinful) or internal displacement preventing access to programmes. Apart from PTV in popularity was the *AVT Khyber*, a private *Pashto* channel is the second most watched channel with coverage inside FATA, interestingly this service has seen much less disruption in viewing figures, but it is unclear why this is the case.

Also, almost 10.0% of respondents indicated a preference for *Geo News* - the most popular private channel in Pakistan. Because private transmission is not universally available this figure may be less than could otherwise be expected. This inability to reach all households is because satellite is very expensive and not a viable option for many; while cable is not available in FATA. Limitations in access and language are also likely to account for the low numbers of respondents that identified international TV channels.

### Radio listenership

Radio is much more accessible medium for information sharing than newspapers and television; with only 21.5% of respondents not possessing a radio at home and 2.7% choosing not to listen to it.

From the data recorded, it appears that respondents enjoy greater choice of national and internationally-led radio programming. In 2011, 28.7% of survey participants recorded that they listened to *Radio Pakistan*; a percentage exactly equal to the combined figures for *BBC Pushto* (15.5%) and *BBC Urdu* (13.2%). While a comparable

number (28.1%) of people stated that they listened to *Deewa* – this growth in popularity among all demographic groups in FATA is linked to its mix of both information and entertainment.

It is notable that despite radio growing as the most valuable means of learning news, data recorded in Figure 7.5 have for the most part reduced significantly (even by up to a half), for these leading radio stations, with the exception of *Deewa*; however no new station has ultimately gained in popularity. It can only be assumed that respondents are becoming more supportive of particular stations and therefore not choosing several as they were invited to.

Regarding the remainder of the radio stations: these are largely local stations servicing the needs of local communities or tribal areas and therefore do not have the reach of larger radio stations.


### Conclusion

From the research it is apparent that there is access to national and international news for significant number of the people of FATA: with radio largely providing a conduit for this process. The quality of these media appears to be strong in the eyes of respondents, with Pakistani media, in particular, gaining strong levels of trust.

However, gender disparity appears to be maintaining some levels of information poverty with women apparently being more dependent on: family, friends and neighbours.

There also appears to be strong bias for local language media, with English-language sources always receiving very low scores; this is not surprising given the language barriers preventing greater support. Surprisingly BBC local language stations receives a greater audience share than the value of 'British radio' (recorded in Figure 7.1) would suggest. This may be the result of a perceived attitude of local ownership (rather than UK ownership) for these stations - but additional research would be necessary to test this supposition.

Figure 7.5: Which Radio stations do you listen regularly?



This contradiction of support versus other attitudes expressed is also true with regard to *Deewa* radio. This is because, despite being funded by the US (a negatively perceived nation [see Chapter 8]), it enjoys a considerable audience.



## CHAPTER 8

# Attitudes Towards Pakistan's International Relations Policies







## CHAPTER 8

## Attitudes Towards Pakistan's International Relations Policies

The legacy of 9/11 has defined much of the world's debates around international relations and interventions, and this is no different in Pakistan. After exertion of US influence, Pakistan has become a significant front in 'War on Terror'. This position has afforded the Pakistan Government a strong position to contribute to global political dialogue; acquire infrastructure and institutional development assistance; and, aid in supporting poverty-reduction strategies.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of FATA perceptions regarding those countries with whom Pakistan shares a strong relationship. To this end the chapter is split into two sections: 1) Attitudes towards the US and UK; and 2) Attitudes towards the rest of the world.

### 8.1: Attitudes towards aid from the US and the UK

#### Military aid from the US and the UK

As documented in Chapter 4, there is much public debate over the effectiveness of military aid from the West, and in particular the UK and US, to the Frontier Corps (see Figure 4.20). To test these differing attitudes further, respondents were asked to give an opinion on whether or not Pakistan should accept funds from these nations in order to develop its military capability.


From the data recorded, it appears that public opinion opposes the acceptance of military aid: with 45.6% of respondents providing the answer no. In contrast only one-third of respondents thought that Pakistan should continue accepting this support. This figure may be considered surprising as military aid – through training - was considered by 50.0% of respondents to give them

more confidence in the Frontier Corps (see Figure 4.20).

The figures documented in Figure 8.1 for 2011 are interesting because they are comparable to those recorded in 2009, but a reversal of those for 2010. It is therefore apparent, from the survey (and FGDs), that there is no strong consensus in FATA (particularly as 20.6% of respondents *did not know*) with opinion continually changing. An outcome, likely linked to military outputs in FATA at the time of the survey – with successes reducing the perceived need for external interference and losses compelling desires for greater international support.

These attitudes appear not to be split along gender lines as, since 2010, surveys have sought to offer equal representation of both men and women. Therefore, the increase and subsequent decrease cannot be ascribed to inclusion of greater numbers of women in the survey process.

**Figure 8.1: Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for the military build up?**



Overall, this question requires further study to see what trend occurs in the long-term.

### Male FGDs

The majority of focus group participants were of the opinion that military aid placed Pakistan at a disadvantaged position because of the stringent conditions that are believed to be associated with this aid and should therefore not be accepted. It is not clear what these conditions are but they are possibly linked to the consistent demand from international partners to continue to support and champion the 'War on Terror'; a perspective that may be opposed because considerable minority of people look favourably on the Afghan Taliban (see Chapter 6).

However, in contrast respondents from the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Lakki, Tank and DI Khan thought that Pakistan would be better able to face challenges if it was equipped using aid from the US and UK.

### Female FGDs

Female participants were largely unable to provide an opinion but when they were forthcoming no consensus was formed. Some, like their male counterparts, thought that military aid disadvantaged Pakistan, while females from Orakzai Agency opined that military aid allowed the Pakistani military to better oppose their enemies.


### Developmental aid from US and/or UK

The survey also sought to elicit opinions on whether development aid, in contrast, should be accepted from the US and/or UK.

Regarding this question, opinion favoured the statement: Pakistan should accept developmental aid from the US and/or UK. Consequently, 48.4% of respondents answered yes while 32.0% said no. Again this view is comparable to 2009 and a variation on 2010. In 2010, almost three-quarters answered yes.

This drop in support for international aid regarding poverty-reduction strategies again signals that there is no clear consensus of opinion, particularly as almost 20.0% did not provide an opinion.

**Figure 8.2: Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for development?**



However, given cultural opposition to external interference perhaps this is not surprising.

### Male FGDs

As it may be expected, opinions expressed by male focus group participants were commonly supportive of Pakistan receiving aid from the US and/or UK for development; it was believed that assistance would better enable Pakistan to alleviate poverty, generate employment and change the lives of the people of Pakistan for the better, if used effectively.

### Female FGDs

Female respondents' echoed the responses of male FGDs. It was thought that aid would help to develop Pakistan and thus meet the aspirations of people in FATA.

### Opinions on the US

The potentially favourable desire of respondents to accept assistance from either the US and/or UK appears to somewhat contradict overall impressions of these two states. General attitudes towards the US and UK are recorded in Figure 8.3 and 8.5 respectively.

The data is compelling, with only a small minority of respondents looking towards these countries favourably; and the majority taking the opposite perspective.

With regard to the US, following some marginal softening of attitudes, there has again been a considerable loss in confidence of the communities in FATA. In 2011, only 2.7% of people viewed the US *very favourably* and 10.6% *somewhat favourably*. This compares to 8.8% who perceive them in *somewhat unfavourable* and 58.8% in *very unfavourable* terms. While some survey participants did not know or would not provide a response, the total figures of opposition remains forceful.

Improvements in the quality of the Frontier Corps and the outputs of FATA development institutions may explain why figures for 2011 have improved on those from 2008. Significant policy changes need to be implemented before any real change in confidence is likely; this may include stopping drone attacks in FATA or openly seeking dialogue with ethnic *Pakhtun*, a process possibly allowing for the repatriation of Afghan refugees.

It is interesting to note however, that future attitudes towards the US, as they develop into 2012 and beyond, will equally be influenced by reactions to the unilateral operation conducted by the US against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad: Pakistan, in May 2011. This operation, while successful in finding the leader of *Al Qaeda* was undertaken by US military personnel without the prior knowledge or political approval of the Government of Pakistan;

a reality that has resulted in an exacerbation of mistrust and resentment felt towards US. This should not be read as the expression of support by the population of Pakistan towards the late Osama bin Laden but a statement of disapproval for this public show of disregard for Pakistani sovereignty. Future research will need to discern how this action has affected perceptions.

The reason for this hostility is in large part due to the almost universal opinion that the US is pursuing policies that are to the detriment of the Muslim world. As seen in Figure 8.4: almost three-quarters of FATA residents – as represented by the survey – shared this negative perception, with the greatest proportion (some 68.2%) declaring the US *not favourable*.

### Opinions on the UK

This apparent hostility directed towards the US is repeated to some degree towards the UK. In 2008, hostility towards the US is somewhat evident towards the UK as well, but not to the same degree. In 2008, a strong majority of respondents looked *very unfavourably* (58.0%) towards the UK, however, in 2011 this has reduced to a significant 37.2%. This combined with the figure of those who are *somewhat unfavourable* (10.7%) means that for the first time a survey can document a combined figure of less than 50%.

**Figure 8.3: Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the government of USA?**





Figure 8.4: US attitude towards the Islamic world



Attitudes in favour of the UK have also improved with the UK maintaining the gains it acquired during the 2010 survey.


To try and further clarify the information presented about the UK in Figure 8.3: respondents were asked to state whether their current attitude had changed in the last year. From the information recorded, some 10% considered their attitude to have improved. A change roughly comparable to the reduction in unfavourable attitudes recorded in Figure 8.5. However, 22.5% were of the opinion

that their perspective had worsened. While this response is troubling it remains part of a constant decline in this point of view since 2008; moreover this reduction does not appear to have damaged overall perceptions. It is difficult to interpret the significance of *no change* as it is not evident whether these respondents possessed a positive or negative attitude in the past.


**Reason for changing attitudes**

Reasons for this change in opinion are unclear, but a

Figure 8.5: Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the government of UK?



**Figure 8.6: Is your opinion of the UK generally getting more favourable, less favourable or stayed the same?**



possibility is the resignation of Tony Blair in 2007 and the subsequent loss by Labour of the 2010 general-election. However, this change of opinion has not been reciprocated towards the US following the election of President Barak Obama in 2008.


The UK general-election was comprehensively covered in Pakistan by the media, and followed by the people of FATA, because of local interests – with reference to – UK's attitudes towards fighting the 'War on Terror'. It will be interesting to see how these changes continue following the 'Arab Spring' vocally supported by the West, and direct intervention in Libya.

Despite some need for conjecture, the 2011 survey has endeavoured to better understand the reason for these changing perceptions. As a consequence, respondents were asked what they considered to be the strongest links between the UK and Pakistan.

Disappointingly, the majority (almost two-thirds) of respondents were unable to provide an answer. However, from what opinions that could be extracted, the greatest links were seen with regard to *higher education* (13.5%) and *development assistance* (16.5%). From this it seems that activities linked to empowerment in FATA are most noticeable. Nevertheless, increased research is required to better understand what issues (for

example: security or the media [see Chapter 7]) would increase a positive union between the two nations.

**Figure 8.7: What do you consider to be the strongest links between the UK and Pakistan?**



Also respondents were asked to define what type of relationship Pakistan has with the UK. Again, a noteworthy finding is that one-third of respondents were not able to express an opinion. Thus, it

appears that, for a great many people, attitudes formed towards the UK are dependent on shared perceptions of external UK activity rather than in regard to its activities in Pakistan.

Of those attitudes that did inspire opinion, the prominence of perceived inequality in a UK-Pakistan partnership is troubling as it may generate resentment, an outcome that would result in unfavourable attitudes and policies being formed and championed. Nevertheless, support appears to remain consistent from the approximate one-third of respondents who view the UK as either a partner or ally.


**Attitudes towards UK international policy**

In addition to these questions regarding the direct influence of the UK on Pakistan, survey participants were invited to give their opinions on the international policies of the UK. This will also go towards helping to understand what has improved attitudes towards these historically allied countries.

**Global peace and stability**

Firstly, opinions were documented on the extent to which the UK was perceived to have improved peace and stability. Attitudes recorded in 2008 mirror the dissatisfaction with the UK as recorded in Figure 8.5: that is over 60% of respondents disagreed and only 7% agreed. This implies that

**Figure 8.8: Which of the following best describes the UK's relationship with Pakistan?**



**Male FGDs**

Male respondents were quite vocal on this issue: they stated that the UK (and US) is putting too much pressure on Pakistan to act beyond its capacity. And that greater appreciation is needed because of the human losses and continued action despite an unstable economy (which has struggled to find international investment).

**Female FGDs**

Female respondents were not as aware on the issue and remained uncertain.

unfavourable attitudes are closely linked to perceptions of harm recorded during the 'War on Terror' and not on diplomatic actions through the United Nations Security Council or other multilateral diplomatic initiatives.


Although, in recent years perceptions appear to be looking more favourably towards the UK, the dominant opinion remains that it is not improving global peace and security. In 2011: 19.3% of people thought the UK was contributing to global peace compared to 37% who thought it was not. It is not clear what aspects of UK policy are approved of,

requiring additional research on the extent to which: direct military acts; training initiatives; development assistance projects; and/or diplomatic overtures are considered positive or negative.

It is worth noting that this survey was conducted

This intervention, combined with the diplomatic support offered during the 'Arab Spring' may also influence the long held view that the UK is anti-Islam. As seen in Figure 8.10, it is a strongly held conviction that the UK is *not favourably* disposed towards Islam by some 56.7% of respondents (with an additional 14.4% who considered this attitude to

**Figure 8.9: Do you think that the UK: Helps to make the world more peaceful & stable**




before the successful, UN-mandated 'no-fly zone' was imposed over Libya. This outcome, supported in large part by the UK, may affect attitudes towards UK's prestige as a source of global peace and security in 2012.

be *less favourable*); a viewpoint opposed by only 3.4%.

**Male FGDs**

Male participants opined that (along with the US) UK's actions and continued presence in Iraq and

**Figure 8.10: UK attitude towards the Islamic world**



Afghanistan, combined with its uncompromising policy towards Iran, were inflammatory towards the Islamic world. Perceptions of the UK providing unconditional support for Israel was also seen as devaluing global peace and security, an outcome that will result in increased global conflict.

These attitudes show that the West (including the UK) needs to work harder at ensuring greater public dialogue with Muslim nations to dispel inaccurate attitudes, and further, to ensure greater co-operation from Islamic countries when intervening in nations perceived to be within Muslim spheres-of-influence.

### Female FGDs

Female respondents were unsure what role the UK was playing in peace-building initiatives so could not provide an opinion.

### Promotion of respect for democratic values

Following the question on peace and stability, respondents were asked to what extent they believed the UK contributed to the protection and promotion of democratic values. The preservation and enrichment of democracy has always been a key aspect of the UK's foreign policy. This aim, and ability to fulfil it, was not viewed with particular support by interviewees. Since 2008, through to 2011, an approximate 20% of survey participants have agreed that the UK has promoted respect for democratic values. This is opposed by, a continually decreasing, segment of society that is equal to or

greater than those that support the UK's actions.

To some extent, this data needs to be treated with caution, as attitudes to development are relative (i.e. respondents values may not mirror those supported by the UK or the Pakistan community in general). In FATA a significant minority sympathise (see Chapter 5) with the Taliban and support their right to return to power in Afghanistan; that is, democracy would be better served by their defeat of the international forces in their homeland rather than supporting the publicly-elected political system that is supported by the UK.

### Promotion of respect for Human Rights


Another pillar of UK foreign policy and tradition is support for Human Rights, but again perceptions roughly mirror those relating to democracy.

Again a certain amount of cultural relativism will have influenced respondents as differing attitudes to what constitutes a breach of human rights is visible among the FATA population, for example the subjects of suicide bombing and 'honour killing' (see Chapter 5). Also, attitudes are likely to be influenced by the perceived anti-Islamic actions of the UK around the world.

### Support for the United Nations (UN)


In addition to the questions above, respondents were further asked: did they think the UK values the UN. The results show that beliefs are divided. In 2011, 22.3% of respondents considered that the UK

Figure 8.11: Do you think that the UK: Promotes respect for democratic values





**Figure 8.12: Do you think that the UK: Promotes respect for Human Rights**



did value the UN; in contrast, 28.9% disagreed and opined that the UK did not.

With regards to this question the most favourable answer has been *don't know*. This implies that there is a general lack of knowledge on UK values and a lack of awareness of international relations outside of issues of direct concern to Pakistan, FATA and the Muslim world. To some extent this is unsurprising as international organisations are often controversial and divide opinion within countries, let alone when trying to evaluate the perceptions of others.

**Promotion of global prosperity**

Surprisingly perhaps, negative agreement is more convincing with regard to the UK's contributions

towards improving global prosperity, although attitudes appear to be losing their prominence. In 2011, approximately one-third of respondents considered that the UK was not adding value, while only 18.4% believed that they were.

Reasons for this prominent negative attitude may be quite diverse: with attitudes possibly being linked to concern surrounding development activities failing to improve economic opportunities in FATA or the apparent lack of support offered by the UK for the general economy of Pakistan.

**Efforts to safeguard the environment**

With regard to UK initiatives to support the conservation of the global environment,

**Figure 8.13: Do you think that the UK: Values the United Nations-UN**





Figure 8.14: Do you think that the UK: Helps to make the world more prosperous




respondents were again split on the issue, but approximately half of those surveyed were not able to provide an answer.

**UK involvement in Afghanistan**

While international involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, led by the US and UK, are often discussed as

Towards the end, respondents were asked to indicate how they would define the UK's involvement in Afghanistan: although one-quarter of respondents were unsure, the most common perceptions offered by interviewees were negative. In total, almost one-third of respondents stated that either the UK should not *be Afghanistan at all*

Figure 8.15: Do you think that the UK: Helps to safeguard the global environment



one and the same, this survey sought to extract attitudes towards Afghanistan in isolation. This is because Afghanistan is inextricably linked ethnically and geographically with the people of FATA, while Iraq is a state that has little impact on the tribal areas; however, it would be naïve to think that news about the conflict has not to some extent influenced or reinforced individuals' attitudes.

(20.3%) or they were *engaged in an attack on Islam* (18.1%). However, it should be noted that these figures are considerably lower than those recorded in 2008.

As the survey was conducted before the death of Osama bin Laden the answer: the UK *will leave Afghanistan as soon as Osama bin Laden is found* has taken on increased significance as these 16.1%

of respondents (double that recorded in 2010) have the potential to either escalate opposition to the UK or increase its legitimacy in *supporting stability* (as considered by 4.2% in 2011) and *rebuilding/developing Afghanistan* (as considered by 4.9%).

To further investigate these perceptions, the survey asked the participants to define exactly how favourably they viewed UK intervention in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the number of those that looked most favourable on UK activities equalled only 4.6%; while this is to be expected it is troubling that this figure is approximately half that recorded in 2010 (and the lowest figure since 2008).

The majority of respondents had strong feelings

against UK actions, with 51.5% considering themselves to not be in favour; a further 11.4% were less favourable. While the strength of opposition remains compelling, it is however reducing (from almost 90% in 2008). This change is in the most part the result of increased indecision on the subject. According to male FGDs these concerns will be maintained as shared opinion continues to be that international forces in Afghanistan are impacting on the overall security situation in Pakistan, especially in FATA, an outcome that has caused internal displacement, loss of life and destruction of property.

Attitudes towards the US are equally poor (see Figure 8.18) but with a concerning decrease of support from those that would consider their

**Figure 8.16: Which of the following best describes the UK's involvement in Afghanistan?**





Figure 8.17: UK Role in Afghanistan



involvement to be favourable: from 8% in 2010 to less than 3% in 2011.

Similar reductions in the number of people that are *not favourable* can be seen to those enjoyed by the UK, but attitudes towards the US are improving at a slower rate. Also, it appears that the strength of feeling opposing US intervention is greater than that for the UK, with 62% of respondents stating they were *not favourable*, a figure that is equalled by UK dissenters if the *not favourable* and *less*


*favourable* variables are combined.

**Male FGDs**

As seen in Chapter 5, attitudes towards Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban are very important to respondents; consequently, it was unsurprising that it inspired strong arguments in the male FGDs.

Generally, respondents opposed UK involvement in Afghanistan: the reasons for this were not entirely clear as respondents did not fully engage with the

Figure 8.18: US Role in Afghanistan



possibilities offered in Table 8.16. Possible alternative reasons to those listed are: shared culture and religious values or Talibanisation.

In spite of this, some did opine that the UK had invested Afghanistan's infrastructure development and were therefore working to improve the long-term stability of Afghanistan.

### Female FGDs

Exclusion of women from political debate again denied female participants the opportunity to provide information on this issue.

### Attitudes towards the immigration policies of the US and UK

As was seen in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.8 – 1.13): there appears to be some desire from the people of FATA to leave the tribal areas. The majority would prefer to remain within Pakistan but some would consider the US (1.4%) or the UK (2.4%). This interest has encouraged the survey to make a study of general perceptions towards the immigration policies of these two developed nations.

It must be noted that the number of respondents that previously identified US or UK as preferred destinations are likely to have a positive attitude towards the policies of these countries but it does


not automatically mean they are positive towards their immigration policies, because of bad personal, familial or community experiences. Also, general attitudes, when expressed, are likely to be based on less than adequate information (e.g. rumour) as direct interaction with these immigration policies is unlikely for the majority of respondents.

Notwithstanding these caveats, it appears that respondents to some extent possess a negative point of view – a claim that is however, significantly limited by over 50% of respondents not being able to provide an answer, of which some 30% had *no opinion* and this could represent a certain ambivalence to the domestic policy of the UK that could be swayed either way by actual interaction with relevant processes. Only 5.9% of respondents were *most favourable* in their opinion of UK's immigration policy. Similar findings regarding favourability, if more exaggerated, can be seen with regard to the US.

### Male FGDs

In contrast to the findings recorded above, the majority of male respondents were favourable towards emigration to either the UK or US, possibly showing that while these destinations are not the first choice of many, they remain an attractive

Figure 8.19: US and UK Immigration Policy



proposition for a larger proportion. With regard to immigration policies, they were however, of the opinion that to gain entry would be very difficult, especially to the US, and therefore this positive attitude cannot be reflected in the findings of the survey as participants need to be recorded as at least less than favourable.

### Female FGDs

In *Pakhtun* tribal society, women are not permitted to emigrate for education or employment so female respondents were largely apathetic towards immigration policy.

## 8.2: Opinion on other nations

This section of the chapter is divided into various parts, namely: geographically close nations; other Islamic nations; and other Western nations. In general, these nations have sizable Pakistani populations, but the survey team was unable to discern if family ties linked respondents with any of these countries.

### Opinion on geographically close nations

The 2011 survey has sought to map respondents' opinion using a scale that allows for greater insight into levels of favourability than those for the US and UK.

### Afghanistan


Over the last four years, opinion from FATA respondents appears to be improving. In 2011, a clear majority of survey participants (63.8%) looked favourably on their neighbour; an increase on the approximate 40% - 45% documented in between 2008 and 2010. A changing of opinion that has also seen an equal but opposite change in *unfavourable* attitudes: with the combined number of interviewees with a negative perception reducing by half since 2010 to under one-quarter (23.5%).

It is unclear whether respondents' attitudes are based on support for Taliban operations – i.e. whether a resurgent militancy in Afghanistan has inspired greater support – or for the stabilisation and development activities of international actors improving opportunities (e.g. creating an environment conducive to the return of refugees or trade).

### India

Understandably, given regional tensions, particularly over Kashmir, and continual diplomatic instability – e.g. following the 2008 (or 26/11) Mumbai attacks by Pakistani Islamist insurgents – favourability towards India is very low. In 2011, only 8.2% of respondents looked on India with some degree of approval. This is in contrast to the three-

Figure 8.20: Opinion on relations with Afghanistan



quarters that held a degree of hostility towards Pakistan's larger neighbour.

### China


In contrast to the ethnic/tribal links between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the rivalry between

### Opinion on major Muslim countries

#### Iran

With regard to fellow Muslim nations, the survey firstly sought to document FATA perceptions regarding Iran. As seen in Figure 5.13: Ayatollah Ali

Figure 8.21: Opinion on relations with India



Pakistan and India, relations with China are linked to more traditional strategic-diplomacy (i.e. trade, security co-operation and development assistance).<sup>23</sup> This relationship is looked on very positively by respondents, with some three-quarters describing ties between the two nations as *very favourable* (42.7%) or *somewhat favourable* (32.1%). This compares to only 10% that disagree.

This dynamic is significant, in that it comprehensively shows that bi-lateral relationships can be forged without reference to interactions with Islam and the Muslim world; however, it is possible that China's attitude towards Iran and Syria in the UN Security Council may have increased the strength of support for some.<sup>24</sup>


Khamene'i is seen as a trustworthy religious leader by a little over 13% of respondents; it is therefore, unsurprising that given his influence on the social and political direction of Iran that two-thirds of respondents were favourable towards the Islamic Republic: also, Iran's inflammatory stance towards the West is also likely to have influenced perceptions. The majority (37.9%) describes their opinion as being *somewhat favourable*.

While this endorsement of Iran is compelling, a stronger base of opposition is apparent than was recorded for China – i.e. the strength of positive attitudes appear to have reduced (with the number of those providing a considerable endorsement reducing by some 40%) – therefore support remains but with some reservations for the

<sup>23</sup> See 'China-Pakistan relations', Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070>, accessed 8/12/2011

<sup>24</sup> See for example 'Analysts: Russia, China ready to block new UN sanctions on Iran', Voice of America, 11/11/2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Analysts-Russia-China-Ready-to-Block-New-UN-Sanctions-on-Iran-133720178.html>, accessed 8/12/2011 and 'Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syria regime', The Guardian, 5/10/2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria-resolution>, accessed 8/12/2011

Figure 8.22: Opinion on relations with China



majority. And almost 20% of respondents looked on Iran with mistrust, with half of this number considering their attitude to be *very unfavourable*.

When attitudes were disaggregated by Agency/FR however it can be seen that perceptions appear to be overly biased towards certain tribal areas: that is, support is centred in Bajaur Agency (95.0%); FR Tank (87.5%); Khyber Agency (72.5%); and, Orakzai Agency (71.4%) – while in contrast significant

opposition is held in FR DI Khan (47.5%); South Waziristan Agency (40.4%). FR Kohat (34.4%); FR Lakki (30.0%); Kurram Agency (26.0%); and, FR Bannu (18.6%) contain above average levels of opposition. This in part is the result of sectarian differences between *Sunni* majority FATA and *Shia* majority Iraq.

Figure 8.23: Opinion on relations with Iran







Figure 8.24: Opinion on relations with Iran (breakdown by region)

Very Favourable Somewhat Favourable Somewhat Unfavourable Very Unfavourable Don't Know No Response



## Saudi Arabia


Saudi Arabia is the sight of two of the most holy cities of Islam. Making the *Hajj* to Mecca and visiting Medina are personal goals for Muslims and to do so will earn individuals the right to add the title *Haji* to their name. Saudi Arabia is also a favoured city for emigration, as reported in Figure 1.13, because of opportunities for employment. Some members of the male FGDs also felt that Pakistan should follow the example of Saudi Arabia and impose Sharia law.

Over the course of surveys, data shows that more than 80.0% of respondents are positively favoured towards Saudi Arabia: and within this over three-quarters are *very favourable*. In contrast just 4.5% are, to different degrees, unfavourable. These respondents are largely 'progressive' or 'leftist' in

comprising some 60% Muslims<sup>25</sup> - was generally positive. In 2011, some 60% of respondents looked on the country with some level of favourability, a noteworthy rise in that recorded in 2009 and 2010. In comparison only approximately 20% of respondents were unfavourable. The reason behind this attitude was illustrated in both male and female FGDs, where despite limited knowledge of the country, it was perceived that strong development had meant that Malaysia was a country that Pakistan should aspire to emulate.

What is interesting to highlight is that the number of people that were not able to provide a response was relatively low compared to other Figure in this chapter, particularly those referring to the US and UK; therefore, it appears that respondents were

Figure 8.25: Opinion on relations with Saudi Arabia



their values, and they believe Saudi Arabia has used FATA to fulfil their national agenda.

## Malaysia

With regard to a Muslim country that is not of direct influence to Pakistan or a source of global political scrutiny, to the degree of other nations identified in this survey: it is found that respondents attitudes towards Malaysia - a country with a population


more confident in supplying an opinion on a Muslim country than one where social and religious differences may be more stark.

## Opinion on Western countries: Canada, France, Germany

To further understand FATA perceptions relating to the US and UK, as well as those relating to geographically close and Islamic nations, the survey

<sup>25</sup> 'Malaysia', CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html>, accessed 8/12/2011

Figure 8.26: Opinion on relations with Malaysia




team asked respondents to give their opinions on other Western countries.

The survey accordingly focused on three countries that had historically welcomed immigrant Muslims members, including those from the *Pakhtun* Diaspora; namely: Canada, France and Germany.

The findings are almost completely uniform suggesting that, outside of the US, the West is

banded together as one-and-the-same. Favourable perceptions towards the 'West' fluctuate between approximately 27% and 30%; this favourability is very similar to that documented on the UK (6.1%: *very favourable* and 23.9%: *somewhat favourable* [see Figure 8.5]). The 'West' also mirrors the UK in terms of numbers holding a *somewhat unfavourable* attitude, with the 'West' scoring between 10.0% and 12.0% compared to approximately 11.0% for the UK.

Figure 8.27: Opinion on relations with Canada, France, Germany



Differences between the 'West' and the UK appear greatest with regard to *very unfavourable* opinions: the UK is perceived in a particularly negative light by some 37.0% compared to an approximate 17.0%-18.0% for the 'West'. This indicates that there is a greater deal of uncertainty about perceptions towards Canada, France and Germany than is apparent for the US and UK.

Overall, the US appears to be treated apart from the 'West' and UK, with perceptions being significantly more negative than other like-minded nations. However, as shown by the UK, attitudes towards Western nations may decline if greater numbers of people are engaged in debate.

<sup>26</sup> This lower level of support for France may be the result of the public debate and subsequent legislation banning the wearing of veils in public.

## Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the people of FATA's perception on countries that have an influence on the politics, social and religious traditions and development. From the evidence it is clear that Islamic countries and those that are considered to be neutral to the affairs of Pakistan are more favourably perceived. However, from the attitudes disaggregated on Iran, certain tribal areas may be more supportive than others.

With regard to those countries that are seen to be unfavourably influencing Pakistan more caution is evident; and, in the cases of India and the US, and to some extent the UK, particular hostility. Future research may wish to analyse how specific, significant events impact on these perceptions: for example, in 2011 the incidents of Quran burning in the US and UK, and the release of graphic photos reportedly showing abuses of Afghan civilians by ISAF forces; and what trust is placed in the reporting of incidents by media – with particular emphasis on whether the positive and negative actions of the Western world are reported in FATA.

As shown by the different issues questioned in the case of the UK this attitude persists regardless of international relations subjects. It is also apparent that the countries of the 'West', with the exception of the US are perceived in a generally universal way: consequently, activities to soften relationships should perhaps be undertaken at a multi-lateral level to holistically improve attitudes.

It is however, of some note that FATA is very defensive of its culture and traditions and therefore perceptions of hostility may not be universal to Pakistan (and Muslims), but it is likely to be an effective, if potentially exaggerated, guide. Further research would be required to test this supposition.

# CHAPTER 9

## Way Forward





## CHAPTER 9

## Way Forward

Because of neglect and political marginalisation, FATA remains one of the most under-developed areas of Pakistan. However, its prestige has grown in recent years following its prominent position in the 'War on Terror'; a reality that has resulted in the Government of Pakistan allocating some PKR 15 billion in the fiscal year 2010-11 to improve development and increase stability. This funding has been supported by additional aid and support from the international community for poverty alleviation, infrastructure development, industrial development and growth and supporting local economies through the creation of employment opportunities (especially targeting the youth).

In spite of this investment of resources, the survey continues to map substantial mistrust directed towards those government officials and politicians that are responsible for implementing reform, by the population of FATA. This evaluation of the FS and FDA is based on the direct experiences of people being excluded from making decisions and monitoring the management of projects that are supposed to be for their benefit. In not incorporating the views of local populations in the government led FATA Sustainable Development Plan the activities are likely to be insensitive to local dynamics and ignorant of communal aspirations. This in part, is the direct result of continued support for the archaic colonial structures that support the *status quo*.

To reverse this discontent and to ensure greater efficiency of project planning and implementation, development activities must seek to empower the disenfranchised in FATA, so that issues concerning security (in both terms of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want') and prosperity can be championed. This outcome will improve trust in the government, and its international partners, while

also reducing social space for militants and extremists to justify their acts.

Based on the findings of this year's study, we propose the following recommendations based on three basic concepts: cultural appropriateness; development of local capabilities; and community participation and tribal involvement.

**Cultural Appropriateness:** This survey has placed a great deal of emphasis on understanding the culture of the *Pakhtun*; on customs, beliefs and traditions. The key to solving perceived problems and engaging the people in a grand project of inclusive nationhood is through respect and recognition of their traditions.

**Developing Local Capacities:** In keeping with the concept of respecting culture and traditions, it is crucial to have programmes that develop local capacity to assume the responsibilities of local governance and effective law enforcement; a development that would allow for a transfer from archaic colonial structures to contemporary institutions. Experience indicates that even in the most challenging situations qualified local capacity has been able to negotiate with insurgents to enable the continued implementation of programmes under certain acceptable conditions.

**Community Participation and Tribal Involvement:** As with all development interventions, community participation at the field level is crucial for social change. Development partners must ensure that community at large is taken into confidence to better ensure ownership of the programme, and to aid in the monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the leadership that is responsible for the collective priorities established in the proposed participatory planning process.

## Political reform

Over a century ago, the highland *Pakhtun* tribes of Frontier [today's FATA], represented by few *maliks*, signed an agreement with the British Raj, which comprised their civil liberties on so called freedom to practice their customs and traditions. This article, served the interests of British and a small number of *maliks* who were privileged by the British Raj through allowances. When Pakistan gained independence, and inherited the FATA region, the few privileged *maliks* negotiated the retention of their privileges.

The issue of administrative reforms, a process necessary for FATA to be in a stronger position to mainstream into Pakistan, has never been debated properly in parliament. Extension of the Adult Franchise Act to FATA in 1996 was the first legislative change to FATA since the FCR was enacted in 1901.

Since the 'War on Terror' has focused international attention on the region, the Government of Pakistan has been under immense pressure from the international community, as well as civil society in Pakistan, to bring drastic governance reforms to the conflict-zones of FATA. To its credit, the Government of Pakistan led by the Pakistan People's Party has shown its commitment when on 12th August 2011 the President of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, signed two regulations i.e. 1) FCR (Amended) 2011 and 2) Political Parties Ordinance for FATA.

These amendments, once implemented, will help address several local grievances and will also help in creating a supporting environment for the stakeholders to undertake development and conflict resolution initiatives. Besides, political parties will need to take greater consideration of the aspirations of FATA communities and engage in campaigns that will involve local people, especially youth, in a productive way, reducing space for the militant groups to exploit the already aggrieved young.

However, these reforms cannot be allowed to stall, as fundamental changes to administrative system of FATA (and its constitutional status) need to be debated and implemented. It remains, that the need for drastic change is absolute.

To this end, the Government of Pakistan must:

- Implement the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) (Amended) 2011 and Political Parties Ordinance
- Debate necessary reforms to FATA's administrative structures and put into practice identified development opportunities
- Empower communities to exert greater oversight of local governance
- Ensure all elements of society are sensitively, represented
- Champion political education to increase trust and better enable communities to engage with political parties
- Enable opportunities for peaceful campaigning by disengaged and underrepresented communities, social groups and minorities
- Use popular media to stimulate debate within and between communities to promote greater public monitoring and evaluation of local governance institutions

## Legal reforms - Reforming *jirga*

*Jirga* is a traditional justice system that has historically been practiced by *Pakhtun* communities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), *Jirga* is the only formal mechanism for dispensing justice and resolving conflicts in the FATA. *Jirga* in every day practice refers to a tribal institution of decision-making and dispute settlement that incorporates the prevalent local customary law, institutional rituals and a body of village elders whose collective decision about the resolution of a dispute (or local problem) is binding on the parties involved.<sup>27</sup>

At present, justice dispensation services in FATA operate through two structures: the official FCR *jirga* and community-based dispute resolution

<sup>27</sup> Ali Wardak, University of Glamorgan, UK, (2002 b). Note: The Pashtun/Pukhtun *jirga* system is almost the same on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.



through the *olasi jirga*. As compared to FCR *jirga*, *olasi jirga* is widely respected, trusted and legitimised in FATA. A recent CAMP study on the *jirga* system [‘Understanding *Jirga*: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas’] establishes the fact that more than 70% FATA population prefer *olasi jirga* – in comparison to just 12% of respondents that trusted FCR *jirga*.<sup>28</sup>

*Pakhtuns* have historically preferred *jirga* to formal justice because: 1) it is conducted by respected elders with established social status and a knowledge of valued local traditions/values (customary law) reputations for piety and fairness;<sup>29</sup> 2) it dispenses quick justice; 3) it is cheap; 4) it is considered less susceptible to corruption or bias; and, 5) it has an element of compensation for the victim.

Although the *jirga* may be preferred for the reasons cited above, it is devalued by various systemic weaknesses. It is of particular concern that internationally endorsed human rights can be violated, especially with regard to women and minorities; also, in cases of murder, *jirga* may recommend direct vengeance or *badal*, or *swara*.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, despite perceptions of objectivity (as the decision maker is nominated by both sides) critics believe that decisions are made based on changing societal values rather than a fair and impartial code of law. Victims also lack the opportunity to appeal as under the Constitution in Article 247(7): the jurisdiction of the higher judiciary, that is to say the provincial High Courts and the Supreme Court, does not extend to the FATA.

Under international human rights law, Pakistan is obligated to ensure that, for all those living within its jurisdiction, their rights are protected. Consequently, the *jirga* infringes on this.

To this end, the Government of Pakistan must:

- Fully implement its responsibilities with regard

to the protection of human rights

- Ensure that, if *jirga* is to continue, that a basic code of conduct be agreed and adhered to
- Extend the jurisdiction of the higher judiciary into the FATA to protect those that feel mistreated by the *jirga* system
- Consider installing a modern legal system as is the case in other *Pakhtun* dominated areas
- Evaluate the value of demands by some participants for *Sharia* law

## Security

**Strengthening the Frontier Corps:** There is international, national, and importantly local support for the Frontier Corps, as a culturally representative security provider that is able to effectively communicate and empathise with the communities that they are protecting. Consequently, the recruitment and training of these paramilitaries should continue with the medium-term goal that these men would become local law-enforcement officers after their security role has ended; it is therefore, essential that plans be developed for their future so that they do not become a further source of militancy or conflict between tribes.

The future development of the Frontier Corps as a conventional law enforcement body could also be preferable as the Pakistan Police is not a desired institution in FATA. Furthermore, it will enable historical community organisations to take on new positive roles. The formation of *Lashkars*, could perhaps, be re-focused on meeting humanitarian emergencies (e.g. Red Crescent, emergency rescue).

To this end, the Government of Pakistan must:

- Instigate a review, in conjunction with community representatives, of the cultural role played by and aspirations for the Frontier Corps, *Lashkars* and *Khasadars*
- Evaluate the potential law enforcement potential of the Frontier Corps, and if

<sup>28</sup> ‘Understanding *Jirga*: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas’, by Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Published by CAMP, July 2011 ([www.camp.org.pk](http://www.camp.org.pk))

<sup>29</sup> Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan: Ali Wardak, University of Glamorgan, UK.

<sup>30</sup> *Swara* means marriage of a woman from the offender’s family/tribe to the victim’s close relative without her consent

applicable prepare training mechanisms for this role

- Prepare policies for either integration of Frontier Corps into formal security sector or reintegration into civilian life

**Military strategies and tactics:** As we have seen in the survey data, the FATA population supports role and efforts of the Pakistan Army to combat militancy in FATA but the Government of Pakistan must:

- Investigate how excessive force has exacerbated internal displacement and the destruction of property
- Evaluate the role international aid can play in improving military efficiency and capacity, while remaining sensitive to local attitudes to external intervention
- Analyse the value of drones in the 'War on Terror'

### Cross-border solidarity

In both FATA and Afghanistan substantial international and national commitments have been undertaken regarding development. Similar social and economic conditions present on both sides of the border, enable (just as that which has occurred with security) the potential for co-ordinated activities. At present, the dislocation of activities has led to some incidents of resentment.

Furthermore, the economies of Pakistan and Afghanistan have often benefitted from informal trade relations: therefore, where security permits, a more co-operative border would provide greater opportunities for the communities of both FATA and Afghanistan.

To this end, The Government of Pakistan must:

- Seek to facilitate, where appropriate, greater co-ordination of activities between communities in FATA and Afghanistan, through representative and accountable bi-lateral civil commissions, to improve the sensitivity of development projects
- Consider, in consultation with tribal structures, implementation of development corridors, across the border
- Improve trade routes between FATA and

Afghanistan to improve economic opportunities among and between communities

- Work with Afghanistan partners to improve positive political education
- Support improved civil society co-operation to aid in activities such as the education of the FATA population to better reduce the efficacy of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban

### Conclusion

The 'Way Forward' provides a substantial agenda for addressing the development, law and order, and international issues identified by the people of FATA. Importantly, based on the cultural foundation of the *Pakhtun*, the proposed 'Way Forward' includes a methodology for the effective engagement of government with the people of FATA, in formulating a lasting solution to archaic governance structures.

The agenda proposed is a grand project that, unfortunately, does not have any short cuts for success. As described, it will require bold steps on the part of the Government of Pakistan, accompanied by dedicated and unwavering support from the international community, as well as the commitment of tribal cultures to relax their long-held traditions.

It is clear from the opinions expressed that 'engagement' of the people is desired. The platform for that engagement should be devolution in three key areas: 1) governance; 2) the rule of law; and 3) strengthening of FATA security mechanisms. The first recommendation would require radical change in the FATA Secretariat, because, in its place the recommendation is for elected leadership and publicly accountable local administration infrastructure. As described and pointed out in the report, the second and third key areas are important culturally and are respected local institutions.

In keeping with the historical analysis and the strategic role that the cross border transportation routes can, and do play in the business and employment of the people of FATA, development corridors may stimulate the economy of border

areas, and then by extension FATA as a whole. One of the potential side effects of this strategy may be the potential to develop tools that would enable closer bi-lateral relations between the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Another theme of this chapter has been the need for development strategies and the strengthening of the Frontier Corps, as part of efforts to counter the insurgency. Moreover, the government must ensure that non-combatants are better protected from excessive force from the military to counter the insurgency. Consequently, military operations must be deliberately calculated, with long-term gains being prioritised over short-term expediency (a potential cause of disaffection and social and political hostility).

The 'Way Forward' may be our concluding chapter, but it should be the beginning of a new chapter in Pakistan, the international community, and, most importantly, for the *Pakhtun* on both sides of the border.



# Appendixes





## APPENDIX I

## Research Methodology and Sample Plan

This research report is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. Supporting material was used, where appropriate, from desk-based research of published studies, newspapers articles and the historical experiences of CAMP programmes.

Qualitative information was gathered from eighteen focus-group discussions. Minutes were recorded and analysed, before being contrasted with the data recorded in the quantitative questionnaire.

Quantitative data was collected through the use of a structured questionnaire. The objective of this process is to sample both adult males and females to record their perceptions of key issues related to their lives in FATA. As gender plays such an important role in public opinion, the sample was designed to interview equal numbers of males and females in each community; this was the case regardless of the possibilities of tribal areas having slightly unequal populations of males and females due to seasonal migration and emigration. In

seeking this equal division of opinions the survey sought to address the cultural tendency of marginalizing women.

### Research Methods and Instruments

#### I. Qualitative

##### Focus-group discussions (FGDs)

The organising of focus groups, as a qualitative research tool, is a helpful means of documenting the views of locally-respected informants. All sections of the FATA society were included in these discussions: with participants chosen in order to provide a diversity of political, social, technical and religious backgrounds.

FGDs were designed to provide a forum for informants to express their points-of-view, in order to represent and explain key perspectives on the different issues related to the FATA region. A total of 18 FGDs were held, and attended by an average of nine local representatives, as follows:

Framework M.1

S.#	Agencies/FRs	Date	Gender	Youth	Elders
1	Bajaur Agency	30/07/2011	Male		√
		30/07/2011	Female		√
2	Mohmand Agency	29/07/2011	Male		√
		02/08/2011	Female	√	
3	Khyber Agency	29/07/2011	Male		√
		01/08/2011	Female	√	
4	Orakzai Agency	28/07/2011	Male	√	
		29/07/2011	Female		√

S.#	Agencies/FRs	Date	Gender	Youth	Elders
5	Kurram Agency	28/07/2011	Male	√	
		29/07/2011	Female		√
6	North Waziristan	11/08/2011	Male	√	
		11/08/2011	Male		√
7	South Waziristan Agency	02/08/2011	Male		√
		11/08/2011	Female	√	
8	FR Peshawar and FR Kohat	01/08/2011	Male	√	
		01/08/2011	Female		√
9	FR Bannu, FR Lakki, FR Tank and FR DI Khan	03/08/2011	Male		√
		03/08/2011	Female	√	

**The themes discussed included:** the constitutional status of FATA; Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR); Presidential Ordinances/regulations and their impact on the governance systems of FATA; present social, political, economic and administrative structures; pace of development; local opportunities for contributing to development activities; law and order in FATA; governmental decisions in a post-9/11 context; the crackdown on militant groups in FATA and Swat; US drone attacks in FATA and their impact; and the inclusion of women in decision-making.

## II. Quantitative

In addition to having a well-structured questionnaire, successful social research requires a sensitive sampling framework: one that is manageable and positively representative. Overall, the quantitative survey aimed to sample all of FATA with only a minimal margin for error.<sup>31</sup> It was considered that for an area with an estimated population of four million<sup>32</sup> a sample of 4,000 people was necessary.

Accordingly, **3,480** people were selected from the **7** Agencies of FATA, the remainder being taken from the **6** frontier regions, using a Proportionate

Stratified Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure the most representative sample. One of the advantages of quantitative sampling is that a small proportion of people can be used to make assumptions for communities as a whole. Framework M.2 shows the resultant sample size by area:

**Margin of Error:** The estimated margin of error for this survey – based on single questions of a ‘Yes/No’ for the ‘people of FATA’ as a whole - is approximately 1.5%, equalling a 95% confidence level. That is, if a random sample were taken 100 times, in 95 cases the expectation would be that differences in answers would be plus or minus less than 1.5%. However, at the local level (i.e. looking at a specific agency or frontier region) then the margin of error increases because it will comprise a smaller proportional sample size.

## Sampling Plan and Field Implementation

### Accessibility

At the beginning of this project CAMP evaluated information on the accessibility of areas within FATA resulting in a list of villages, towns and tehsils that were considered unreachable because of any of the following concerns: security, governmental

<sup>31</sup> The desired margin of error for the whole of FATA was less than 2% but it is acknowledged that in areas of smaller sample size then the margin of error may exceed this.

<sup>32</sup> As there is no up-to-date data for FATA, this figure is based on the 1998 census.



## Framework M.2

Agency	Population	Sample Size	Margin of Error
Bajaur	595,227	680	3.8
Khyber	546,730	760	3.6
Kurram	448,310	680	3.8
Mohmand	334,453	360	5.2
North Waziristan	361,246	440	4.7
Orakzai	225,441	280	5.9
South Waziristan	429,841	280	5.9
<b>FATA Agencies Total</b>	<b>2,941,248</b>	<b>3,480</b>	<b>1.7</b>
<b>Frontier Region</b>			
Bannu	19,593	80	10.9
D. I. Khan	38,990	80	10.9
Tank	27,216	80	10.9
Lakki	6,987	40	15.5
Peshawar	53,841	80	10.9
Kohat	88,456	160	7.7
<b>Frontier Regions Total</b>	<b>235,083</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>FATA (Total)</b>	<b>3,176,331</b>	<b>4,000</b>	<b>1.5</b>

imposed curfew and/or extreme weather conditions. In total, 403 locations (42%) in FATA were considered out-of-reach of the survey team. Of the remaining 557 population centres, 400 were sampled.

These 400 locations were selected using a two-stage process. Firstly, CAMP randomly selected a sample of accessible tehsils, within which the 400 villages/towns were indiscriminately selected during the second stage.

A total of 10 interviews were conducted in each location, with half of the respondents representing male perspectives and the other female. In keeping with local culture: female enumerators interviewed women, and male enumerators interviewed men.

The resulting quantitative research structure is shown in Framework M.3:

**Limitations because of inaccessibility:** As previously noted, access to all population centres in

FATA was limited because of different concerns. This, it must be acknowledged, inevitably limits perceptions recorded to more peaceful areas in each Agency and FATA in general. This omission may well have affected the findings contained within the survey, for, as seen by the perceptions of those who had been victims of internal displacement and those who had not, differences can arise because of life experiences.

Aside from what could be discerned from areas that have suffered similar insecurity to those areas that remain closed to the survey team, it is not clear how these **42%** of the approximately 690 villages in FATA would have perceived different subjects in FATA. What is known is that participants from these largely rural areas would have (if included) changed the demographic and cultural perspectives of the survey.

This omission of insecure locations should not reduce the value of the findings for decision-makers

Framework M.3

S. No	Agency/FRs	Total sample size X villages	Total sample
<b>A</b>	<b>Agencies</b>		
01	Khyber	10 X 76	760 respondents
02	Kurram	10 X 69	690 respondents
03	Mohmand	10 X 36	360 respondents
04	North Waziristan	10 X 10	100 respondents
05	South Waziristan	10 X 28	280 respondents
06	Orakzai	10 X 28	280 respondents
07	Bajaur	10 X 68	680 respondents
<b>B</b>	<b>Frontier Regions</b>		
08	Bannu	10 X 10	100 respondents
09	Tank	10 X 10	100 respondents
10	Peshawar	10 X 8	80 respondents
11	Kohat	10 X 16	160 respondents
12	Lakki	10 X 7	70 respondents
13	DI Khan	10 X 10	100 respondents
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>400 villages</b>	<b>4,000 respondents</b>

and key stakeholders, as the information presented is still very illustrative of the thoughts and feelings of a significant number of people in FATA. Consequently, they should still be used as a guide on the direction of a more peaceful tribal area in the future.

### Selection of interviewees

Within each selected location enumerators were divided into four areas (i.e. two for male enumerators and two for female enumerators) from which either two or three interviews were conducted (comprising a total of five men and five women). In each area, interviewees were targeted around significant local landmarks (or 'starting points'), such as: *hujra* of a prominent *Malik*, mosques, *Imam Bargah* in Shia communities, successful shops, schools and hospitals.

From these areas interviewees were selected randomly, with male enumerators selecting unknown households from one side and female enumerators selecting unknown households on the other. In areas where this rule could not be properly applied, enumerators made note of this difficulty

on their contact sheet.

**Limitations in using the 'starting point' methodology:** The starting points in each village were local landmarks, from which enumerators would interview respondents by targeting those behind every third door or compound. This approach, it must be noted, created bias in the sample towards the centre of each location; residents in these urban areas are more typically wealthy, educated and/or from more established families. This reality is likely to have influenced the findings of the survey as perceptions are likely to have been influenced by experiences within this environment: also it may provide a disproportionate sample of literacy levels, access to media and educational status than might otherwise have been expected in FATA.

Again, this limitation should not diminish the value of the data presented, as the aspirations of those interviewed still positively reveal the development trends desired by a substantial proportion of the FATA population, and also reveals how the interests of 'elites' in society may impact on the future

**Box M.1**

Some alterations to selected survey locations had to be undertaken during the conducting of the research. These are summarised below:

- In Bajaur, the survey team were unable to access Mamund Tehsil because of cross-border attacks on security forces. In consultation with CAMP's Survey Management, enumerators changed focus to alternative villages in Bajaur.
- Military operation in Central Kurram prevented the survey team from accessing the local population of the intended sample village. CAMP's Survey Management advised enumerators to seek relevant participants from IDP camps located in Lower Kurram.
- The survey team was unable to access the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan because of the internal displacement of the local community following military operation: which started in 2009.
- Ongoing drone attacks in North Waziristan also limited activities as the survey team felt unable to take all their equipment for fear that local communities may mistake them for US spies.

direction of life in the tribal areas, outcomes that will affect the region as a whole, regardless of status or geographical location.

**Method of respondent selection**

Prior to conducting an interview, the enumerators ensured that potential respondents were at least 18 years old, indigenous to FATA and that they were from the location under investigation. Enumerators also ensured that interviewees had not participated in any survey during the six months prior to the date of questioning.

The Kish-grid methodology was used for selecting respondents from within a sampled house, if applicable.<sup>33</sup> If the selected respondent was unavailable a 'substitute' could be interviewed using a predefined rule.

It is believed that this sampling method provides a robust quantitative survey with only limited margin of error, but with some caveats as defined above.

**Questionnaire**

The questionnaire used for this 2011 survey

incorporated both open and closed response questions, replicating those used in 2008, 2009 and 2010, with some new questions for the year 2011 survey.

**Interviewer training**

Prior to the commencement of the survey, CAMP Enumerators were trained by independent consultants, under the supervision of CAMP senior management, on the questionnaire methodology and on security. This process was accompanied by a pre-testing of the questionnaire.

Pre-testing aimed to:

- Determine the time length of the interview
- Check questionnaire content
- Check the skipping and coding patterns
- Correct and improve translation

Pre-tests were conducted with the support of adult Pakistani males and females, aged 18 and over, in suburbs of Peshawar on 4 July 2011. The average time of each interview, during these pre-tests, was 55 minutes: with the minimum time taken being 45 minutes and the maximum being 65 minutes.

<sup>33</sup> Kish-grid is a form of equal probability sampling that follows a set of protocols where potential interviewees are listed by the enumerator, for example according to their age, and then selected by a predefined rule.

Based on the pre-tests CAMP is confident that enumerators possessed a strong general understanding of the questionnaire and that they were able to professionally read the questions to respondents as written and without bias. Furthermore, the survey team sought to employ enumerators that would be sensitive to local traditions by employing interviewers who were culturally local to the areas within which they were working.

Throughout the sampling, supervisors ensured that standards were maintained by utilising different checking methods. At the conclusion of the survey, feedback collected on the substance and structure of the questionnaire was shared with the senior management of CAMP.

### Data entry and cleaning

Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP recorded the answers to all the 4,000 questionnaires using a database entry program. The data was then checked and cleaned using SPSS, a statistical analysis computer program.

### Survey Management and Monitoring

Management and co-ordination of the survey was shared between CAMP's Islamabad based Project Coordinator and its Survey Manager based in the Peshawar regional office. The responsibilities of these officials included: co-ordinating training of enumerators, pre-testing of the questionnaire and field implementation.

During the conducting of the survey, CAMP's head office provided additional coverage of the process, along with field offices in the Agencies of Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan of FATA.

### Back-checking

Framework 4 below provides a breakdown of the number of questionnaires that were subject to a back-check. Back-checking was undertaken by one of CAMP's field offices, as well as from the CAMP regional office in Peshawar.

Back-checking of data was undertaken using a variety of methods. 647 (16.2%) interviews were observed by supervisors at the time of the


Framework M.4

Method of back-check/control	Frequency
Direct supervision during interviews	647
Back-check in person by supervisor	2,381
Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office	240
Not subject to back-check	732

consultancy; of the remainder, the majority 2,381 (59.5% of the total number) were thoroughly back-checked by supervisors revisiting the villages and confirming details with respondents, their families or locals. In addition, the finding of a further 240 interviews (6.0%) were confirmed via telephone conversations from CAMP's regional office in Peshawar.

Only 18.3% of the interviews were not back-checked. As problems were not identified during the confirmation process, CAMP confidently presumes that these responses are accurate.

Graph M.1



## Contact sheet and response rate

Framework M.5													
Contact Analysis Sheet-FATA Poll 2011													
Sr.#	Agency/FR	Sample size	No response	Refused to co-operate	Kish-Grid selection unavailable	Under-aged	Not a resident of the agency	Not a Pakistani national	Substitute respondent	Interrupted interview	Interviewed in past six months	Successful interview	Total contacts
1	Bajaur Agency	680	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	680	<b>683</b>
2	Mohmand Agency	360	112	200	22	18	2	1	0	1	2	360	<b>718</b>
3	Khyber Agency	760	128	175	134	47	13	17	0	74	19	760	<b>1367</b>
4	Orakzai Agency	280	37	84	11	38	16	0	0	8	0	280	<b>474</b>
5	Kurram Agency	680	52	84	17	9	13	21	6	18	6	680	<b>906</b>
6	North Waziristan Agency	440	103	203	40	41	19	19	1	2	0	440	<b>868</b>
7	South Waziristan Agency	280	10	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	280	<b>296</b>
8	FR, Peshawar	80	4	55	6	8	1	0	0	8	4	80	<b>166</b>
9	FR, Kohat	160	17	67	0	29	12	5	0	3	2	160	<b>295</b>
10	FR, Bannu	80	18	35	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	80	<b>137</b>
11	FR, Lakki	40	7	16	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	40	<b>66</b>
12	FR, Tank	80	26	46	28	13	0	0	0	1	1	80	<b>195</b>
13	FR, D.I. Khan	80	27	28	47	14	1	1	0	0	0	80	<b>198</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,000</b>	<b>543</b>	<b>995</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>4,000</b>	<b>6,369</b>


## Conclusion

Although some compromises have had to be made during the conducting of the survey (i.e. in calculating the total population and accessing only secure locations), which may have resulted in some distortion to the findings, it is believed that the data remains valuable and that the sampling framework employed was appropriate. The professional execution of the survey also provides confidence that the information on FATA is within the margin of error desired.

# Demographics of survey

## Gender Equality

The survey has been designed to document the different perceptions and concerns of male and female respondents in FATA. Graph A.1 below shows that over subsequent years CAMP has gradually worked to decrease gender disparity, a benefit gained from historical experience of fieldwork and increased access in FATA.




## Age group

All surveys appear to have consistently targeted a range of age groups. Within these age groups, those of 18-29 years and 30-49 remain dominant; in 2011, these groups accounted for 39.2% and 46.1% respectively. These figures roughly correspond with those that were recorded in the past.

Respondents from 50+ year age groups remained relatively low. This should not be taken as a visual display of youth gaining greater influence over decision making, as tribal elders retain much influence, but instead is likely to be a representation of a national demographic fact: that is, Pakistan has experienced a growth in the number of youths within its population. Furthermore, it is not evident how many elders were substituted because they were absent during quantitative research. Sampling was simply targeted at adults over 18 years of age, with interviews being selected by the Kish-grid mechanism.

The most under-represented age group was 65 + years. In 2011, only 2.2% of respondents fell within this age group. While, data on 50-65 years shows that they comprised 12.5% of the 2011 sample.



## Education

The following data shows the educational level of respondents between 2008 and 2011. Following the implementation of the Kish-Grid methodology in 2009, the education levels of respondents have been roughly comparable. The 2008 survey appears to show that an above average level of education was represented by the survey.

university educations where 6.7% of respondents had attained a bachelor's degree and 2.9% a master's degree.

Other figures remained largely consistent from between surveys undertaken using the Kish-Grid method.

**Table A.1: Education (General)**

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Not schooled	23.4	41.1	34.9	39.5
Religious education only	10.0	11.8	7.8	9.4
Schooled up to a primary level	8.3	9.8	14.1	8.8
Schooled up to a middle level	10.5	7.7	10.5	8.7
Schooled up to secondary school certificate	23.1	12.5	13.5	14.0
Schooled up to intermediate	12.5	8.7	9.5	9.4
Bachelors degree	8.2	6.1	6.5	6.7
Master degree	-	-	2.7	2.9
Specialisation: MBBS/doctor	-	-	0.4	0.3
Specialisation: Engineering	-	-	0.1	0.2
Those with a professional education	4.2	2.4	0.2	0.2

In 2011 a significant number of respondents (39.5%) were *not schooled* and a further 8.8% were only *schooled up to a primary level*, a negligible decrease in the combined total (49.0%) recorded in 2010. Furthermore, 9.4% of interviewees were found to have received *religious education only*, an increase of the 7.8% in 2010 but below the 2009 high of 11.8%. This means that the majority of respondents did not possess a mid-level or higher education.

Encouragingly the number of respondents educated up to secondary school certificate continues to grow, albeit very slowly. In 2011, 14.0% of respondents had attained this level of education, up from 13.5% in 2010 and 12.5% in 2009, a phenomenon that is repeated with regard to

## Education of the head of the family

If the respondent was not the head of the family then they were asked what level of education the head of the family possessed.<sup>34</sup> The data shows that heads of households outside of those that were survey respondents were generally lower educated than respondents, with 60% possessing an education below a mid-level. However, it does appear that this figure is a reduction to those recorded in 2009 and 2010.

Overall, the data implies that education is growing in importance in FATA with respondents showing greater levels of secondary school qualifications, as well as university education, than their elder family members. This may help to explain why education is growing in importance as detailed in Chapter 1.

<sup>34</sup> It is notable that it is very rare for a female to be head of a household therefore these statistics will largely refer to male education levels of what could be expected to be older generations.



Table A.2: Education of head of the household

Responses	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Not schooled	55.4	46.5	42.7
Religious education only	4.7	9.9	8.7
Schooled up to a primary level	10.0	11.0	9.8
Schooled up to a middle level	11.4	7.7	11.5
Schooling up to secondary school certificate	10.2	11.8	13.4
Intermediate	3.2	5.8	6.0
Bachelors degree	2.9	4.0	4.6
Master degree	1.7	2.4	2.6
Specialization: MBBS/doctor	0.2	0.6	0.4
Specialization: Engineering	0.1	0.2	0.2
Other professional education	0.2	0.2	0.2

### Occupation

In addition to education levels, respondents were asked to define their primary occupation. In recent years, the largest source of 'employment' has been as a *housewife*, however this figure has reduced for the 2011 survey. The percentage however, shows that of female respondents interviewed a very significant proportion are employed within the home and do not possess 'careers'. This is in keeping with cultural traditions but may also explain the demands for female empowerment recorded in Chapter 1.

Another leading occupation was that of *home-based worker*, which has dramatically increased to 22.1% (2011) from 2.7% in 2010. While it is not clear what the job description of home-based worker comprises, it is notable that the approximate 20.0% increase in this occupation is similar to the reduction in the housewife category. Consequently, it may be that female respondents are re-classifying their roles within the home. If this possibility is correct, it reaffirms the marginalised position of women in terms of employment outlined above. However, this is conjecture, and no real information is available to understand this change.

Female dominated occupations also include; women's health workers (0.8%), teachers (4.8%) and some skilled trades, including embroidery and

tailoring (4.1%).

The data also clearly shows a gradual decrease in the number of agriculture-based employment. Since 2008 the number of *agricultural labourers* and *farm owners* has consistently fallen; in 2011 only 7.1% and 0.2% were employed in these roles respectively. This in part, is due to internal displacement forcing rural areas to be evacuated for military operations and resulting in the loss of livestock and land. Also, to some extent, it may be an example of global trends in rural-urban economic migration.

Of the remaining categories, it is interesting to note that business ownership has more than doubled since 2010. In 2011, 9.4% of respondents described their occupation as *small business owner* and 4.7% as a *large business owner* – by comparison, the figures were 5.1% and 1.5% respectively in 2010.

It is discouraging however, to see that levels of unemployment have risen to 8.1% in 2011. It is also notable that the information contained within Table A.3 does not provide an effective analysis for hours of employment – that is, it is not clear the extent to which respondents may consider themselves to be under-employed.



Table A.3: Occupation (General)

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Agricultural labourer	11.3	10.0	9.0	7.1
Farm owner	12.6	7.1	1.4	0.2
Unskilled labourer	4.4	5.2	3.6	3.4
Skilled labourer	5.1	7.3	6.9	4.1
Technician	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.0
Clerical employee	1.8	1.8	1.0	1.3
'White collar' worker	12.0	4.1	2.0	3.5
Manager/Supervisor	1.0	0.9	1.2	2.1
Small business owner	8.3	12.1	5.1	9.4
Large business owner	3.5	1.2	1.5	4.7
Government employee	9.3	9.8	-	-
Home-based worker	-	5.7	2.7	22.1
House wife	14.0	18.7	38.1	18.2
Women's health worker	-	-	2.6	0.8
Student	2.9	2.3	3.0	1.7
Chowkidar (watchman)	-	-	3.5	2.3
Civil servant for FATA	-	-	1.8	2.5
Security provider	-	-	0.6	1.0
Provincial civil servant	-	-	0.9	0.2
Teacher	-	-	6.8	4.8
Unemployed	-	-	6.6	8.1
Other	4.7	6.7	0.4	1.7
Don't Know	0.1	0.5	-	0.1
No Response	8.0	4.8	-	-

### Occupation by gender

From the survey result it is apparent that men are more likely to be *unemployed* than women, which may have implications for family incomes as males generally provide the greatest economic contribution in FATA.

In rural tribal areas, some women are owners of small businesses or farmland. This is interesting because, in tribal society, female inheritance is discouraged. In these circumstances, it is likely that the female respondent was also the head of their family.

### Income level of the respondents

From the data it appears that the income levels of respondents remain lower than could be expected in other urban centres across Pakistan. This contrasts with the perception that the people of FATA are prospering due to black market opportunities made available because of the conflict (e.g. smuggling of heroine and opium and illicit arms manufacturing).

In 2001, approximately one-third of respondents earned PKR 10,000 or less, one-third earned between PKR 10,001 and 15,000, and one-third

Table A.4: Monthly income of family (PKR)

Responses (PKR)	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Up to 3,000	24.2	11.5	7.4	4.4
3,001-5,000	30.0	21.6	1.2	0.3
5,001-7,000	15.0	22.0	17.6	11.9
7,001-10,000	8.6	14.2	24.5	21.9
10,001-15,000	11.9	15.2	31.8	31.7
More than 15,000	10.5	15.7	17.6	29.9

over PKR 15,000. From this information, it is apparent that average levels of income are improving in FATA, with some shifts from low income towards higher incomes being recorded.

However, it must be recognised that because of inflation these data results are to some extent misleading; this is because it is questionable whether these higher income figures are sufficient to fulfil basic human needs for the majority of

### Marital status

In spite of the young demographic largely represented in the survey, a large majority of respondents were married. This is in keeping with traditions in rural Pukhtun where early marriage is common. Only 16.0% of respondents were single and had never been married.

### Family size (of a household)

In FATA it is traditional for extended family units to

Table A.5: Marital status

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Married	75.6	74.2	77.2	80.8
Widowed or Divorced	1.8	5.7	4.2	3.2
Single	22.0	17.0	18.6	16.0
No Response	0.7	3.1	-	-

respondents. In the future it may be necessary to redefine the incomes levels illustrated, to better reflect inflation rates. This will allow for a closer examination of the number of respondents that are under-employed or unable to secure sufficient economic opportunities (a concern expressed in Chapter 1).

live together. It is common for the head of the family and their spouse to share their home with their sons (whether married and unmarried), their unmarried daughters, their daughters-in-law and their grandchildren. This can result in households becoming very large.

Table A.6: Family size of household (2011)

Response	Male (adult)	Female (adult)	Male children	Female children
1-5 persons	91.8	92.6	73.9	69.5
6 and above persons	8.2	7.4	10.6	9.5
No persons	-	-	15.6	21.1

It is assumed that in response to this question, respondents provided information on the number of people in their compound. From the information recorded by enumerators it seems that it is not uncommon for households to be home to 6-10 people, and often 11-15 people.

### Religion

FATA is a predominantly a Muslim society, with only a few exceptions – including: Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs. The insurgency has further diminished non-Muslim traditions, as they have fled the region in order to avoid the conflict and potential hostility towards them.

### Proportion of Shia and Sunni Muslims in FATA

Respondents who identified themselves as Muslim were also asked to designate which sect they

belonged to; for all three years the average ratio describes the Shia population FATA comprising 13.2% and the Sunni population 86.8%.

Shia populations are largely confined to the Agencies of Kurram and Orakzai.

### Saying prayers regularly

It is evident from the data recorded by CAMP that people in FATA regularly perform/say their prayers. It can be established that only a minority of people do not conform to this assertion, with only 10.0% of respondents on average (but in some instances dropping to as low as 5.6%) declaring that they only *sometimes* say their prayers.

Less than 1.0% of respondents in FATA did not say prayers or failed to provide a response.

Table A.7: Religion

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Muslim	99.7	97.5	99.6	99.8
Christian	0.2	1.7	0.1	0.1
Sikh	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1
Hindu	-	0.1	-	-
No Response	-	0.7	-	-

Table A.8: Proportion of Shia & Sunni Muslims in FATA

Responses	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Shia	13.2	12.9	12.9
Sunni	86.8	87.1	87.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table A.9: Frequency of saying prayers

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Regularly	85.0	87.1	87.6	93.6
Sometimes	14.4	9.0	11.2	5.6
Never	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Not Asked	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
No Response	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.5
Don't Know		0.8	0.0	0.0
N/A	0.3	2.6	0.4	0.2

### Fasting

Similarly strong support was recorded with regard to fasting during the Islamic month of Ramadan. On average, since 2008, 96.6% of survey participants replied that they *regularly* adhered to this religious practise, in contrast only 2.0% stated that they either *sometimes* or *never* partook of fasting. This level of support is expected, as *Pakhtun* society considers non-adherence to be very embarrassing.

### Attend mosque

In *Pakhtun* society it is rare for women to attend

performed *Haj or Umra* in Saudi Arabia.

### Interest in participating in another survey

At the end of each interview respondents were asked whether they would be interested in taking part in another survey in the future. In 2008, 92.4% respondents stated that they would like to be part of a survey in the future, yet in subsequent years this enthusiasm has reduced. In 2011, just over half of respondents thought they would be interested in participating in another survey.

However, surveys remain a vital way of identifying

Table A.10: Fasting

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Regularly	98.7	94.5	97.0	96.4
Sometimes	0.6	2.5	1.6	1.9
Never	0.2	0.1		0.1
Not Asked	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
No Response	0.2	0.1	0.9	1.4
Don't Know		0.4		0.0
NA	0.3	2.6	0.4	0.2

mosque for prayers, therefore it is unsurprising that 43.5% of female respondents stated that they never attend mosque. Of those women who do attend mosque, they do so *occasionally* because they have

local issues, highlighting possible solutions and providing opportunities for policy-makers to interact with communities on areas of tribal concern.

Table A.11: Attend mosque

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Daily	52.5	54.3	20.5	28.3
Several Times A Week	12.9	11.9	25.9	17.9
Once A Week	3.8	3.0	1.8	2.0
Monthly	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.0
Several Times A Year	5.2	0.5	0.7	-
Once A Year Or Less	0.2	0.2	0.2	-
Never	15.6	14.7	49.4	43.5
Don't Know	0.4	4.7	-	-
No Response	8.8	7.3	0.6	7.5
N/A	0.3	2.6	0.4	0.0

Table A.12: Interest in participating in another survey

Responses	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)
Yes	92.4	62.2	60.3	53.2
No	6.9	8.0	7.6	7.4
Don't Know	0.5	29.9	32.1	39.5
No Response	0.2			

# OPINION POLL 2011 QUESTIONNAIRE

## MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

### SECTION A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

**Q.1 What sources of information do you have access to?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Pakistani press	1	Friends & family	11
Pakistani radio	2	Work colleagues	12
Pakistan TV	3	Neighbours	13
British press	4	Friday sermon	14
British TV channels	5	Communal gathering	15
British radio	6	Government officials	16
American press	7	Tribal elders	17
American TV	8	None	66
American radio	9	Other (specify)	77
Internet, books and films	10	Don't know	88

**Q.2 Which sources of information do you trust the most?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Pakistani press	1	Internet, books and films	10
Pakistani radio	2	Friends & family	11
Pakistan TV	3	Work colleagues	12
British press	4	Neighbours	13
British TV channels	5	Friday sermon	14
British radio	6	Communal gathering	15
American press	7	Government officials	16
American TV	8	Tribal elders	17
American radio	9	Other (specify)	77

**Q.3 Which newspapers do you read regularly?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Ausaf	1	Pakistan	13
Daily Times	2	The Post	14
The Dawn	3	Aaj Kal	15
The Frontier Post	4	Aaj	16
Jang	5	Mashriq	17
Khabrain	6	Wahdat	18
The Nation	7	UK newspapers	19
Nawa-e-Waqt	8	Afghan newspapers	20
The News	9	None	66
Observer	10	Other (specify)	77
The Statesman	11	Don't know	88
Express	12		

**Q.4 What television stations do you watch regularly?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Aaj	1	Bolan	14
ARY	2	CNBC	15
AVT Khyber	3	Star	16
AVT	4	Century TV	17
Pakistan Television (PTV)	5	Al Jazeera	18
Hum	6	BBC	19
Dunya	7	CNN	20
Samma	8	Sky News	21
Express News	9	Geo Super	22
Din	10	None	66
Dawn News	11	Other (specify)	77
Geo News	12	Don't know	88
Waqt	13		

**Q.5 Which radio stations do you listen to regularly?** (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)

Response	Code	Response	Code
BBC Pushto	1	FM 100	10
Radio Pakistan	2	FM 103	11
BBC Urdu	3	BBC English	12
FM 104 Buraq	4	Dewa (Voice of America)	13
FM 88 Lakki	5	Khyber Agency 91 MHZ	14
RADIO Pak MW	6	Razmak 1584 KHZ	15
FM 106	7	Other (specify)	77
Miranshah, 1593 KHZ	8	Don't know	88
FM 101	9		

## SECTION A: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

### GENERAL

**Q.6 Do you think things in Pakistan are going in the right direction?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.7 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing Pakistan?** (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Law and order	1	Human rights violation	11
Bad governance	2	Lack of good roads and transportation	12
Corruption	3	Taliban fighters	13
Political instability	4	Foreign fighters	14
Bad economy	5	People fleeing from the area as refugees	15
Inflation	6	Afghan refugees coming into the area	16
Energy crisis	7	Lack of jobs	17
American influence	8	Other (specify)	77
Bomb blasts	9	Don't know	88
Poverty	10		



**Q.8 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing FATA? (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Law and order	1	Human rights violation	11
Bad governance	2	Lack of good roads and transportation	12
Corruption	3	Drone attacks	13
Political instability	4	Taliban fighters	14
Bad economy	5	Foreign fighters	15
Inflation	6	People fleeing from the area as refugees	16
Energy crisis	7	Afghan refugees coming into the area	17
American influence	8	Lack of jobs	18
Bomb blasts	9	Other (specify)	77
Poverty	10	Don't know	88

**Q.9 Would you live outside the FATA, if given the option to?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.9.1 If Yes: why would you prefer to live outside? (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
Because FATA is no more a peaceful place to live	1
Because in FATA there are not many economic opportunities available	2
Because of constant military engagement in FATA, forcing people to leave	3
Because of drone attacks	4
Because of Taliban brutal treatment	5
Because of presence of Al-Qaeda and its associated foreign fighters	6
Because development conditions in FATA are not conducive	7
Because there are many opportunities available outside FATA	8
Other (specify)	77

**Q.9.2 If yes, where would you prefer to live?** (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Peshawar	1	Saudi Arabia	8
Other cities of Pakistan	2	Afghanistan	9
USA	3	Dubai	10
UK	4	Other Middle Eastern Countries	11
Germany	5	Other European countries	12
Canada	6	Other (specify)	77
Iran	7	Don't know	88

**Q.9.3 If no, why would you prefer to live in the FATA?** (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)

Response	Code
I like to live within my own village and community	1
I like the way we live in our tribal culture and tradition	2
I feel more secure in FATA	3
We have been living in FATA since long	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.10 Which of the following are the most important service that the GoP should provide to your district?** (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Security	1	Electricity supply	10
Justice	2	Political education of the masses	11
Policing	3	Good governance	12
Education/schools	4	New jobs	13
Health services/hospitals	5	Land reform to allow for local ownership	14
Water and sanitation	6	Better agriculture assistance	15
Roads	7	Other (specify)	77
Tackling terrorism	8	Don't know	88
Food supply	9		

**Q.11 Who are you most in contact with?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Political Agent	1	Tribal elders	10
Pakistan Army	2	Mullah	11
Frontier Corps	3	NGOs	12
MNAs	4	Government Officials	13
Teachers	5	Foreign fighters	14
Doctors	6	None	66
Senator	7	Other (specify)	77
Taliban	8	Don't know	88
Media	9		

**Q.12 Which of the following do you trust the most?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Political Agent	1	Tribal elders	10
Pakistan Army	2	Mullah	11
Frontier Corps	3	NGOs	12
MNAs	4	Government Officials	13
Teachers	5	Foreign fighters	14
Doctors	6	None	66
Senator	7	Other (specify)	77
Taliban	8	Don't know	88
Media	9		

**Q.13 What do you want for your children?** (*Single response only, divided by gender*)

For Boys	Code	For Girls	Code
More education	1	More education	1
More security	2	More security	2
Employment opportunities	3	Employment opportunities	3
Marriage	4	Marriage	4
Religious education	5	Religious education	5
Other (specify)	77	Purdah (veil)	6
Don't know	88	Other (specify)	77
		Don't know	88

## POLITICAL ISSUES

### Q.14 Should Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas:

Response	Code
Be fully integrated into KPK	1
Keep its current governing arrangements	2
Be established as a separate province of Pakistan	3
Be established as a FATA Council	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

### Q15: What is the reason for your answer?

**Q.15.1 Be fully integrated into KPK because:** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
It was historically one and the same area	1
It is geographically linked to each other	2
It is ethnically linked to each other	3
It would be easy to govern	4
We would have better economic/social and political opportunities	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.15.2 Keep its current governing arrangements because** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
The system of FCR suits to our culture and environment	1
The system in the rest of the country is not a very good example	2
We are living with this system since long	3
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.15.3 Be established as a separate province of Pakistan because:** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code
We want to be mainstreamed into Pakistan but want to keep our cultures and traditions intact	1
Domination from KPK would not be acceptable	2
We want control over our own resources	3
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.15.4 Be established as a FATA Council because:**<sup>1</sup> (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code
Dealing with one decision maker (President of Pakistan) is easier than dealing with the whole Parliament	1
It would be a gradual shift from old to new system	2
This will prepare us for the future political change	3
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.16 Do you agree with the President's decision of August 2009 allowing the political parties to organise and operate in FATA?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.17 What do you think of FCR?**

Response	Code
It should be abolished	1
Fundamentally reformed	2
Partly reformed	3
Retain in its present form	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

<sup>1</sup> In this case, the President would retain his powers under Article 247 of the Constitution

**Q.17.1 What aspects are most important to change in the FCR? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
Powers of the Political Agent should be curtailed considerably	1
Fundamental rights should be addressed in the FCR	2
Collective responsibility/arrest clause should be removed	3
Territorial responsibility clause should be removed	4
Demolition of property clause should be removed	5
The right to appeal against PA's decision should be given to the FATA residents	6
Jirga under FCR should be free of PA's influence	7
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.17.2 What aspects are most important to retain in the FCR? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
The jirga system under FCR should remain intact	1
Maliks/tribes should remain responsible for law and order	2
FATA people should be given the right to practice their customs and traditions without any interference	3
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.18 What do you think of the Government of Pakistan's 2009 proposals for reform of the FCR?**

Response	Code
Fully support	1
Partly support	2
Fully oppose	3
Partly oppose	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**Q.19 Which would you participate most in the following? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
The activities of political parties	1
Elections	2
Citizen forums to discuss local issues	3
Agency councils	4
Monitoring of government service delivery	5
Process of development	6
None	66
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.19.1 Which of these activities do you think would be most effective in bringing a positive change in the lives of FATA residents? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
The activities of political parties	1
Elections	2
Citizen forums to discuss local issues	3
Agency councils	4
Monitoring of government service delivery	5
Process of development	6
None	66
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.20 Are you on the voters register?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.21 Do you have a National Identity Card (NIC)?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2

**Q.22 Which living politician do you admire the most?**

\_\_\_\_\_ Don't know  None

**Q.23 What is your assessment of the performance of the political administration in FATA?**

Excellent	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
1	2	4	5	88

**Q.24 How has this performance changed over the past 12 months**

- 1) Improved a lot       3) Stayed the same       5) Worsened a lot   
 2) Improved a little       4) Worsened a little

**Q.25 What could the political administration do to improve your perception of their performance?**

*(Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
Improve living conditions in the area	1
Improve law and order situation	2
Improve the justice dispensation system	3
Generate employment	4
Improve education and health conditions	5
Improve the human rights situation	6
Make sure the community participation in decision-making process	7
Other (specify)	77

**Q.26 Who best represents your needs? *(Multiple responses are allowed)***

Response	Code
Maliks/elders	1
Political Agent	2
Pakistan Army	3
NGOs/Civil society	4
Religious leaders (Mullah)	5
Political leadership	6
Taliban or other groups	7
Other (specify)	77



## SECURITY ISSUES

**Q.27 What can Pakistan Government do to deal with suicide bombers and other terrorists?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code
Use the army to defeat them	1
Negotiate with the terrorists	2
Dialogue with local political/tribal authorities	3
Empower moderate Islamic voices	4
Enforce bans on terrorist organisations	5
Provide employment	6
Stop following the instructions of the West	7
Ask for more help from the West	8
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.28 Some people support or oppose each of the following. What is your opinion? Do you support or oppose:**

Response	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	No Response
a. The Pakistani military pursuing Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign fighters inside FATA	1	2	3	4	88	99
b. The U.S. military working with the Pakistani military to pursue Taliban ,Al Qaeda and foreign fighters inside Pakistan	1	2	3	4	88	99
c. The U.S. military pursuing Taliban, Al Qaeda and foreign fighters by itself inside Pakistan, without working with the Pakistani military	1	2	3	4	88	99

**Q.29 How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?**

Response	Code
Very great	1
Fairly great	2
Not a threat at all	3
Don't know	88
No response	99

**Q.30 Who/what is to blame for the high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan? (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Afghan Taliban	1	Saudi Arabia	10
Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan	2	USA	11
Other Pakistani Taliban groups	3	Western Influence Countries	12
Lashkar-e-Toiba	4	India	13
Jash-e-Mohammad	5	Iran	14
Pakistan Army	6	Israel	15
Lashkar-e-Islam (Mangal Bagh group)	7	Other (specify)	77
Ansar-ul-Islam	8	Don't know	88
Al Qaeda	9	No response	99

**Q.31 Who/what is to blame for not doing enough to stop high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan? (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Police department's lack of capacity	1	Poverty	7
Intelligence agencies failing to intercept	2	Lack of political will	8
Pakistan's Army lack of capacity	3	Western influence	9
Lack of education	4	Other (specify)	77
Unemployment	5	Don't know	88
Lack of social development	6	No response	99

**Q.32 Where do the bombers come from?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Afghanistan	1	Punjab	6
Kashmir	2	Other parts of Pakistan	7
West	3	Other (specify)	77
India	4	Don't know	88
FATA	5	No response	99

**Q.33 Do you think possessing nuclear weapons enhances Pakistan's security?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.34 Which of the following agencies do you believe should be primarily responsible for security in FATA?** (*Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code
The tribal communities/Lakhkars	1
The Khassadars and levies(Political administration)	2
The military	3
The Frontier Corps	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.35 How do you rate the performance of each of the organisations above in providing security in FATA?** (*Eg. very good, good, neutral, poor, very poor*)

**Q.35.1 Tribal Communities / Lakhkars**

Excellent	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
1	2	3	4	88

**Q.35.2 Khasadar and levies**

Excellent	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
1	2	3	4	88

**Q.35.3 The military**

Excellent	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
1	2	3	4	88

**Q.35.4 The Frontier Corps**

Excellent	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
1	2	3	4	88

**Q.36 Which do you trust the most to provide security? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
The tribal communities/Lakhkars	1
The Khassadars and levies(Political administration)	2
The military	3
The Frontier Corpse	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.37 Do you think the FC plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.38 If trained with international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in their ability to do their job?**

Response	Code
More confidence	1
Less confidence	2
Don't know	88

**Q.39 What are the main reasons of conflicts in FATA? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Conflict over land	1	Crime	5
Family	2	Extremist	6
Tribal	3	Other (specify)	77
Political	4	Don't know	88

**Q.40 How secure do you feel in your daily life?**

Response	Code
Very secure	1
Somewhat secure	2
Somewhat insecure	3
Very insecure	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**Q.41 Compare to last year, do you feel your security is getting better or worse?**

Response	Code
Much better	1
Somewhat better	2
No difference	3
Somewhat worse	4
Much worse	5
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**Q.42 How could your sense of security be improved? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
Deploy more troops in FATA	1
Strengthen local communities lakhkars	2
Capacitate the FC and Khasadar/levie forces	3
Extend proper police system to FATA	4
Other (specify)	77

**Q.43 What are the biggest threats to your security? (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Conflict	1	Crime and banditry	6
Terrorist attacks	2	Inadequate food	7
Army activity	3	Inadequate healthcare	8
Sectarianism	4	Other (specify)	77
Drone attacks	5	Don't know	88

**Q.44 Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2

**Q.45 If yes, where did you go? (Please note the city/town or district)**


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**Q.46 What is your view of the level of support you received from GOP? (eg. very good, good etc)**

Excellent	Good	Poor	Very poor	Don't know
1	2	4	5	88

**Q.47 What is the most important issue that affects your and your family's quality of life? (Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Unemployment	1	Insecurity	7
Inflation	2	Access to justice	8
Poverty	3	Infrastructure	9
Access to education	4	Housing	10
Access to health services	5	Other (specify)	77
Access to food	6	Don't know	88

**Q.48 How do you rate the performance of the FATA Secretariat?**

Response	Code
Excellent	1
Good	2
Fair	3
Poor	4
Very poor	5
Don't know	88

**Q.49 What is the reason for your answer?**

**Q.49.1 FATA Secretariat (FS) has performed well because:** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
FS involves FATA people in the planning process	1
FS has been implementing successful projects in FATA	2
The staff of FS is cooperative with FATA people	3
The projects FS has implemented have long-term impact	4
FS utilises grants it receives for FATA's development	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.49.2 FATA Secretariat (FS) has performed badly because:** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
FS never involved FATA people in the planning process	1
FS has implemented badly planned projects in FATA	2
FS staff do not cooperate with FATA people	3
FS does not have FATA representation at the policy and mid-management level	4
The projects FS has implemented have long-term impact	5
FS does not utilise grants it receives for FATA's development	6
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.50 How do you rate the performance of the FATA Development Authority?**

Response	Code
Excellent	1
Good	2
Fair	3
Poor	4
Very poor	5
Don't know	88

**Q.51: What is the reason for your answer?**

**Q.51.1 FATA Development Authority (FDA) has performed well because:** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
FDA involves FATA people in the planning process	1
FDA has been implementing successful projects in FATA	2
The staff of FDA is cooperative with FATA people	3
The projects FDA has implemented have long-term impact	4
FDA utilises grants it receives for FATA's development	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.51.2 FATA Development Authority (FDA) has performed badly because:** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
FDA never involved FATA people in the planning process	1
FDA has implemented badly planned projects in FATA	2
FDA staff do not cooperate with FATA people	3
FDA does not have FATA representation at the policy and mid-management level	4
The projects FDA has implemented have long-term impact	5
FDA does not utilise grants it receives for FATA's development	6
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.52 Various foreign countries, including US and UK, have expressed an interest in providing development assistance for FATA. How do you think that assistance could be most valuable?** *(Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code	Response	Code
Roads	1	Security	8
Electricity	2	No international assistance is needed	9
Education	3	No assistance is needed from US or UK	10
Health	4	No opinion	55
Livelihoods	5	Other (specify)	77
Supporting employment	6	Don't know	88
Humanitarian assistance	7		



**Q.53 Do you understand how development priorities are decided in FATA and projects selected?**

Yes	No	Don't Know	No Response
1	2	88	99

**Q.54 How could this process be improved? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
Government and NGOs should involve communities in the process	1
Proper baseline surveys should be conducted before making development priorities	2
The political administration role should be minimized in making decisions on selection of communities and projects	3
Process should be inclusive of all stakeholders	4
Other (specify)	77

**Q.55 Do you support or oppose the presence of the following groups inside FATA today?**

Response	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	No Response
a. The United States military	1	2	3	4	88	99
b. Arab and Foreign Al Qaeda fighters	1	2	3	4	88	99
c. Afghan Taliban fighters (led by Mullah Omar)	1	2	3	4	88	99
d. Pakistani Taliban fighters	1	2	3	4	88	99

**Q.56 What do you think of the Pakistan army's military offensive in FATA?**

Response	Code
Fully support	1
Partly support	2
Fully oppose	3
Partly oppose	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**Q.57 How would you describe Pakistani Taliban?** (*Don't read the list – check appropriate box - Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code	Response	Code
Are they freedom fighters	1	Foreign fighters	6
Defenders of Islam	2	No opinion	55
Defenders of tribal communities	3	Other (specify)	77
Terrorists	4	Don't know	88
Uneducated youth	5		

**Q.58 Do you know what Al-Qaeda is?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.58.1 If yes, what do you think of Al-Qaeda?**

Response	Code
Very favourable	1
Partly favourable	2
Unfavourable	3
Very unfavourable	4
No opinion	55

**Q.59 What should happen to any foreign fighter/Jihadi currently living in FATA?** (*Multiple responses are allowed*)

Response	Code
They should be allowed to stay	1
They should be allowed to stay but only if they cease violence	2
They should be asked to leave	3
They should be forced to leave by the Pakistani military	4
There are no such people in FATA	5
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**Q.60 What do you think of US drone strikes in FATA?**

Response	Code
Always justified	1
Sometimes justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided	2
Never justified	3
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**SECTION C: RELIGION & POLITICS****Q.61 Which religious authority do you trust the most? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Javed Ghamdi	1	Sipah-e-Sihaba	9
Prof. Anees	2	Lashkar e Islam	10
Amir Liaqat Hussain	3	Tehrek e Taliban Pakistan	11
Tahir Ul Qadri	4	Jash e Mohammad	12
Dr. Israr Ahmed	5	Mulana Sofi Mohammad	13
Al – Huda	6	None	66
Jamaat Ud Dawa	7	Other (specify)	77
Laskar e Tayyaba	8	Don't know	88

**Q.62 Which religious authority outside of Pakistan do you trust the most? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman	1	Imam Khumenaee	4
Hamza Yousaf	2	Other (specify)	77
Dr. Zakir Naik	3	Don't know	88

**Q.63 Is there any justification in Islam for suicide bombing<sup>2</sup>?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Justified	1	Don't know	88
Rarely justified	2	No response	99
Never justified	3		

<sup>2</sup> Some people think that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified.

**Q.64 Should religion .....** *(Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
Provide a moral code that everyone should follow	1
Play no role	2
Dictate women's rights	3
Define criminal and civil laws	4
Define how governments are chosen	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.65 In your opinion what is the most important human rights issue in Pakistan today?** *(Multiple responses are allowed)*

Response	Code
Violence against women	1
Violence against children	2
Violation of minority rights	3
Lack of Freedom of expression	4
Lack of Freedom of movement	5
State's inability to provide basis amenities of life	6
Lack of education and health	7
Excessive violence by the state	8
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.66 Do you think that a person has the right to kill a relative to protect the honour of their family?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.67 What phrase best describe the Afghan Taliban? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation	1
Ignorant of Islamic values / teaching	2
A terrorist group	3
A political group	4
An anti-women group	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.68 If you could vote for any party or group in a Pakistani election, which one of the following would you vote for?**

Response	Code
Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	1
Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)	2
Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q)	3
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)	4
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	5
Awami National Party (ANP)	6
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	7
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)	8
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Pakistani Taliban)	9
Al Qaeda	10
Independents	11
Will not vote	12
None	66
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88
No response	99

**Q.69 Will the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.69.1** How would you feel about this if they did?

Very good	Somewhat good	Very bad	Somewhat bad	Don't know
1	2	3	4	88

**Q.70** What would be the impacts in FATA if the Afghan Taliban come into power? (Multiple responses are allowed)

Response	Code
Pakistani Taliban groups will be strengthened and we may have Talibani Style Sharia law in FATA	1
It will have very bad impact on the security of FATA	2
Female education and health in FATA will suffer	3
Shia community may be forced to leave the area	4
People with progressive thinking may be forced to leave	5
IDPs may not be able to return	6
Religious minorities in FATA will suffer	7
The situation for NGOs and government both will not be conducive to work and at the end people in FATA will suffer	8
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**AFGHAN REFUGEES****Q.71** Should all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan return to Afghanistan?

Yes  No  Don't Know

**Q.72** To what extent do you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan? (Ask separately for each statement)

Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't Know	No Response
Make a positive contribution to Pakistan and Pakistan's economy?	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Damage Pakistan's economy?	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Undermine Pakistan's security?	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Create tension with the local Pakistani population	1	2	3	4	5	88	99

## SECTION D: OPINIONS ON OTHER COUNTRIES

**Q.73 Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for the military build up?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.74 Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for development?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**Q.75 Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the following countries:**

<i>Response</i>	Very Favourable	Somewhat Favourable	Somewhat Unfavourable	Very Unfavourable	No Response	Don't Know
Afghanistan	1	2	3	4	99	88
India	1	2	3	4	99	88
Iran	1	2	3	4	99	88
China	1	2	3	4	99	88
Saudi Arabia	1	2	3	4	99	88
Canada	1	2	3	4	99	88
France	1	2	3	4	99	88
Germany	1	2	3	4	99	88
Malaysia	1	2	3	4	99	88
The United States	1	2	3	4	99	88
The United Kingdom	1	2	3	4	99	88

## SECTION E: OPINION ABOUT PAKISTAN AND UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS AND POLICIES

**Q.76 Do you think that the UK:** *(Ask separately for each statement)*

<i>Response</i>	Yes	No	Don't know	No Response
Helps to make the world more peaceful & stable	1	2	88	99
Values the United Nations (UN)	1	2	88	99
Helps to make the world more prosperous	1	2	88	99
Helps to safeguard the global environment	1	2	88	99
Promotes respect for democratic values	1	2	88	99
Promotes respect for Human Rights	1	2	88	99

**Q.77 Which of the following best describes the UK's relationship with Pakistan?** *(Read list and circle only one)*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Code</b>
Unequal	1
Partners for peace and progress	2
Close allies in the war against terror	3
A left over from colonial days	4
Partners in development and dealing with emergencies	5
Home of many British Pakistanis	6
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.78 Which of the following best describes the UK's involvement in Afghanistan?** *(Read list and circle only one)*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Code</b>
Committed in the long term to a stable Afghanistan	1
Will leave Afghanistan now Osama Bin Laden is dead	2
Should not be in Afghanistan at all	3
Engaged in an attack on Islam	4
Is a partner in rebuilding and developing Afghanistan	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88
No response	99



**Q.79 Is your opinion of the UK generally becoming more favourable, less favourable or stayed the same?**

Response	Code
More favourable	1
Less favourable	2
Stayed the same	3
Don't know	88

**Q.79.1: What is the reason for this?**

Response	Code
Links with UK in higher education	1
Sports link between Pakistan and UK/ UK sports personalities	2
Family links	3
Development assistance.	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**Q.80 What is your opinion of the UK and USA on the following? (Ask separately for each statement)**

Response	UK	Code	USA	Code
Role in Afghanistan	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99
Attitude towards the Islamic world	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99
Immigration policy	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99
Role in Pakistan				
Development assistance in Pakistan				

## SECTION F: DEMOGRAPHICS

### D 1: Gender of respondents (On observation):

Male  Female

### D 2: Age group of respondent

Response	Code	Response	Code
18 – 29 years	1	50 – 64 years	3
30 – 49 years	2	65 + years	4

### D 3: Education level of respondent

Response	Code	Response	Code
Not schooled	1	Schooled upto Bachelor level	7
Religious education only	2	Master degree	8
Schooled upto Primary level	3	Specialisation: MBBS/doctor	9
Schooled upto Middle level	4	Specialisation: Engineering	10
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level	5	Those upto professional education	11
Schooled upto Intermediate level	6		

### D 3a: Education level of head of the household

Response	Code	Response	Code
Not schooled	1	Schooled upto Bachelor level	7
Religious education only	2	Master degree	8
Schooled upto Primary level	3	Specialisation: MBBS/doctor	9
Schooled upto Middle level	4	Specialisation: Engineering	10
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level	5	Those upto professional education	11
Schooled upto Intermediate level	6		

### D 4: Monthly income of respondent's family in PKR?

Response	Code	Response	Code
Upto PKR 3000	1	PKR 7001 – PKR 10000	4
PKR 3001 – PKR 5000	2	PKR 10001 – PKR 15000	5
PKR 5001 – PKR 7000	3	More than PKR 15000	6

**D 5: Occupation of respondent**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Agricultural labourer	1	Provincial civil servant	11
Chowkidar (watchman)	2	Skilled labourer	12
Civil servant of FATA	3	Small business owner	13
Clerical employee	4	Teacher	14
Farm owner	5	Technician	15
Home-based worker	6	Unskilled labourer	16
Lady health worker (LHW)	7	White colour employee	17
Large business owner	8	Unemployed	18
Management/supervisor	9	Other (specify)	77
Military, police, security personnel	10		

**D 6: Marital status of respondent**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Married	1	Single	4
Widowed	2	No response	99
Divorced	3		

**D 7: How many people live in your household/compound?**

Number of People: \_\_\_\_\_

Male (adult)	Code	Female (adult)	Code	Male children	Code	Female children	Code
1-5 persons	1	1-5 persons	3	1-5 children	5	1-5 children	7
6 and above persons	2	6 and above persons	4	6 and above	6	6 and above	8

**D 8: Religion of respondent**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Christian	1	Hindu	4
Sikh	2	Other (specify)	77
Muslim	3	No response	99

*(Ask if answer is 3 in D8)*

Shiite

1

Sunni

2

*(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)*

**D 9: Please tell me whether you regularly, sometimes, or never engage in the following religious practices**

Response	Regularly	Sometimes	Never	Not Asked	No Response
Pray five times a day	1	2	3	4	99
Fast during Ramadan	1	2	3	4	99

*(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)*

**D 10: How often do you pray at the mosque?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Five times a day/daily	1	Several times a year	5
Several times a week	2	Once a year or less	6
Once a week	3	Never	7
Monthly	4	No response	99

**D 11: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Yes	1	No	2
Don't know	88		

**Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:**

"Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have about the interview. To help him do that, could I have your telephone number?"

**Respondent Information:**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Tel No. \_\_\_\_\_

NIC Number \_\_\_\_ \_

**Interviewer Certification:**

"I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided to me.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**To be completed by the Supervisor:**

**Interview subject to Back-check/Control**

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

**Method of Back-check/Control**

- 1. Direct supervision during interview
- 2. Back-check in person by supervisor
- 3. Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office
- 4. Not subject to back-check

**Initial Questions (for Interviewer only)**

Name of surveyor -----

Date of interview -----

Agency/FR -----

Tehsil -----

[1] Rural.

[2] Urban

## Agency/Tehsil/FR-Wise List of Villages

### Bajaur Agency

Tehsil Khar		Tehsil Utman Khel		Tehsil Salarzo		Tehsil Nawagai	
1	Aman Kot	1	Soor Hando	1	Kotkai	1	Main Nawagai
2	Khar	2	Gardai	2	Redawno	2	Mammazo
3	Anayat Qilla	3	Qazafi	3	Baro	3	Khona Kalay
4	Gandaw	4	Sikandara	4	Dag Qilla	4	Kamangara
5	Lar Raghgan	5	Hayati	5	Tallai	5	Doda
6	Yousuf Abad	6	Ghazi Baba	6	Chewatra	6	Gud Khel
7	Falang	7	Swal Qilla	7	Dagai	7	Shinger
8	Jar	8	Bagh Barang	8	Bar Raghgan	8	Zorbandar
9	Molla Kalai	9	Mego Shah	9	Khan Abad	9	Nari
10	Haj Lawang	10	Naraji	10	Yarani Khandaro	10	Mashkanro
11	Maminzo			11	Chargo	11	Charming
12	Shin kot			12	Tabai	12	Tangi
13	Sadiq Abad			13	Tandai	13	Inzari
14	Qazi Derai			14	Sarazghai	14	Loesame
15	Gulshan Abad			15	Rasha Dehrai	15	Meagano
16	Mehrosa			16	Nazakai	16	Parmakhai
17	Banda			17	Gullu Shah	17	Malkana
18	Shekhan			18	Ghakhe		
19	Sabandi			19	Chergori		

### Mohmand Agency

Teshil Haleem Zai		Teshil Prang Ghar		Teshil Kamli Haleem Zai		Teshil Ekka Ghund	
1	Biki Khel	1	Kirra	1	Ghazibaig	1	Shaheed Banda
2	Nasrat Kor	2	Khadikas	2	Ali Hassan Kalay	2	Aqrab Dag
3	Khwaidad Khel	3	Dawederai	3	Nahqi Yousufkhel Kalay	3	Hafeez Korona
4	Surdagy	4	Oiaw Khan				
5	Prata	5	Monda Saparay	4	Alam Beg Kalay		
6	Kasai	6	Spina Khawra				
7	Malook Kor	7	Navi Kalay				
8	Shati Khel	8	Srazierak Bocha				
9	Yousuf Khel	9	Tor Zarak Bocha				
10	Dara	10	Bakaro Delai				

Tehsil Haleem Zai		Tehsil Prang Ghar		Tehsil Kamli Haleem Zai		Tehsil Ekka Ghund	
11	Shani Khel	11	Ziarat				
12	Dorba Khel	12	Dando Khandao				
13	Ghalani Khas	13	Bahlola				
14	Ghallani Colony	14	Karkana				
		15	Manrai				

### Khyber Agency

Tehsil Jamrud		Tehsil Landi Kotal		Tehsil Mulagori	
1	Ali Masjid	1	Dargai/ Regha	1	Pendi Lalma
2	Bakkar Kalai	2	Kam Shelman	2	Gari Doulat Khel
3	Ganj GarhiJalal din	3	Muhammad Akbar Kalai	3	Main Morcha
4	Jalal Din		Ghani Khel	4	Goghar Dand
5	Khan Moh Kalai	4	Pero Khel Barha Malik Kalai	5	Sher Burj
6	Inayat Khan Mastal Khel	5	Mirdad Khel Chengai Kalai	6	Lowra Main
7	Sarfaraz Khan	6	Chenar Khan Kalai	7	Aba Khel
8	Shah Alam/ Ibrahim Khel	7	Toti Khel	8	Muradi Khel
9	Moh Wali Khan/Mashin	8	Malqana	9	Haji Shah Alam
	Wala Kalai	9	Saidgai	10	Tor Tapay
10	Mula Juma Gul Wali Khel	10	Mados Khel	11	Naher Ghara
11	Lala China	11	Abdur Rauf Kalai	12	Sher Khanu Kalay
12	Sultan zai Kapan Tangai	12	Chinarona	13	Ganji Kalai
13	Mado Khel	13	Shudan Khel	14	Zagh Kalai
14	Malik Ismail Nawab Kalai	14	Shaheed Kalai	15	Shaheed Mena
15	Meram Khan	15	Kadow Khel	16	Khwar Ghara
16	Chenar Kalai	16	Khan Khel Kalai	17	Jando Baba
17	Sumer Bagh	17	Khan Khel Kalai	18	Haji Dadwali Kalai
18	Gul Rehman	18	Kharigar Kalay	19	Shekhanu Kalai
19	Godar	19	Mirdad Khel Mulagan	20	Haji Jandar Kalay Murad
20	Sur Qamar	20	Haji Gulab Noor		Dhand
21	Ghreeza	21	Ashiq Kali		
22	Speelana kas	22	Lagad Khel		
23	Husay Khula	23	Taisan Khel		
24	Jamal Khel	24	Ashkhel		
25	Burj Kalai	25	Mulagoii		
26	Sikander Khel	26	Pasaid Khel		
27	Wazir Dhand				
28	Sakhi PolTalab Ghara				
29	Talab Ghara				
30	Malak Abad				

### Orakzai Agency

Upper Orakzai		Lower Orakzai		Lower Orakzai	
1	Mashti Bazar	1	Kalaya	1	Kuraiz
2	Sangra	2	Char Khel	2	Suleman Khel
3	Hassan Dara	3	Zaridar	3	Khandoo
4	Mir Ghara	4	Qalat	4	Meetho
5	Karim Shah Kalai	5	Zera	5	Pat Tangay
6	Mulagai	6	Andkhel	6	Kada Bazar
7	Shahkar Nwasi Kalay	7	Tazi Khel	7	Hussaini Gari
		8	Shamar		
		9	Palosai		
		10	Naka Mela		
		11	Bar Merako		
		12	Kuku Dara		
		13	Abishel		
		14	Qambara Ali Kalay		

### Kurram Agency

Tehsil Upper Kurram Parachinar		Lower Kurram Sadda		Central kurram	
1	Parachinar	1	Sateen	1	Tarali
2	Ziran	2	Pirak	2	Gawai Ghara
3	Karman	3	Pir Qayum	3	Sultanei
4	Loqman Khel	4	Sadda	4	Tawde oba
5	Shaluzan	5	Darnni	5	Gawdra
6	Mali Kali	6	Khanano Kalay	6	Apange
7	Shablan	7	Shashoo	7	Zangai
8	Agra	8	Warsak	8	Mazreena
9	SultanNasti Kot	9	Skhi Ahmad Shah	9	Wrasta
10	Ibrahim Zai Main	10	Makizai Sharki	10	Morghhan
11	Ibrahim Zai	11	Kochi	11	Morgan dara
12	Borki	12	Mat Khoza	12	Sham kai
13	Khar Luchi	13	New Abadi	13	Manato
14	Pewar	14	Jabei Kalay	14	Gawaki
15	Gambeel	15	Sanzalo Kalai	15	Oweet
16	Alam Sher	16	Bugen	16	Jalmai
17	Mali Khel	17	Uchat	17	Tando
18	Sara Gala	18	Manduri	18	Mandan
19	Kachkina	19	Chapri	19	Doger



Tehsil Upper Kurram Parachinar		Lower Kurram Sadda		Central Kurram	
20	Kunjali Zai	20	Mir bagh	20	Zarani
21	Jhalandar	21	Badma		
22	Dangila				
23	Wacha Dara				
24	Jalm Zai				
25	Sadino Kali				
26	Sameer				
27	Sara Kali				

### North Waziristan Agency

Tehsil Miranshah		Tehsil Razmak		Tehsil Spinwam	
1	Shehzad Kot,	1	Zaman Malak Kalay	1	Shamiri
2	Datta Khel Village,	2	Sher Khan kalai	2	Aba khel
3	Shana khura, Hamzoni	3	Fateh Mod	3	Hassan Khel
4	Patti khel, hamzoni	4	Zargwal Khel	4	Bobali
5	Ali khel	5	Diroon	5	Mirali Village
6	Ahmad khel			6	Data khel
7	Umarzai			7	Spinwam Chowk
8	Raghzai Kalai				
9	Khatti kalai				
10	Khaer kalai				
11	Aghzan kalai				
Tehsil Data Khail		Tehsil Shewa		Mirali Tehsil	
1	Pir Samand Kot	1	Tora Sawabai	1	Haider Khel
2	Boya	2	Almara	2	Eidak
3	Tarka khel	3	Shadimi kot	3	Khadi
4	Char Khel	4	Por khel	4	Zariki
5	Bar kalai, Degon	5	Pipali		
6	Keez Kalai, Degon	6	Dhai		
		7	Tandi		
		8	Zalol Khel		
		9	Alam Khel		
		10	Druzanda		
		11	Khan Khel		

### South Waziristan Agency

Tehsil Birmal		Tehsil Wana		Tehsil Toi Khula	
1	Dana	1	Doag	1	Kotkai
2	Sarghishai	2	Dabkot	2	Gul kuch
3	Sara khawra	3	Daza ghondai	3	Gul kuch bazar kalai
4	Margha	4	Ghwa khwa	4	Zarmillana
5	Kaza punga	5	Mughal khel		
6	Azam warsak	6	Kari kot		
7	Baghara	7	Sherana		
8	Ghandai	8	Spin		
9	Kaloosha	9	Tanai		
10	Zairai lita	10	Wacha khorha		
11	Sholam				
12	Manra				
13	Nargosai				
14	Wacha dana				

### FR Peshawar

Jana Kor		Asho Khail	
1	Barki Janakor	1	Sarmast Khel
2	Mandi	2	Zarin Khel
3	Samabadaba	3	Murid Khel
4	Samabadabere Herchan		
5	Tatki Janakor		

### FR Kohat

Bosti Khel		Zarghan Khel		Sheraki	
1	Las Gari Mirwal Kalai	1	Babozai	1	Amal Khel Bala
2	Samandi Mela Habib Kalai	2	Bazi Khel	2	Azbar kalay
3	Isra mela Main Noor Kalai	3	Ferozi Mela	3	Obash Khel
		4	Mani Khel	4	Doctor Sallem
		5	Sardar Khel	5	Tary Kalley
		6	Shapal Kiwal	6	Noor Ali Kalai
		7	Toor Khel		

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### FR Bannu

1	Beezan Khel
2	Azeem Kalay
3	Mohmand Khel Wazer
4	Chari Narmi Khail
5	Hindi Khel
6	Ghowara Baba Khail
7	Custam Bakakhel
8	Chashma

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### FR Lakki

1	Masti Khail
2	Guli Khail
3	Sargara Muhammad Khan
4	Tajori

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### FR Tank

1	Jandola
2	Kerriwam
3	Khaicha
4	Khargai
5	Doulat Korona
6	Musa Khan Korona
7	Serra Khowla
8	Sobat Kech

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### FR D.I. Khan

1	Mughal Kot
2	Darazanda
3	Landi Baloch Khan
4	Doogh Shengai
5	Ragha Sar
6	Parwara
7	Shiek Mela
8	Karriwam

## A

## REGULATION

*further to amend Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901*

**WHEREAS** it is expedient further to amend the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (III of 1901) for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

**NOW, THEREFORE**, in pursuance of the provisions contained in clause (5) of Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the President of Pakistan is pleased to make the following Regulation:—

1. **Short title and commencement.**— (1) This Regulation may be called the Frontier Crimes (Amendment) Regulation, 2011.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

3. **Substitution of long title and preamble Regulation III of 1901.**— In the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (III of 1901), hereinafter referred to as the said Regulation,

(a) for the long title, the following shall be substituted, namely:—

"further to provide for maintenance of peace, law and order and good governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas";

(b) for the preamble, the following substituted, namely:—

**“WHEREAS** it is expedient further to provide for maintenance of peace, law and order and good governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas;

**NOW, THEREFORE**, in pursuance of clause (5) of Article 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the President is pleased to make the following Regulation:—”;

(c) the words, colon and dash "it is hereby enacted as follows:—" shall be omitted.

4. **Amendment of section 1, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, in section 1,—

(a) for sub-section (3) the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“(3) It shall extend to such Federally Administered Tribal Areas as may be notified by the Governor from time to time in pursuance of Article 145 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas include the tribal areas as specified in the Third Schedule to this Regulation.”; and

(b) sub-sections (4) and (5) shall be omitted.

3. **General Amendment, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for the words “Deputy Commissioner” or “District Magistrate” wherever occurring the words “Political Agent” or “District Coordination Officer or “Assistant Political Agent”, as the case may be, shall be substituted.

5. **Substitution of sections 2,3,4 and 5, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 2,3,4 and 5 the following shall respectively be substituted, namely:—

**“2. Definitions.**— In this Regulation, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

- (a) “Appellate Authority” means an Authority established under section 48 of this Regulation;
- (b) “Council of Elders” means in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a council of three or more respectable elders appointed by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and presided over by Assistant Political Agent vested with powers under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898);
- (c) “FATA Tribunal” means a Tribunal established under section 55A;
- (d) “Governor” means the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as Agent to the President of Pakistan for Federally Administered Tribal Areas in terms of Article 145 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan;
- (e) “*Qaumi Jirga*” means *Jirga* consisting of respectable elders and representatives of the tribes; and
- (f). “*Rewaj*” means usages, traditions and customs of the tribes in vogue in Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

**3. Relation of Regulation to other laws.**— (1) The provisions of this Regulation shall take effect in case to which they apply, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.

(2) The powers conferred by this Regulation may be exercised in addition to any powers conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force, and, where the contrary is not expressed or implied, other laws in force in Tribal Areas in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force shall, so far as may be, apply to cases dealt within that place under this Regulation.

(3) The laws specified in the Second Schedule shall apply to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

**4. Assistant Political Agent.**— (1) In any Agency or Frontier Region in the whole or any part thereof where all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force, the Governor may confer powers under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) on any Assistant Political Agent.

(2) Every Assistant Political Agent shall have all the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the First Class as specified in Schedule III and additional powers as specified in Part I of Schedule IV to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), and may pass any sentence of imprisonment or fine or both as provided in this Regulation.

(3) When exercising any of the powers of a Political Agent or District Coordination Officer under this Regulation, an Assistant Political Agent shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Regulation, to be the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and shall exercise all or any of the powers specified in the First schedule.

(4) Every Assistant Political Agent shall exercise his powers in subordination to the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and in such cases or class of cases, and within such local limits as the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer may, by order in writing, direct.

**5. Power of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer to transfer the case.**— The Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer may, on the application of any of the parties, after notice to the other party and hearing them, transfer any civil or criminal matter to any Assistant Political Agent, within thirty days from the appointment of the Council of Elders and shall record reasons thereof for such transfer of the case.”.

**6. Omission of section 6, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 6 shall be omitted.

**7. Substitution of sections 7,8,9,10 and 11, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 7,8,9,10, and 11, the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“7. Tender of pardon to accomplices.**— Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), for the purpose of this Regulation, shall be construed to read as under,-Z

"(1) In the case of any offence, at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or trial of the offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence, the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may tender pardon to such person on condition of his making full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether, as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof:

Provided that no person shall be tendered pardon who is involved in an offence relating to hurt or *qatl* without permission of the victim or, as the case may be, of the heirs of the victim.

(2) The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record his reasons for doing so.

(3) Every person accepting a tender of pardon under this section shall be examined as a witness in the subsequent trial, if any.

(4) Such person, unless he is already on bail, shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.

**8. Civil reference to the Council of Elders.**— (1) Where the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is satisfied from any information that a civil dispute exists between the parties which is likely to cause breach of peace, he may, for the settlement thereof make an order in writing stating the grounds for his being so satisfied, refer the dispute within fifteen days to the Council of Elders, for findings in accordance with *Rewaj* who shall give its findings within ninety days on the issues in dispute after making necessary inquiry and hearing the parties and their witnesses.

(2) Where a reference to the Council of Elders is made under sub-section (1), the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall nominate the Council of Elders. The names of the members so nominated be communicated to the parties, and any objection taken thereto by any of the parties, shall be recorded. The Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall dispose of the objections after hearing the parties and recording the reasons thereof, appoint the members of the Council accordingly.

(3) The order of reference made under sub-section (1) shall state the issues in dispute on which the findings of Council of Elders is required.

(4) On receipt of the findings of Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District

Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by recording his reasons may,-

- (a) pass a decree in accordance with the findings of the majority of the Council of Elders; or
- (b) remand the case to the Council of Elders for further inquiry and findings.

**9. Effect of decree on finding of Council.**— A decree passed under clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 8 shall,-

- (a) be a final settlement of the case so far as the decree relates to the matter stated in the reference; and
- (b) have, to that extent and subject to the provisions of this Regulation with respect to the finding of appeal or revision as the case may be, the same effect as a decree of a Civil Court of ultimate jurisdiction, and be enforced by the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, as a decree of such Court.

**10. Restriction on jurisdiction of Civil Courts.**— No Civil Court shall have Jurisdiction to call in question the legality of anything done or purported to be done in respect of any matter, the cause of action whereof has arisen in the Tribal Area.

**11. Criminal references to Council of Elders.**— (1) Whenever an offence, of which the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer is competent to take cognizance under this Regulation, is committed, the case shall be registered and the accused shall be produced before the Assistant Political Agent concerned within twenty four hours of the arrest of the accused excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Assistant Political Agent having jurisdiction. The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer as the case may be, shall make an order in writing referring the question for finding of guilt or innocence of any person or persons accused of any offence or offences, to the Council of Elders for its findings who after holding necessary inquiry and hearing the parties and witnesses, submit its findings to the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer as the case may be. The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall appoint the members of the Council of Elders within ten days from the date of arrest of the accused and shall require the Council of Elders to submit its findings on the question referred to within ninety days.

(2) Where a reference to the Council of Elders is made under sub section (1) and the members of the Council have been nominated by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, the names of the members so nominated be communicated to the accused and the complainant, and any objection taken thereto by any of the parties, shall be recorded. The Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall dispose of the objections after hearing the parties and the reasons thereof be recorded and appoint the members of the Council accordingly.

(3) On receipt of the findings of the Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by recording his reasons may,-

- (a) pass an order in accordance with the findings of the majority of the Council of Elders; or
- (b) remand the case to the Council of Elders for further inquiry and findings.

(4) No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once.”

**8. Insertion of sections 11A and 11B, Regulation III of 1901.**- In the said Regulation, after section 11, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:-

**“11A. Bail.**- (1) Where any person accused of non-bailable offence is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he may be released on bail,. However, he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for ten years:

Provided that the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail:

Provided further that a person accused of an offence as aforesaid shall not be released on bail unless the complainant has been given notice to show cause why he should not be so released.

(2) If it appears to the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused may, pending such inquiry be released on bail with or without sureties for his appearance.

(3) The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall record his reasons in writing for so doing.

(4) Nothing herein shall be deemed to authorize the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, to release on bail any person accused of non-bailable offence not in custody or not produced before him.

(5) The FATA Tribunal, Appellate Authority, or in case of a person released on bail by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may cause any person who has been released under this section, to be re-arrested and may be committed to custody by an order recording reasons for so doing.

**11B. Reference by Qaumi Jirga in exceptional cases.**- The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may take cognizance of any offence or civil dispute in exceptional circumstances, if so recommended by a Qaumi Jirga of the Tribe in the interest of justice and public peace.”.

**9. Substitution of sections 12 and 13, Regulation III of 1901.**- In the said Regulation, for sections 12 and 13 the following shall be substituted, namely:-

**“12. Punishment on conviction on findings of Council.**- Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, convicts a person under clause (9) of sub-section (3) he may pass sentence of imprisonment or fine or both for the offence, provided that the sentence shall not exceed fourteen years.

**13. Manner of enforcing sentences.**- Any sentence passed under section 12 shall be executed in the manner provided for the execution of sentences in Chapter XXVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898); and-



- (a) an offence punishable with imprisonment for life shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years;
- (b) the imprisonment in default of payment of fine shall be simple and the provisions of sections 63 to 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) shall, subject to aforesaid provisions, apply to sentences passed under this Regulation; and
- (c) the sentence of imprisonment and fine provided by the Pakistan Penal Code or any other law specified in the Second Schedule to this Regulation for the offence shall (1860 XLV of 1860) be applicable to such offence committed in Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”.

**10. Omission of sections 14,15,16,17 and 18, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, sections 14,15,16,17 and 18 shall be omitted.

**11. Substitution of sections 19 to 32, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 19 to 32 the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“19. Record of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer.**— (1) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, passes any sentence of imprisonment or fine or both, he shall maintain a complete record of the case and record his reasons for passing the sentence.

(2) The record shall be made by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and the Council of Elders in Urdu, English or Pushto.

**20. Attendance of parties and witnesses before Political Agent or District Coordination Officer or Council of Elders.**— Where a reference is made to a Council of Elders, the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may exercise all or any of the powers conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act V of 1908) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Act V of 1898) respectively, as the case may be, for the purpose of compelling the attendance, before himself or the Council of Elders or Joint Council of Elders, of the parties, and witnesses, or any of them, in any case and at any stage of the proceedings.

**21. Blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribe.**— In the event of any tribe of Federally Administered Tribal Areas or any section of the tribe or any member of the tribe, acting in hostile, subversive or offensive manner towards the State or to any person residing within the settled area of Pakistan, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by an order in writing may direct,—

- (a) the arrest of hostile members of such tribe wherever they may be, and the attachment of the property both movable and immovable wherever it may be found, belonging to them or any of them;
- (b) the detention in safe custody of any person so arrested or property so attached; and
- (c) debar all or any such member of the tribe from access into the settled area of Pakistan by public proclamation:

Provided that the above-mentioned actions shall be taken against plareena of the accused in the first instance, and if the circumstances so warrant, then any or all of the following actions may be taken by a well-reasoned order in writing against,-

- (i) the sub-section of the tribe of the accused;
- (ii) the section of the tribe of the accused;
- (iii) any other section of the tribe of the accused,

Provided further that the confiscation of the property so attached shall be made after public proclamation and holding necessary inquiry.:

Provided also that women, children less than sixteen years of age persons over sixty-five years of age shall not be arrested and detained under this section.

**Explanation:—***Plareena* as mentioned in first proviso includes the male descendants of the paternal grandfather of the accused.

**22. Fines on communities accessory to crime.—**(1) Where, from the circumstances of any case, there appears to be good reason to believe that the inhabitants of any village, or part of a village, or any of them, have -

- (a) connived at, or in any way abetted, the commission of any offence; or
- (b) failed to render any assistance in their power to discover the offenders or to effect their arrest;
- (c) connived at the escape of, or harbored, any offender or person suspected of having taken part in the commission of any offence; or
- (d) combined to suppress material evidence of the commission of an offence;

the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, impose a fine on the inhabitants of such village or part of a village, or any of them as a whole:

Provided that women, children less than sixteen years of age and persons over sixty-five years of age shall not be arrested and detained under this section.

**Explanation.-** (2) Nothing contained hearing shall be construed to debar the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, to take any appropriate action against the personnel entrusted with watch and ward duties in the particular locality in accordance with *Rewaj*.

**23. Fines on communities where murder or culpable homicide is committed or attempted.—**Where, within the area occupied by a village community or part of a village-community, a person is found dangerously or fatally wounded, or the body is found of a person believed to have been killed, the members of the village community or part thereof shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 22, unless the elders of the village-community or part thereof show that the members thereof -

- (a) had not found an opportunity of preventing the offence or arresting the offender; or
- (b) have used all reasonable means to bring the offender to justice.

**24. Recovery of fines.—**Fines imposed under section 22 shall, in default of payment, be recoverable as if they were arrears of land revenue due by the members of the community or part thereof upon whom the fine is imposed.

**25. Forfeiture of remissions of revenue etc. in the case of communities and persons accessory to**

**crime.**— Where a village-community or part of a village-community has become liable to fine under section 22, it shall further be liable to forfeit, in whole or in part and for a term or in perpetuity, any remission of land revenue of which it may be in joint enjoyment, and the members of the village-community or part thereof, as the case may be, shall in like manner be liable severally to forfeit any assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance paid out of public funds which they, or any of them, may enjoy.

**26. Forfeiture of public emoluments etc., of persons guilty of serious offences or of conniving at crime.**— Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, that any person who is in the enjoyment of an assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance payable out of public funds, has been guilty of a serious offence, or has colluded with or harboured any criminal, or has suppressed material evidence of the commission of any offence, or has failed, on the investigation of any criminal case, to render loyal and proper assistance to the authorities, to the best of his ability, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may in addition to any other penalty to which such person may be liable under any law for the time being in force, direct the forfeiture, in whole or in part and for a term or in perpetuity, of such assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance, as the case may be:

**Explanation.**— For the purposes of this section the expression “serious offence” means any offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or more.

**27. Powers to direct forfeiture.**— Forfeiture under section 25 or section 26 may be adjudged by order of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, for a term which may extend to three years, and by order of the Governor or any officer authorized by him for any longer term or in perpetuity.

**28. Powers of Governor saved.**— Nothing contained in sections 25, 26 and 27 shall affect the powers of the Governor with respect to the grant, continuance or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of any assignment or remission of land-revenue or of any allowance paid out of public funds.

**29. Preparation to commit certain offences.**— Where a person is found carrying arms in such manner or in such circumstances as to afford just grounds of suspicion that the arms are being carried by him with intent to use them for an unlawful purpose, and that person has taken precautions to elude observation or evade arrest, he shall be taken in custody and be tried as provided in section 11 and if found guilty, may be punished with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees and the arms carried by him be confiscated and in case of habitual offender or previous convict, he may be punished with imprisonment with extend to two years or with fine which may extend to rupees ten thousand and the arms carried may be confiscated.

**30. Adultery.**—(1) A married woman who, knowingly and by her own consent, has sexual intercourse with any man who is not her husband, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.

(2) Cognizance shall not be taken of an offence under this section unless a complaint has been made by the husband of the woman, or, in his absence, by a person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when the offence was committed.

**31. Power to prohibit erection of new villages or towers on frontier.**— (1) No new hamlet, village-habitation, tower or walled enclosure shall, without the previous sanction in writing of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, who may either grant or refuse such sanction as he thinks fit, be erected at any place within one hundred and twenty yards from the

center of the road.

(2) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, refuses to sanction the erection of any such hamlet, village-habitation, tower or walled enclosure, as the case may be, he shall record his reasons in writing for so doing.

**32. Power to direct removal of villages.**— Where it is expedient on military grounds, the Federal Government may, by order in writing, direct the removal of any village situated in close proximity to the frontiers of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to any other suitable site, and award to the inhabitants such compensation for any loss which may have been occasioned to them by the removal of their village as, in the opinion of the Federal Government, is just and adequate.”.

**12. Omission of section 33, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 33 shall be omitted.

**13. Substitution of section 34, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for section 34 the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“34. Attachment or disposal of buildings used by robber, etc.**— (1) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that any building is habitually used as a meeting place by robbers, house-breakers, thieves, receivers of stolen properties, protectors or harbourers of thieves or their abettors, habitual offenders who commit or attempt to commit, or abet the commission of the offences of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating, mischief, car-lifting, offences involving breach of peace, or by desperate and dangerous criminals or for the purpose of gambling, he may, by order in writing, direct the arrest of such persons and prohibit the owner or occupier thereof from so using such building, and, if the order is not obeyed, he may, by a like order, direct that the building be attached in favour of Government of Pakistan, and where such attachment is not feasible, then the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may pass an order of the disposal of the building if the *Jirga* of the Tribe expresses its inability to effect surrender of the accused to the Administration. Such further order shall be without prejudice to any punishment to which the offenders or owner or occupier of such building may, under any law for the time being in force, be liable for disobedience of the prohibitory order.

(2) No person shall be entitled to any compensation in respect of the disposal of any building under sub-section (1).”.

**14. Omission of section 35, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 35 shall be omitted.

**15. Substitution of sections 36 to 40, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 36 to 40 the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“36. Power to require persons to remove in certain cases.**— Where, in the opinion of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, any person,—

- (a) is dangerously fanatic; or
- (b) belongs to a frontier tribe and has no ostensible means of subsistence or can not give a satisfactory account of himself; or
- (c) has a blood-feud; or

(d) has occasioned cause of quarrel likely to lead to blood-shed;

the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may by order in writing, require him to reside beyond the limits of the territories to which this Regulation extends, or at such place within the said territories as may be specified in the order:

Provided that, if the person has a fixed habitation in the place which the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, requires him to leave, an order under this section may not be made without the recommendations of Council of Elders.

**37. Penalty for breach of certain orders.**— Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 31, or disobeys an order under section 21 or section 32, or a prohibition under section 34, or a requisition under section 36, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.

**38. Powers of arrest.**— In any place in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force—

- (i) any private person may, without an order from a local administration and without a warrant, arrest or cause to be arrested, and make over or cause to be made over to Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, or take or cause to be taken to the nearest notified post of the local administration, any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned; and
- (ii) section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), shall, mutatis mutandis apply to Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

**39. Arrest without warrant in cases under section 496A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860).**—

(1). Where there is reason to believe that a person has committed or attempted to commit an offence punishable under section 496A of the Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), an officer of the Law Enforcement Agencies, under the command of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest that person on the requisition of the husband of the woman, or, in his absence of a person having the care of her on his behalf, or, in the absence of both the husband and any such person as laws aforesaid from the village in which the woman resides, on the requisition of a head man of the village.

(2). An officer of law Enforcement Agencies, under the command of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, making an arrest under sub-section (1) shall, without unnecessary delay, take or send the person arrested to the nearest Magistrate having jurisdiction.

(3). The Magistrate may in default of bail being furnished to his satisfaction, detain the person arrested for such period, not exceeding fourteen days, as may be necessary to enable the husband, or, his absence, a person who had care of the woman on his behalf, to make a complaint.

**40. Security for keeping the peace.**— (1) Where any person, who is likely to do any wrongful act or commit any offence, which may cause breach of peace or disturb the public tranquility, is produced before the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he may require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties for good behaviour and keeping the peace for a period not exceeding two years.

(2) The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall hold necessary inquiry as nearly as may be practicable, into the truth of the information upon which such action has been taken, in accordance with sub-section (2) of 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898).

(3) Pending completion of such inquiry, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for preventing the breach of peace or commission of any offence, direct the person to execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping the peace and maintaining good behaviour failing which he may be detained until such bond is executed or, in default of execution of bond, until the inquiry is concluded within a period of thirty days.

(4) After holding such inquiry, as provided above, if it is proved that there is an apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may pass an order directing such person to execute the bond with or without sureties for his good behaviour and for keeping peace and tranquility for a period not exceeding two years failing which he may be detained. In case it is not proved that there is any apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall release such person if in custody, and if not in custody shall discharge him.

(5) Where a person has been convicted of the offences as mentioned in section 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898), for the offences under the laws mentioned in the Second Schedule he may be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties for his good behaviour and for keeping the peace. If the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the bond so executed shall become void.

(6) Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is of the opinion that sufficient grounds exist for making an order under sub-section, (4) he may, by order in writing, direct that the person concerned after his release shall notify his residence and any change of his residence in the manner prescribed in section 565 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for a term not exceeding two years.”

**16. Insertion of section 40A, Regulation III of 1901.**- In the said Regulation, after section 40, the following new section shall be inserted, namely:-

**“40A. Arrest by authorities other than Political Agents etc.**- Whenever a person is arrested by the authorities other than the Political Agents, District Coordination Officers or their subordinate staff and is produced before the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, he shall immediately inform the Governor or an Officer authorized by him and the Chairman FATA Tribunal about the production of such person before him and thereafter shall proceed against him in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation and the circumstances of the case.”

**17. Substitution of sections 41 to 45, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 41 to 45 the following shall be substituted, namely:-

**“41. Security from families or factions in case of blood-feud.**— Where a blood-feud or other cause of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed exists, or, in the opinion of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is likely to arise between two families or factions or tribes, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, after holding an inquiry as hereinafter provided, order all or any of the members of both families or factions or tribes or of

either family or faction or tribe to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for their good behavior and keeping the peace, during such period, not exceeding two years as he may fix.

**42. Procedure in inquiry.**— Where the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, holds an inquiry under this Regulation, he shall follow the procedure as prescribed in section 117 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), as nearly as may be practicable. The record of the inquiry proceedings shall be maintained and such inquiry shall be concluded within thirty days.

**43. Breach of bond.**— (1) A bond executed under section 40 shall be liable to be forfeited if the person bound thereby to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, as the case may be, commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, any offence punishable with imprisonment or fine or both.

(2) A bond executed under section 41 shall be liable to be forfeited, if the person or persons bound thereby to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, as the case may be, commit or attempt to commit, or abet the commission of, any offence punishable with imprisonment in respect of any member of the opposite family or faction or tribe to which the bond related.

(3) If, while a bond executed under section 41 is in force, the life of any member of either family or faction or tribe is taken or attempted to be taken, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may declare the bond of all or any of the members of the other family or faction or tribe and their sureties if any, to be forfeited, unless it is shown to his satisfaction that the homicide or attempt was not committed by, or in consequence of the abetment of, any member of that family or faction or tribe.

(4) The procedure as provided in Chapter XLII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898), shall be followed for the forfeiture of the bond under this Regulation.

**44. Imprisonment in default of security.**— (1) Where a person ordered to give security under section 40 or section 41, does not give security on or before the date on which the period for which the security is to be given commences or in cases of forfeiture of bond, he shall be committed to prison or, if he is already in prison, be detained in prison until the period for which the security was required, expires, or until within such period he or they furnish the required security bond to the satisfaction of the Court.

(2) Imprisonment for failure to give security under this Chapter may be simple or as the offence requiring the security directs in each case.

**45. Length of imprisonment.**— Where a person has suffered imprisonment for two years for failure to give security under section 40 or section 41, he shall be released forthwith, provided where the person in the opinion of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, is habitual or desperate or hardened criminal or the grounds on which he was detained have not ceased, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may proceed afresh under the provisions of this Chapter for passing a fresh order and reasons thereof be recorded.”.

**18. Omission of section 46, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 46 shall be omitted.

**19. Substitution of sections 47 and 48, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 47 and 48 the following shall be substituted, namely:—



**“47. Modified applications of Chapters VIII and XLII, Act V of 1898.**— Where, within the territories in which all or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for the time being in force, it is found necessary or expedient to take security under this Regulation from the inhabitants of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas against whom all or any of the provisions of section 40 to 45 may for the time being in force, the provisions of Chapters VIII and XLII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall be read as if for the words “High Court”, “Court of Session” and “Sessions Judge” wherever they occur, the words “FATA Tribunal and the Appellate Authority” be substituted, and all references to any such Court shall be deemed to refer to FATA Tribunal or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be.

**48. Appeal.**— An appeal shall lie to the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner if authorized so by the Governor, within thirty days from the date of any decision given, decree or sentence passed, or order made by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, under this Regulation, ”.

**20. Omission of section 49, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 49 shall be omitted.

**21. Substitution of sections 50 to 55, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 50 to 55 the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“50. Powers in exercise of criminal appellate jurisdiction.**— The Appellate Authority may, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in any criminal proceedings, exercise the powers to direct tender of pardon conferred by section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and any of the powers conferred on an Appellate Court by sections 195, 405 to 410, 422, 423, 426 to 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), and may also enhance any sentence after issuance of show cause notice to the convict:

Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to authorize the Appellate Authority to set aside the findings on any question of fact of a Council of Elders, where such findings has been accepted by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, unless it is of the opinion that there has been a material irregularity or defect in the proceedings or that the proceedings have been so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of justice. The Appellate Authority shall dispose of the appeal within sixty days.

**51. Sentences which may not be passed on appeal.**— No sentence shall be passed by the Appellate Authority in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction which the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, could not have passed under this Regulation.

**52. Powers in exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction.**— The Appellate Authority may on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the decision, decree or order appealed against or remand the case:

Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to authorize the Appellate Authority to vary or set aside any decision, decree or order given, passed or made in any civil proceedings under this Regulation, unless it is of the opinion that there has been a material irregularity or defect in the proceedings or that the proceedings have been so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of justice or that the decision, decree or order is contrary to good conscience or public policy.

**53. Record of reasons.**— Where the Appellate Authority, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in any proceedings under this Regulation, varies or sets aside or confirms any decision, decree,



sentence or order, it shall record its reasons for so doing.

**54. Bar of review of order passed by the Appellate Authority, Political Agent or District Coordination Officer.**— The Appellate Authority, Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall not review any decision, decree, sentence or order given, passed or made by itself.

**55. Enforcement of orders made on appeal.**— Every decision given, judgment and decree passed or order made by the Appellate Authority in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be enforced as if it was a judgment, decree or an order of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, and the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall do all acts and things necessary to give effect thereto.”.

**22. Substitution of section 55A, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for section 55A the following shall be substituted, namely:—

“**55A.** (1) A revision shall lie to the FATA Tribunal within ninety days against any decision given, judgment, decree or sentence passed or order made by the Appellate Authority under this Regulation.

(2) FATA Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman, being a person who has been a civil servant of not less than BPS-21 having experience of Tribal Administration and two other members, out of whom one shall be a person who is qualified to be appointed as Judge of the High Court, well conversant with *Rewaj*, and the other who has been a civil servant of not less than BPS-20 having experience of Tribal Administration.

(3) The Chairman and the members shall be appointed by the Governor on such terms and conditions as he may determine for a period of three years or during the pleasure of the Governor.

(4) The Tribunal shall have the same powers with which the Appellate Authority has been invested under sections 50 and 52 of this Regulation and may also call for the record of any proceedings or case from the subordinate forum and revise any decision, decree, sentence or order given, passed or made under this Regulation. The Tribunal may whenever it thinks proper, direct-

- (a) that a person within limits of its jurisdiction be brought up before the tribunal to be dealt with according to law;
- (b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits be set at liberty;
- (c) that a person detained in any jail situated within such limits be brought before the tribunal to be there examined as a witness in any matter pending or to be inquired into such tribunal; and
- (d) that a prisoner within such limits be removed from a custody to another for purpose of trial.

(5) The tribunal may from time to time, frame rules to regulate the procedure in such cases.”.

**23. Insertion of sections 55AA and 55AAA, Regulation III of 1901.**- In the said Regulation, after section 55A, substituted as aforesaid, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:-

“**55AA. Review.**— The FATA Tribunal may, on an application of any person, filed within thirty days,

considering himself aggrieved of any decision given, judgment and decree passed or order made by it, review the same to correct any mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient ground and shall record reasons thereof.

**55AAA. False Prosecutions,-**(1) Where the Political Agent or the District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, finds that the accusation against the accused was false or malicious, he may call upon the complainant or the informant to show cause why he should not pay adequate compensation to such accused or, where there are more than one, to each or any of such accused, after considering any cause which such complainant or informant may show, and on the satisfaction of the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, was false and malicious, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, order the complainant or Informant to pay adequate compensation to such accused or each of any of such accused keeping in view the nature of accusation and quantum of sentence of offence with which he was falsely or maliciously charged and in default of payment of compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment which may extend to six months.

(2) In any civil matter the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, finds that any claim or defence of any party to be false, frivolous or vexatious, he may direct to pay the cost of litigation and also grant compensatory costs corresponding to the false claim or defence, as the case may be.”.

**24. Substitution of sections 56,57 and 58, Regulation III of 1901.-** In the said Regulation, for sections 56,57 and 58 the following shall be substituted, namely:-

**“56. Protection of Property Rights.-** No person shall be compulsorily deprived of his property unless he is paid adequate compensation with consensus rate or Government assessed value as in vogue in settled areas.

**57. Power of Political Agent or District Coordination Officer to order disposal of certain fines.-** (1) The Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may make such order in writing for the disposal of any fine imposed under sections 12 and 22, deposited in Agency Welfare Fund to be regulated by the rules to be framed under section 62.

(2) Where, in pursuance of an order made under sub-section (1), a person has received compensation for an injury out of the proceeds of a fine, no Civil Court shall take cognizance of a claim to compensation based on the same injury.

**58. Maintenance of register.-** (1) Registers shall be kept and maintained, in forms to be approved by the Governor, of all cases dealt with by the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority and the FATA Tribunal under this Regulation.

(2) The record of all sums received as fines under this Regulation and disbursed by the Political Agent or the District Coordinating Officer, as the case may be, shall be maintained and accounted for, which shall be audited annually. The auditing authority, audit mechanism and such other modalities to be determined in the rules to be framed under section 62”.

**25. Insertion of section 58A, Regulation III of 1901.-** In the said Regulation, after section 58 the following new section shall be inserted, namely:-

**“58A. Jail Inspection.-** FATA Tribunal, the Appellate Authority and the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, shall visit the jails where the tribal convicts or detainees have been kept twice a year.”.

**26. Omission of section 59, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 59 shall be omitted.

**27. Substitution of sections 60 to 62, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for sections 60 to 62 the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“60. Finality of proceedings under this Regulation.**— Except as otherwise provided in this Regulation, no decision made, judgment, decree or sentence passed or order made or act done, under Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V or Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, (Act V of 1898), shall be called in question in, or set aside by, any civil or criminal court.

**61. Application of provisions of the Limitation Act of 1908.**— Unless otherwise provided in this Regulation, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), for filing an appeal, revision and review before the Appellate Authority or the FATA Tribunal shall, mutatis mutandis, apply under this Regulation.

**62. Power to make rules.**— The Governor may make rules to carry out the purposes and objects of this Regulation.”.

**28. Insertion of section 62A, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, after section 62, the following new section shall be inserted, namely:—

**“62A. Power to make rules for the issue and safe custody of rifles and ammunition and for the imposition and recovery of fines.**— (1) The Federal Government may make rules for the issue and safe custody of rifles and ammunition for border village defence, and for the imposition and recovery of fines for any breach of such rules.

(2) Fines imposed for a breach of the rules made under this section may be recovered in the manner laid down in section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898).”.

**29. Substitution of section 63, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for section 63, the following shall be substituted, namely:—

**“63. Indemnity.**— No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything done or intended to be done in good faith under this Regulation.”.

**30. Omission of section 64, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, section 64 shall be omitted.

**31. Substitution of First, Second and Third Schedules, Regulation III of 1901.**— In the said Regulation, for the First, Second and Third Schedules the following shall be respectively substituted, namely:—

## **"THE FIRST SCHEDULE [see section 4(3)]**

### **PART I ----- Powers and Functions with which Assistant Political Agents may be vested by Political Agent or District Coordination Officer.**

- (a) All or any of the powers and functions of a Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be; and

- (b) without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing clause, with the-
  - (i) power to make orders of reference to Council of Elders under section 8 (1);
  - (ii) power to appoint the members of Council of Elder with the consent of parties under section 8(2) when an order of reference to a Council of Elders is made under section 8(1);
  - (iii) power to nominate the members of the Council of Elders when an order of reference to a Council of Elders is made under section 11(1);
  - (iv) power to consider and dispose of objections made by the accused or the complainant to the nomination of the members, and after the disposal of the objections, appoint the members of Council of Elders under section 11(2) and
  - (v) power to take surety bond under section 40.

**PART II ----- Powers and Functions with which Magistrates may be invested by the Governor**

- (a) power to appoint the members of a Council of Elders with the consent of parties where an order of reference to a Council of Elders is made under section 8(1);
- (b) power to nominate the members of the Council of Elders when an order of reference to a Council of Elders is made under section 11(1); and
- (c) power to consider and dispose of objections made by an accused or the complainant to the nomination of the members, and after disposal of the objections, appoint the members of Council of Elders under section 11(2).

**THE SECOND SCHEDULE**  
**[see section 3(3), 13(c) and 40(5)]**

1. Any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, namely sections 121, 121-A, 122, 123, 124-A, 125, 126, 127, 131, 144, 148, 150, 193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 211, 212, 216, 216-A, 295-B, 302, 304, 307, 308, 324, 325, 326, 328, 354, 363, 364, 365, 365A, 366, 367, 368, 369, 376, 377, 379, 380, 381, 382, 386, 387, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 411, 412, 413, 414, 427, 428, 429, 435, 436, 440, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 489-B, 489-C, 494, 495 and 496A.
2. Any offence punishable under section 29 and 30 of this Regulation.
3. Any offence punishable under any of the provisions of the Custom Act, 1969 (Act No. IV of 1969).
4. Any offence punishable under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 (President's Order No. 4 of 1979).
5. Any offence punishable under any of the provisions of the Employment of Children Act, 1991 (V of 1991).
6. Any offence punishable under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997).
7. Abetment of any of the offences aforesaid.
8. Attempt to commit any of the offences aforesaid which are not themselves expressed to be attempts to commit offences.

**THE THIRD SCHEDULE**  
**[see section 1(3)]**

Federally Administrated Tribal Areas include;

- (i) Tribal Area, adjoining Peshawar District;
- (ii) Tribal Areas adjoining Kohat District;
- (iii) Tribal Areas adjoining Bannu District;
- (iv) Tribal Areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan District;
- (v) Tribal Areas adjoining Lakki Marwat District;
- (vi) Tribal Areas adjoining Tank District;
- (vii) Bajaur Agency;
- (viii) Orakzai Agency;
- (ix) Mohmand Agency;
- (x) Khyber Agency;
- (xi) Kurram Agency;
- (xii) North Waziristan Agency;
- (xiii) South Waziristan Agency.”.




**15-08-2011**

**Sd/-**  
**Asif Ali Zardari**  
**President**




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
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
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